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PREFACE 
American government has always emphasised its role in 
the establishment of the State of Israel. It has vehemently 
expressed its moral commitment to the Jewish survivors of the 
Nazi Holocaust. America became Israel's main ally after June 
1967 War. During this period of time the Soviet Union and 
many Arab states started coming closer to each other and this 
turn of events made America to realize a need of a deeper 
involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. 
The defeat of Arab states in the June 1967 War, made the 
Palestinians realise that they had to carry on the struggle on 
their own. In the mean time the US government pledged not to 
recognise or negotiate with the PLO until the organisation 
officially accepted the UN Security Council Resolution 242. The 
United States changed its policy toward the PLO in 1988 after 
the PLO had expressed its willingness to accept a small 
Palestinian state living in peace alongside Israel. 
The US diplomacy has been a major force behind all peace 
negotiations to reach a settlement in West Asia. However, the 
US intervention in the region has been seen as biased and in 
favour of Israel. America continued to find strategic relevance 
of Israel even after the disintegration of the USSR and the end 
of the Cold War. The proactive role of the US in the peace 
process seemed vital for strategic interests of the US in the 
region. Therefore, America continued to support Israel and its 
security at the expense of its neighbour's costs. 
Theoretical Frame work 
There have been frequent and persistent conflicts 
throughout history of nations. Contemporary international 
politics is concerned with conflicts and peacemaking. Conflicts 
have caused at different levels such as inter-personal, inter-
group or inter-state disagreements. It is also caused by a clash 
of cultures, ideological differences, interests or communal 
hatred. A conflict situation usually arises between parties who 
perceive that they possess mutually incompatible objectives. 
International conflict is undoubtedly one of the most crucial of 
all the forms of conflicts, because it could threaten the very 
existence of the whole international system. In the light of 
various types of conflict there are various theoretical 
approaches to the understanding of conflict and peacemaking. 
Conflict management and resolution means the 
transformation of relationship between conflicting parties by 
bringing a problem in a form of solution. More often, the term 
peacemaking is associated with conflict resolution without the 
use of violence. Peace can also be seen as the coexistence of 
different cultures and societies to be obtained by improved 
communication with others, common understanding and ability 
to tolerate with one another. Since violent conflicts are 
dreadfully destructive and costly, peaceful settlement is the 
best option to handle them. The most obvious form of violence 
is an act to do physical harm to other people. In peaceful 
settlement, importance is placed on refraining from threat or 
use of force. Jacob Bercovitch has identified three methods of 
conflict resolution: violence and coercion; bargaining and 
vi 
negotiation; the involvement of third parties in mediation or 
arbitration or good offices.' 
Numerous examples of third party assisted negotiations 
exist in both modern and ancient social settings. The main tools 
of a third party to intervene in a conflict are through mediation, 
facilitation and arbitration. Through mediation the third party 
aids the disputants in reaching an agreement. The function of a 
mediator is to attempt to establish, or re-establish, sufficiently 
good communications between conflicting parties, so that they 
can talk sensibly to each other. It suggests solutions without 
any decision making power. Through negotiations, the 
disputants voluntarily abdicate their own decision making 
power in favour of the arbitrator. 
Mediation is not aimed at helping one party but to bring 
about mutual agreements. It has been widely seen as an 
alternative to the violence.2 In principle third party keep 
confidentiality in delivering intentions, bring the reassurance of 
mutual sincerity, and do not advocate particular outcomes. 
Since the goal is not to help one party win, the process is 
geared toward encouraging the parties to accept compromised 
solutions. The trust of both parties can be gained by the 
impartiality of an intermediary. Maintaining an attitude of 
impartiality throughout is expected to ensure that all parties 
show confidence in the process. Neutrality can be achieved by 
not taking sides. However, being neutral does not necessarily 
means a lack of care or interest in the fair outcome. 
Good offices can be used if the conflicting parties wanted 
to avoid direct contact despite the need to resolve serious 
1 hrob Bercov itch (1984 , Sobal Conflicts and I hird Parties, Colorad a: Westview Press, p.1. 
Ho—Won Jeong(2000, Peace and Conflict Studies, Burli-'gton Ashge±e, p. 130_ 
disputes. Various types of peaceful settlements can be found 
through history. Chapter VI of the UN Charter calls for peaceful 
settlement of disputes through the use of a wide range of 
methods, including negotiations, enquiry, mediation, 
conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement.3 
In international mediation, a third party can be a national 
government, international organisations, or private 
intermediaries. Ideally third parties should not have a direct 
interest in the disputed issues. However, the involvement of 
the United States in West Asia peacemaking seemed to drive 
from the influence of domestic constituencies and geo-strategic 
interests. The US as a third party has been immensely involved 
in a series of mediation and facilitation through its good offices, 
assisting the conflicting parties to reach an agreement in this 
conflict. Despite numerous drawbacks, the US seems to be in a 
stronger position to facilitate the peace process than any other 
third party involvement. Moreover, the parameters involving 
peacemaking and its strategic interests in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict are momentous in the field of conflict and 
peacemaking. 
After the failure of the Camp David talks, both the Israelis 
and Palestinians lost their faith about the prospects of the Oslo 
Peace Process. Consequently, under different and much more 
complicated circumstances, the conflict had arisen to a new 
height of bloodshed and destruction in the form of the al-Aqsa 
intifada. The outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada which started on 
28 September 2000 brought a new phase in the history of 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The threat perception of Israel has 
UN Charter VI Pacific Settlement of Disputes, (Online: web) Accessed on 18 October 2007 
___ -www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter6.htm. 
been drastically intensified when range of Palestinian militants 
carried out wide-ranging acts of extremism in the form of 
suicide bombing. As the aI-Agsa intifada was raging, the US 
alleged that Palestinian organisations were engaged in an 
organised, systematic, and deliberate campaign of terror, 
aimed at inflicting casualties upon the Israeli population. It 
demanded the PA to dismantle terrorist infrastructures and 
threatened to cut off aid to the Palestinians. 
Palestinians further demonstrated their frustration at the 
lack of progress in the peace process and their failure to 
achieve statehood. There were several incidents of suicide 
attacks primarily targeting civilians in busy streets, cafes and 
hotels. In response, the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) adopted a 
wide range of deliberate and coercive counter measures to 
curb Palestinian militancy. Since 29 September 2000, Israeli 
Defence Forces and the Palestinians have been engaged in 
violent confrontation. 
The resumption of violent conflict brought the most fragile 
peace related activities to a virtual standstill. The demise of the 
Oslo Process was seen as the failure of the peace movement in 
its entirety. The Occupation of Palestinian territories, with 
Israeli settlement constructions and colonial policing 
undermined not only the future Palestinian state but also 
Israel's democratic ideals. The IDF inflicted severe damage on 
Palestinian governmental and civilian infrastructures but far 
worse was the damage done to the idea of a "partner". 
The existence of the extremist elements amongst both the 
Israelis and Palestinian cast shadow on the mediation efforts by 
the US and thwarted the peace process. Thus a peaceful 
settlement remained a far cry. The al-Aqsa intifada was a 
reaction to the Israeli and American attempts to impose 
unacceptable permanent-status settlement on the Palestinians 
and force them to concede on two major issues: Jerusalem 
(including control of Haram al-Sharif) and Refugee-problem. 
The unequivocal Palestinian rejection of the American 
proposals at Camp David in July 2000 upset Clinton's 
calculations. The positions of the Israelis and Palestinians on 
the key issues reflected wide difference. 
Judging the developments and sequence of events at the 
face value one may, however, notice that over more than the 
last two decades, no third party has been as involved as the 
United States in Palestinian-Israeli peace process. Therefore, a 
comprehensive study of the US peace initiatives with detailed 
analysis on its dynamics and constraints seemed significant. 
The US peacemaking parameters and at the same time its 
strategic interests in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are 
momentous in the field of peacemaking and conflict 
management and are worth examination in depth. 
It is in the context that the present study critically examines 
the genesis of Arab-Israeli conflict and also various US policy 
initiatives, taken by the US President Bill Clinton during his two 
terms in office, especially in 2000 such as: 
1. Camp David Talks, 11 July 2000. 
2. Sharm al-Shaykh Summit, 16 October 200 
3. Bill Clinton Proposals, 23 December 2000 
The methodology followed in the study is both analytical 
and 	descriptive. 	To be 	able 	to get reliable and objective 
information, the study relied both on Primary and Secondary 
sources. The primary sources included documents published by 
the governments and the US Congress and international 
organisations. The secondary sources included journals and 
research reports related to the area of study, books, electronic 
media, periodicals, journals and the reports of News papers 
etc. 
The study falls into six chapters including the concluding 
chapter. Chapter one discusses 'Genesis of Arab-Israeli Peace 
Process and the U.S. A Brief Historical Account' - It gives a 
concise historical background of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
focussing on Palestine and its people, Zionist movement, and 
the British rule over the Palestine. It also presents an over view 
of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process with special reference 
to the role of the United States. 
Chapter two 'Madrid Conference and Oslo Breakthrough' 
and examines the background of various parleys leading to the 
start of the Madrid Peace Conference, Oslo I and Oslo II and 
the resultant agreements to this end. In this chapter, the 
agreement on Hebron Protocol is also examined. Failure of 
Peace Process and reasons for its limitations are generalised 
and broadly examined. 
Chapter three, 'Wye River, Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum 
and the Peace Process ' throws light on the role of the US and 
the attitude of the Israeli government after the Wye River 
Agreement. The Chapter also examines at length the 
implementation of the Wye River Agreement which led to 
Clinton's visit to Gaza. Sharm-Al Sheikh Memorandum and the 
Palestinian Political Prisoner's pathetic conditions and 
xi 
arrangements for their release find a special mention in this 
chapter. 
Chapter four 'Clinton's Peace Initiatives and the Israeli-
Palestinian Response' critically investigates the peace talks and 
many of the proposals that were undertaken during the 
President Bill Clinton's term(s) in office especially since 2000 
such as Camp David Summit through the al-Aqsa intifada for a 
comprehensive agreement for permanent status between the 
Israelis and the Palestinians. 
Chapter five 'Jewish Lobby in the US and Peace Process' 
critically analyses the role of the Jewish Lobby in the US and the 
Peace Process. The chapter also analysed the importance of 
Jewish Lobby and its all pervading influence in the US body 
politic and its far reaching impact on the US Foreign policy. 
The last and the concluding chapter VI encapsulate critical 
assessment of peace initiatives undertaken by the US 
Governments, with particular reference to the Clinton's 
Administration till his waning days in office. The chapter 
critically evaluates various issues involved in the peacemaking 
efforts towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This chapter 
sums up the findings of the research. 
To My Parents 
Late Gori Begam Sahiba 
And 
Late Nisar Mohd. Khan Sahab 
Whose lives and sacrificial love have shaped my 
vision and thoughts about peace 
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CHAPTER —1 
sraeli-Palestinian Conflict: Brief Historical Account 
..1. Introduction  
Inherent in the dynamics of the conflict between the Zionist 
novement and the Palestinian national movement are the seeds of 
)rotracted conflict, use of force, escalation cycles, and retreat of the 
veak and continuous resistance. Inherent in the dynamics too, are 
he seeds of extremism, the colonizer's war crimes, and the 
iomeland nation's violent resistance and even terrorism. 
The concern of the United States in playing an active role of the 
nediator in the Arab-Israel peace process mainly since the second 
calf of the twentieth century was largely due to its own foreign policy 
ierceptions and interests. These include security of oil supplies from 
he region, protection of Israel's security, the US-Israeli 'special 
elationship' as a strategic ally. The factors behind this relationship 
were significant in terms of diplomacy, aid, arms supply as well as 
trategic considerations. This is self evident from its location as 
lepicted in Map no.1 
2 
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The United States of America has devoted and spent tremendous 
resources in the region. Both economically and militarily, it had 
provided maximum aid to the region (mainly to Israel) than to any 
other country in the world. 
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a direct outcome of the World 
AVar II and the Holocaust, to which the Jews were subjected. The 
iecisive juncture in this conflict was the year 1948, when the Zionist 
'ovement won the war and established the State of Israel. This 
Ifilment of the Zionist aspirations came about at the expense of the 
estinian people, for whom the same date is remembered as 'al-
kba' or the catastrophe. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is among 
• most longstanding and intractable conflict in the post World War 
ra. Over the past half-century this conflict has regularly given rise 
the worst turmoil and badly affected the lives of common 
?stinians. 
During the 1948 War, some 750,000 Palestinians were 
ooted and became refugees; the Palestinians then found 
mselves divided between those who had remained in Israel and 
se who were now outside Israel.' That moment was a turning 
nt for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, fragmenting it into two 
,,sages. First was the external conflict led by the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) which, since early 1960's, fought for 
the Palestinian's right to self determination and the right of the 
refugees to return to their homes. In the late 1990's, they appeared 
to be on their way to eventual resolution with the establishment of a 
Palestinian state alongside the State of Israel. Unfortunately, the 
'Benny Morris (1989), The Birth of the Palestine Refugee Problem 19474949, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
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peace process failed to accomplish its goal. These issues are at the 
heart of Israeli-Palestinian agenda. The second passage was the 
internal conflict, which involved those Palestinians who remained 
within the State of Israel and were transformed almost literally 
overnight from a majority controlling most of the land and resources 
of an extensive territory to a small minority dispossessed of the most 
of its land, completely deprived of national rights, and broadly 
discriminated against in terms of civil rights. 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict provided a distinct opportunity to 
examine a host of concepts significant to the understanding of the 
volatile region of West Asia politics more generally. These concepts 
include national identity and self-determination, the plight of the 
Palestinian refugees, the relative importance of international 
organizations such as the United Nations in dealing with complicated 
conflicts, big power intervention, diverse forms of radicalism, and 
violent and non-violent conflict resolution. The conflict played a 
central role not only in the daily lives of the people throughout West 
Asia but also in the lives of Palestinians and Jews living outside Israel 
and the 'Occupied Territories' many of whom see their existence as 
inseparable from political developments. The Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict has shaped the lives of at least three generations of both 
Israelis and Palestinians. 
1.2. Clinton Diplomacy and its setbacks 
There was a wide spread assumption in the US that resolution if 
the conflict between the Israel and the Palestinians is an extremely 
complex issue. Despite the prevalent portrayal of the US as an honest 
broker in West Asia, American opposition to a comprehensive all 
5 
parties peace settlement between Israel and its Arab neighbours 
goes back at least a quarter century. 
President Woodrow Wilson endorsed the Balfour Declaration 
soon after its issuance in 1917and the US Congress did so in the 
1920s. Despite these and other statements the support of a Jewish 
state or homeland in Palestine, no substantial gestures of US support 
for Zionist aspirations took place until after World War II when the 
status of Palestine became a matter of considerable international 
attention. 
After World War II, United States support for a Jewish state 
grew with the desire to help settle the large number of Jewish 
refugees, displaced persons, and the survivors of the Nazi Holocaust. 
Popular support for Israel among US Jews and significant segment of 
the Christian community supplemented by a general identification 
with Israel as an advanced democratic society with strong liberal and 
humanitarian values aided in the generation of support of Israel as 
sovereign state. 
Harry S. Truman (1945 -1953) followed a "politically beneficial 
Palestine policy" as per the advice of the political advisors. President 
Harry Truman recognised Israel on 15 May 1948, within minutes after 
Israel declared its independence. He believed America's commitment 
to create the Jewish state was clear and unequivocal and that there 
must be no going back.2 
The stage was set for the contemporary Arab-Israel peace 
process by the 1967 war. Until then, the conflict between Israel and 
the Arabs had seemed almost frozen, moving neither toward 
Paul Charles Merkley (2004), American Presidents, Religion and Israel: The Heirs of Cyrus, London: Praeger 
Pub., p.724. 
resolution nor toward war. The ostensible issues in dispute were still 
those left unresolved by the Armistice agreements of 1949. During 
the 1950s and first half of the 1960s, American diplomacy advocated 
Israeli-Arab peace withIn the general working context of UN 
diplomacy. 
The US devoted remarkable energy and resources to the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process during the tenure of President Bill Clinton. 
Despite the prevalent Clinton invited Israel and Palestinian leaders to 
Camp David as part of the persistent efforts to bridge the substantial 
gaps that existed between them. The unequivocal Palestinian 
rejection of American proposals at Camp David in July 2000 upset 
Clinton's calculations. Though Clinton listened with great attention 
and understanding to the Palestinian viewpoints. The Camp David 
summit showed clearly that the peace envisioned by Palestinians was 
not peace Israel was prepared to offer. The positions of the parties 
on the key issues reflected wide divergence. Clinton avoided taking 
stand on many of the most controversial issues such as refugees, 
borders, and security, urging the parties to make a deal between 
themselves. Nevertheless Clinton's role at Camp David was 
unmistakable and both the negotiating parties seemed to have a 
degree of confidence in him. Although they were unable to resolve 
crucial differences, the Camp David established a solid basis for 
future negotiations. It created a favourable environment where each 
side for the first time got a glimpse of the other's bottom line. Camp 
David summit provided the Palestinians an opportunity to present 
their viewpoints and positions directly to the American President 
whereby the US understood the limits of the Palestinian positions. 
Despite the failure of the summit, it certainly transformed the 
character of the peace process. 
Clinton's proposals of December 2000, addressed the most 
contentious issues such as Palestinian refugees, Jerusalem, security, 
and end of the conflict. But it failed to satisfy the conditions required 
for a permanent peace. Clinton could not do much in bringing the 
sides closer for a comprehensive final status agreement. He hardly 
had three weeks from leaving his office when he met Yasser Arafat in 
January 2001. As a result, sufficient progress could not be made in 
the peacemaking. He could bring the conflicting parties to the 
threshold of peace, but at that crucial moment, the untoward 
violence that erupted in the late September 2000, destroyed much of 
what had been achieved in the previous years. Although Clinton 
declared that he was committed to reaching an agreement between 
Barak and Arafat in the waning days of his tenure, neither Barak nor 
Arafat was able to end the crisis on mutually acceptable terms. 
Consequently, Clinton's credibility as a mediator was not sufficient to 
bridge the differences. Certain factors constrained his peace 
initiatives. Pressure from the US Congress was a problem for him. 
America's Republicans controlled both the houses, and pro-Israeli 
resolutions regularly commanded near unanimous support in the 
Senate and the House of representatives. Moreover, Clinton had his 
own calculations and restrains — America's known foreign policy 
stance of supporting Israel. 
The popular American notion views Israel as a democratic 
struggling country and the only US ally in West Asia threatened by 
the fanaticism of terrorism. The Jewish lobby continues to contribute 
substantially to the existence of a special relationship between 
America and Israel. It was mostly because of the US support that 
Israel as a Jewish state could survive and extend its territories at the 
expense of the Arab neighbours. It is the American help- military, 
financial and diplomatic, which sustained Israel and indeed 
encouraged her to the extent of waging very costly wars. The US 
continued to find strategic relevance of Israel even after the 
disintegration of Soviet Union and the end of Cold War. The proactive 
role in the peace process seemed vital for constant strategic interests 
of the US in the region. 
The international consensus for peace in West Asia has involved 
the withdrawal of Israeli forces to internationally recognized (pre-
June 1967) boundaries in return for security guarantees from Israel's 
neighbours, the establishment of a Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip 
and the West Bank, shared Jerusalem as the co-capital of both states, 
and a just solution for the Palestinian refugees. 
Relations between Jews and Palestinians in Israel have not been 
the same since the al-Aqsa intifada. The fracture could not be 
mended without a security guarantee to the Israelis and the 
establishment of an independent Palestinian state. There could be no 
comprehensive solution to the Palestinian Israeli conflict without 
resolving one of its key components: the plight of Palestinian 
refugees. 
1.3. Historical Background 
The-Israeli Palestinian conflict can be best understood if one 
goes back to the early history of Palestine. The claims of the parties 
to the conflict between the Jews and the Palestinians are rooted 
deeply in the early history. Therefore, it is imperative to examine 
their respective associations with Palestine as well as the events that 
went into the making of Palestine problem before it exploded in 
1948. 
I 
Although history, particularly the Holy Bible, mentions the 
existence of several groups of people in ancient Palestine, only three 
groups play a leading role so as to have a lasting impact on it-
Canaanites, philistines, and Israelites. The Palestinians are the 
descendants of the Canaanites and the philistines; meanwhile the 
Canaanites were the earliest known inhabitants of Palestine and are 
thought to have settled there after 3000 B.C. The Canaanites began 
to settle in the coastal plains along the Mediterranean Sea. They built 
villages and developed their own culture3. In the Holy Bible, the land 
is called 'the land of Canaan or the country of Canaanites' (Exodus; 
3:17). Among their cities was Salem inhabited by Jebusites tribe of 
Canaanites, and was invaded by King David the Israelite during 1000 
B.C. who renamed it Jerusalem or 'Zion the city of David.' "The 
Philistines and the Israelites came to the land of Canaan almost 
contemporaneously with each other in the later part of the second 
millennium B.C."4 According to the prevalent tradition, the common 
ancestor of the Jews and the Arabs was Abram who is also known as 
Abraham (meaning father of many nations). But the precise 
separation of the Jews from the Arabs occurred supposedly through 
the two sons of Abraham-Ishmael and Isaac. Ishmael, his first son 
born of his second wife Haggar, an Egyptian maid servant was 
specifically dispossessed of this covenant. God is quoted by Jewish 
historians as having specified that Abraham's second son Isaac born 
to his second wife, Sarah, would inherit the covenant. Nevertheless, 
Ishmael known to be the father of the Arab race was blessed and 
made fruitful. Indeed God is quoted as promising, "I will the son 
(Ishmael) of your maid servant into a nation also, because he is your 
offspring" (Genesis 21: 13). The Israelites subjugated many of the 
6 Henry Caftan (1910), Palestine the Arabs and Israel, London: Longman group, pp.2-9. 
' Henry Cattan (1988), Palestine Question, London; Croon Helm. 
native kingdoms with a systematic and perpetual invasion. These 
included the invasion of the Canaanites tribes. The Canaanites and 
the Israelites never peacefully coexisted henceforth. They were 
constantly at war with each other. However, the philistines and the 
Canaanites were never completely subdued by the Israelites or any 
other invaders who could retain control of their coastal plain along 
the Mediterranean. 
It was the Philistines who gave the modern name of Palestine. 
The rest of the country was occupied and settled by Israelites who 
established the dominion of Israel. The Israelites conquered and 
settled much of the 'Promised Land' (Canaan) under the leadership 
Of Joshua and judges, and eventually a monarchy was established 
under King Saul (1020-1004 B.C.) who unified the Jewish tribes, 
pacified the area and made Israel into a major regional force.5 He 
was succeeded by King David (1004-965 B. C.) who expanded the 
territory of Israel by military conquests. Even King David could not 
completely subdue the Philistines. In 722 B. C. the Assyrians kingdom 
overran the Northern Kingdom that ended the existence of a 
sovereign Israeli state. The Jews in the kingdom of Judah maintained 
its capital at Jerusalem until 586 B. C. but with destruction of 
'Solomon's Temple', the Southern kingdom too came to an end and 
much of the Jewish population was exiled to Babylon. 
After the destruction of Judah, A succession of people ruled 
over Palestine. In 538 B. C., Cyrus, the king of Persia conquered 
Babylon and allowed Israelites to return to their homeland (Ezra 1 
and 7: 13-26). In 332 B.C., Alexander the Great conquered Palestine. 
In 166 B.C., the Jews revolted against their rulers and established the 
Maccabean Kingdom. 
5 For more see Barnard Reich (1985), Israel land of Tradition and Conflict, London: West View Press, p.49. 
In 63 B.C., the Roman emperor Pompey Conquered Palestine 
thus ending the Maccabean rule making Palestine a Roman province 
of Judea. In 40 B.C., Herod became king of Judea. He rebuilt the 
second temple of Jerusalem. It was during his rule that Jesus Christ of 
Nazareth, the founder of Christianity was born in Bethlehem thereby 
making Palestine the 'Holy Land' of Christendom. 
The Jews revolted twice against the Romans. Titus, the Roman 
Emperor destroyed Jerusalem and the Second Temple leading to 
either death or dispersal of Jews unto the four corners of the Roman 
Empire. 
Under the Roman emperor Hadarian Jerusalem was designated 
as a Roman colony, in which Jews were forbidden either to reside or 
enter, and in an attempt to blot out Jewish identity in the land, Judah 
was renamed as Palestine, supposedly after the Philistines, an 
Aegean people6 
Since then until the middle of the nineteenth century there 
were practically no Jews in Jerusalem and only a small number lived 
in Palestine, but mainly at Tiberias and Safad. Roman Emperor 
Constantine, when converted to Christianity, issued a decree in 323 
A.D. making Christianity the religion of the Roman Empire. Palestine 
then was governed for over 200 years as part of the Eastern Roman 
Empire from Constantinople. In 638 A.D. Palestine came under 
Islamic rule.'Whether Muslim or Christian, the Palestinian shared a 
collective memory of the glories of Arab- Islamic Empire from 732 
A.D. through 1258 A. D. It was the most powerful and the advanced 
empire of its time, renowned for military conquests and brilliant 
r Rowley (198-1), n.8, p.13 
'Pamela Ann Smith (1984), Palestine and Palestinians 1876-1983, London: Croom helm, pp.38-44 
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intellectual achievements in medicine, philosophy, the arts, and 
other fields. 
But the Arab Civilization was destroyed by the Mongols who 
exercised brutal and tyrannical rule for nearly 260 years.' 
In 1517, Palestine came under the supremacy of the Turkish 
Ottoman Empire and remained within their control for four centuries 
until 1917. In 1917, Palestine was captured by the British forces and 
placed under British military administration until the period of the 
League of Nations Mandate in 1922.9 The British colonization did not 
alter or affect the character of its inhabitants, language, customs and 
culture which basically remained Arab in nature. Notwithstanding the 
long and blood stained history of wars, invasion, and conquests in 
Palestine, the original indigenous characteristics of the population 
remained unchanged until the middle of the twentieth century. 
The Palestine Diaspora is a direct result of the creation of the 
state of Israel which resulted in the disintegration of the Palestinian 
Arab society. The natives were forced to leave Israel, West Bank and 
Gaza Strip and live in exile as refugees.1° They are the original 
inhabitants of Palestine who traced their historic roots in Palestine 
from the time of ancient Canaan. They lived in Palestine and in other 
parts of west Asia before the advent of Islam. There was 
acculturation of other racial elements into the Palestinian group, 
mainly the Greeks, the Romans, the Muslim Arabs and the crusaders. 
However, this Palestinian group which comprises both Muslims 
and Christians continued to constitute the main element of the 
Cheryl A Ruh=nherg (2003), The Pa'ectinlans In search of a j.~st peace, London Croon I IPIm, pp.78-14, 
Pamela Ann smith (1984), Palestine and PaIeabn'ons 1876 1983, London, Croon Helm, pp.38-44 
12prna-a Sherona (2000), and Mohammed Abu Nimur,'The Arab —Israel Conflict", in Debora J. Garner led.) 
understanding of Contemporary Middle East, London: Lynne Reiner Pub, pp.61-195 
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population until the majority of inhabitants were displaced during 
the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. Apart from the Muslims and Christians, 
there existed other minority communities which lived in their midst 
and these included Jews, Armenians, Assyrians and kurds. Jews 
represented only a small community from the later part of the first 
century until the middle of Twentieth century A. D. At the time of the 
Balfour Declaration (1917), The Jews represented less than 10 per 
cent of the total population of Palestine. 
Christians as well as Muslims have deep religious ties to 
Palestine. It is the birth place of Jesus Christ and the site of the 
Prophet Muhammad's ride to paradise. It is the third holiest place in 
Islam and is commemorated in Jerusalem by the Dome of the Rock 
and al-Agsa Mosque which are both situated on the Harem al-
Sharif.11 For the Christians, Jerusalem is equally sacred, situated the 
Church of the Holy Sepulchre, and many other hallowed place. 
Bethlehem, Nazareth, Galilee, and other sites through the country 
are also revered.12 
1.4. Zionist Movement 
Zionism emerged in the late nineteenth century in Europe in 
response to the rise of European Nationalism and anti- Semitism.13 It 
represented the translation of Diaspora religious orientation into a 
secular ideology inspired by political thought of 'gentile' Europe. 
Three concepts of the Zionism were profound: One reaffirmed the 
cultural isolation of the Jews and adherence to tradition. Another 
sought to assert Jewish identity in terms of a national ethos and a 
"For more understanding of Christian and Islamic as well as Jewish attachments to the Holy Land, see, Karen 
ARMSTRONG (1996), Jerusalem: One City, Three Fifth, New York: Ballantine Books 
`` Cheyrl A. Rubenberg (2003), The Palestinians in Search of just Peace, London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, pp.1- 
5. 
13 Sharona and Abu-Nimer (2000), n. 14, pp.-61-195 
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"return to Palestine" under political auspices. The third concept 
advocated the participation of the Jews in the social and cultural life 
of the West, while retaining a sense of separate identity. The political 
Zionism emphasised the importance of a politically independent 
Jewish state and had chosen Palestine as the site.14 
The Founder of the Zionist Movement in its preliminary pre-
political phase was Leo Pinsker (1821-910), a Russian Jew. Although 
he was preceded by several lone precursors of Zionism, Pinsker was 
the first thinker-, whose work evoked immediate response producing 
an organised effort to promote immigration to Palestine as a step 
towards solving the Jewish problem. His pamphlet 'Auto 
Emancipation' published in 1882 coinciding with the spread of terror 
and massacre of Jews throughout Russia was the first coherent 
Zionist statement of the Jewish problem and its proposed solution. 
He expressed his concern for the perpetual persecution of Jews 
around the world which could be resolved satisfactorily till they 
became a normal nation with independence in its own territory. The 
crux of the solution was an independent national entity, and it was 
of little consequence which territory was settled for this purpose. 
Pinsker, however realised that if Palestine was placed at the centre of 
the doctrine, the emotional drive of the enlightened Jews could be 
turned to advantage of the movement.15 Independently of Pinsker, 
Theodor Herzl, an Austrian Jewish journalist, set forth a more 
elaborate and audacious solution for the Jewish problem. In 1897, 
Herzl, founded the World Zionist Organization (WZO) which 
continued to carry on his work after he died in 1904. By the turn of 
the nineteenth century, Zionist repatriation effort became 
''Ibrahim Abu-Lughod eds. (1971), The Transformation of Palestine: Essays on the Origin and Development of 
the Arab- Israeli conflict, Evenston: North Western University Press, pp.12 
'S David Waines, "The Failure of the Nationalist Resistance," see in ibid, p211 
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systematic, methodical and internationally organized. In 1897 the 
first Zionist Congress was held in Basle, Switzerland, with the stated 
objective of creating a Jewish state in Palestine by means of 
prodigious Jewish immigration, land purchase, settlement 
construction and institution building.16 Out of the Basle programme 
emerged the World Zionist Organization, a Jewish National Flag 
National Anthem and the National Fund'7 
1.5. Indigenous Challenge to Zionism 
Palestinians strongly refuted the idea that Palestine was 'a land 
without people for the people without a land' as the Zionist slogan 
proclaimed. They reiterated that it had an exciting indigenous 
population who sought independence first from the Ottoman rulers 
and later from the British. It was obvious in conflict with the rights of 
the people of Palestine who had inherited the country since time 
immemorial. Palestinians argued that Jewish presence in Palestine 
had almost ceased from later part of the first century A.D. The Zionist 
objective of creating a Jewish state in Palestine was the root cause of 
the trouble and the source of Palestine tragedy.18 
According to Palestinians: 
1) The Palestinian are the original inhabitants of Palestine who 
traced their historic roots in Palestine from the time of ancient 
Canaan 
2) Historically, the Jews were neither the earliest inhabitants nor 
the owners of the land in Palestine. 
16 Noah Lucas (1974), The Modern History Of Israel, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, pp. 20-38, also see in 
David Rodman (1995), " Patterns of War Initiation in the Arab-Israeli conflict: A Note on the Militar Dimension, 
Israel affairs, 2 (1): pp. 115-126 
" Ritchie Ovendale (1984), The origins of the Arab-Israeli wars London: Longman, P.5. 
18 Evegeni Primakov (1984), "The Problem of Palestine in the twentieth century: Origins, Evolution, Prospects," 
Oriental Studies in the USSR, (9), Moscow: USSR Academy of Sciences, p. 8. 
3) The Jewish occupation of Palestine in Biblical times was simply 
an episode in the long history of the country. 
4) The modern Zionist Jews, the great majority of whom can 
hardly claim to be descendants of the ancient Hebrews, seized 
upon a short Biblical episode and began to stake a political 
claim upon the territory of Palestine after more than twenty 
centuries. 
According to Palestinian interpretation, the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict is a modern phenomenon whose origins lie not in the Bible 
but rather in Zionist ideology and its modern implementation in 
Palestine through policies that are reminiscent of other settler-
colonial projects around the world.19 According to Charles D. Smith 
modern Zionism was the wish to establish an independent Jewish 
existence in Palestine, the ancient land of Israel, which the Jews had 
last governed nineteenth hundred years before. 20 The fact that such 
a claim was incompatible with the facts of history, justice and with 
the rights of the real owners of the country was ignored." 
Contrastingly, the Israeli version of history according to 
prevalent Jewish interpretation portrays an opposing account. To 
them Zionism was an attempt to ensure the return of Jews to the 
land of Israel (Eretz-Israel), which God promised to Abraham and his 
seed. They claimed that the conflict is centuries old and argue that: 
Sharona and Abu-Niemer, (2000), n.14,pp.61-195. 
20Charles D. Smith (1992), Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict New York: ST. Martin Press p.25. 
21Cattan (1988), n. 7, p.11. 
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1) Palestinian claims to be related to the Canaanites are a recent 
phenomenon and contrary to historical evidence. 
2) The Canaanites disappeared from the face of the earth three 
millennia ago, and no one knows if any of their descendants 
survived or, if they did, who they would be. 
3) They claimed a connection to Palestine of more than 1,000 
years, dating back no further than the conquest of 
Muhammad's followers in the seventh century A.D. 
4) By contrast, no serious historian questions the more than 
3,000-year-old Jewish connection to the Land of Israel, or, the 
modern Jewish people's relation to the ancient Hebrews.22 
For the Israelis, their national movement, Zionist, is in a natural 
response to the tragedies of Jewish history. Ever since the 
destruction of the Second Temple in Jerusalem in 70 A.D., Jews had 
been dispersed and without a home land. Dispersal had made Jews 
weak and vulnerable, and led to repeated expulsions and 
devastations. Zionism meant a cultural, psychological, and political 
renaissance. It meant creating a home land for Jews that could be a 
safe haven.23 
The Palestinians and many others, however, view Zionism as an 
exclusive ideology that underlines the settler - colonial movement 
responsible for the occupation of Palestine and the dispossession and 
exploitation of its indigenous population. The problem Zionist faced 
in Palestine was that it was an inhabited country at the time of Basle 
programme in 1897. Ottoman census records 'circa' 1860 illustrate 
the demographic composition of Palestine prior to European Jewish 
22Mitchell G Bard (2006), "Myths and facts on line, Israel's Roots," [Online: web] Accessed 9 august 2006, URL: 
http"// ww'.Je,vn virtuallibrary.org. Bard is the executive Director of the American-Israeli cooperative 
enterprise (AICE). 
23Dennis Ross (2004), The Missing Peace, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux p.16. 
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colonisation. Out of a total population of 600,000; 96 percent of the 
inhabitants were Arabs, including eighty percent Muslims; 10 percent 
Christians, and 6 percent Jewish. Americans, Europeans expatriates, 
and other accounted for the remaining four percent.24 
 
Violent Palestinian resistance accompanied Zionist settlement in 
Palestine from its inception in the 1880's. In March 1886, the first 
clash occurred between Palestinians and Jewish immigrants in 1893. 
Palestinian leader Tahir al-Hussein, Mufti of Jerusalem began to 
publicly expressed concern over the threats inherent in Zionist effort 
to buy land and enlarge the Jewish population through mass 
immigration.25 Urban Arab notables manifested political objections to 
the Zionist enterprise, which was portrayed as an existential threat to 
the Arab Muslim nature of the land and its population. The Zionist 
goal of reviving- the Jewish home land through gaining a majority of 
the population and establishing Jewish sovereignty over Palestine 
became intense sources of concern among Arabs. This was expressed 
in meetings, pamphlets, articles in press, and in petitions to the 
Ottoman authorities, in attempt to prevent Jewish immigration and 
settlements.26 
Theodor Herzl believed through diplomacy and finance that he 
could secure the sympathy and cooperation of the Great Powers, and 
that the Sultan could be persuaded to give the world Zionist 
Organization, a charter for the establishment of his Jewish Palestine. 
But several governments were approached with no effective 
results.27 The Zionist founding fathers were well aware of the fact 
that the establishment of a country that is already the national home 
j4 Janet L. Abu-Lughod (1971), "The Demographic Transformation of Palestine," in Abu-Lughod n. 20, p. 155. 
15Rubenberg (2003), n. 12, p.3. 
'°Avraham Sela ed. 92002), The Continuum Political Encyclopaedia of the Middle East, London: The Continuum 
International Publishing Group, p.58. 
`-,C.H. Dodd and M.E. Sales (1970), Israel and the Arab world, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, p.6. 
of another politically alert people would be a very daunting task. 
However, they were determined to carry out their plans at any cost 
by adopting certain strategies which included the implementation of 
the Basle programme in spite of the opposition of the indigenous 
Palestinians. 
1.6. British Colonialism of Palestine 
World War I provided an opportunity for the Zionist movement 
to make important gains. It was finally during this time, when the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire appeared imminent, that the British 
Government announced its support for the Zionist political objective 
in Palestine. During the war, Great Britain played a duplicitous game. 
It entered into three contradictory agreements. 
1. Hussein-McMahon correspondence: It involved the Arab 
nationalist movement represented by Sharif Hussein, Guardian 
of the holy sites in Mecca. The Arabs pledged to assist the 
British war effort by revolting against the Ottoman Turks. In 
exchange, the British promised to facilitate, the Arab nationalist 
goals of independence and unity in a contiguous territorial 
entity including Palestine after the war. 
2. Sykes-Picot Accord: In 1916, Britain and France secretly signed 
the Sykes -Picot Accord in which they agreed to divide most of 
the Arab world into spheres of influence; France was to have 
authority in Syria, from which it carved out Lebanon, whereas 
Britain was to have control of Iraq, Transjordan, and Palestine. 
3. Balfour Declaration: In 1917, Britain issued the Balfour 
Declaration, pledging support for Zionist objective in 
Palestine.28 
28 bid., p.5. 
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Substantial efforts by the Zionist Organization, with a special role 
played by Chaim Weizmann (a Russian - born Jew and a British 
chemist who having made significant contributions to the British war 
effort was a prominent Zionist leader who later became the first 
President of Israel), preceded the government's decision. 
1.7. Balfour Declaration 
On 2 November 1917, the British Government issued the Balfour 
Declaration. The declaration took the form of a letter from Arthur 
James Balfour, the Foreign Secretary, to Lord Rothschild, a prominent 
Zionist leader. 
It stated: 
I have much pleasure in conveying to you on behalf of His 
Majesty's Government the following declaration of sympathy with 
Jewish Zionist aspirations, which has been submitted to and 
approved by the Cabinet: 
His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in 
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use 
their endeavours to facilitate the achievements of this object, it 
being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may 
prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish 
communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed 
by Jews in any other country. 
I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the 
knowledge of the Zionist - Federation. 
The text of the declaration was approved by the US President 
Woodrow Wilson immediately. It was endorsed publicly by France in 
February 1918 and Italy in May the same year. The Zionists concluded 
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that the British Government had undertaken a solemn commitment 
to facilitate Zionists colonisation of Palestine, the objective of the 
establishment of a Jewish state.29 
The Arabs bitterly contended that the Balfour Declaration was 
issued without the knowledge or the consent of the Arabs. They 
protested to the British Government against it. According to 
Palestinian historians, the root cause of the Palestinian's 
disadvantage lies in two political decisions made in Europe. First in 
1897 by the World Zionist Organization, that resolved to establish a 
Jewish state in Palestine. Second, the Balfour Declaration, which 
undermined the rights of the indigenous Palestinian population. 
Britain formally assumed the Palestine mandate in 1922 until 
May 1948. Between 1920 and 1939 about 350000 Jews came to 
Palestine thereby leading to an Arab revolt in 1936-1939.3° This 
revolt was the longest running Palestinian protest against Jewish 
national aspirations in Palestine. There were minor Palestinians 
uprisings between 1920 and 1921 but there was a dramatic 
escalation of the conflict occurred during the Arab Revolt from 1936-
1939 in protest against the Royal Peel Commission Report (which was 
also Known as Palestine Royal Commission) recommending for the 
Partition of Palestine into two states in order to accommodate Jews. 
Owing to fierce resistance by Arabs, Britain was eventually forced to 
abandon 1937 Partition Plan. At the end of the World War I in 
November 1918 the Ottoman Empire was liquidated. Britain was 
formally given the Palestine Mandate in 1922 and maintained its 
'9 Abu-Lughod (1971), n. 18, pp.1-7 
30 British suppression of the uprising was brutal and oppressive. It included the imposition of harsh emergency 
regulations and practices, including closure of news papers, search- and- seizure operations without warrants, 
mass arrests, and widespread curfews and other forms of collective punishment. Rubenberg (2003), n. 16, p. 6, 
also in Dodd and Sales (1970), n. 31, p. 10. For more detail on the Palestinian uprisings see, Barbara Kalkas, 
"The Revolt of 1936: A chronicle of Events," in Abu-Lughod (1971) n. 18, pp. 237-273. 
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control until May 1948. During 1920-1939 about 350000 Jews came 
to Palestine.31 This led to Arab revolt of 1936-39. This revolt was the 
longest running Palestinian protest against Jewish national 
aspirations in Palestine. 
The Arabs were very angry and protested to the British 
Government against it. Some Palestinian historians said the root 
cause of the Palestinian's disadvantage lies in two political decisions 
made in Europe. First in 1897 by the World Zionist organisation, that 
resolved to establish a Jewish state in Palestine. Second, the Balfour 
Declaration, which undermined the rights of the indigenous 
Palestinian population. 
The Turkish Empire was liquidated when the World War I ended 
in November 1918. Britain formally assumed the Palestine mandate 
in 1922 and maintained its control until May 1948. Immigration of 
the Jews continued despite restriction placed by the British. The post-
war troubles in the Eastern Europe and the British administration 
prompted new waves of Jewish immigration to Palestine. 
Between 1920 and 1939 almost 3,50, 000. Jews entered 
Palestine. The contradiction between Britain's dual commitments, 
the fostering Jewish-self-determination and safeguarding 
Arab rights soon became apparent, and the inevitability of the clash 
between Jewish and Arab national aspirations became manifested.32 
The Palestinians resisted Zionist encroachments, where as the 
Zionists, backed by British, crushed the rebellions. There were 
relatively minor Palestinian uprisings in 1920, and 1921, but one of 
the most dramatic escalations of the conflict occurred during the 
Arab Revolt from 1936 to 1939. This revolt was the longest running 
32 Benny Morris (1990), 1948 and After Israel and the Palestinians, New York: Clerrendon Press), p. 4. 
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Palestinian protest against Jewish national aspirations in Palestine 
prior to the establishment of the Jewish State of Israel. The revolt 
was sparked by the Peel Commission Report (which was also known 
as Palestine Royal Commission) recommending the partition of 
Palestine into two states in order to accommodate the Jews. Owing 
to the fierce resistance of the plan among the Palestinians and the 
Jews, Britain was eventually forced to abandon the 1937 partition 
plan. 
Nevertheless, the partition plan continued to gain legitimacy in 
the aftermath of World War II and the Holocaust which resulted in 
the near destruction of the Jewish people in Europe. During the war, 
the Jews extended full support to the Allies in the hope that at the 
end of war they would be given their promised homeland. 
1.8. The UN Partition Plan 
After Britain handed over its `Palestinian problem' to the United 
Nations, the UN General Assembly appointed a committee in May 
1947 called the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine 
(UNSCP). The UN General Assembly, under strong US pressure, 
approved UN Resolution 181. It suggested the formation of a Jewish 
state and a Palestinian state with Jerusalem under international 
control. The 1947 UN Partition Plan is also known as UN Resolution 
181. 
Full text of Resolution 181 recommends a partition plan for 
Palestine: A 
The General Assembly 
Having met in a special session at the request of mandatory 
power to constitute and instruct a special committee to prepare for 
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the consideration of the question of the future government of 
Palestine at the second regular session. 
Having constituted a special committee and instructed into 
investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of 
Palestine, and to prepare proposal for the solution of the problem, 
and 
Having received and examined the report of the special 
committee (document A/364) including number of unanimous 
recommendations and a plan of partition with economic union 
approved by the majority of the special committee, 
Considers that the present situation in Palestine is one which is 
possible to impair the general welfare and friendly relations among 
nations; 
Take note of the declaration by the mandatory power that it plans 
to complete its evacuation of Palestine by 1 August 1948; 
Recommends to the United Kingdom, as the mandatory power for 
Palestine, and to all other members of the United Nations the 
adaptation and implementing with regard to the future with 
economic union set out below; 
Requests that: 
a) The Security Council take the necessary measures as provided 
for in plan for its implementation; 
b) The Security Council consider, if circumstances during the 
transitional period requires such consideration, whether the 
situation in Palestine constitute a threat to peace, if it decides 
that such a threat exists, and in order to maintain 
international peace and Security, the Security Council should 
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supplement the authorisation of the General Assembly by 
taking measures under article 39 and 41 of the Charter, to 
empower the United Nations Commission, as provided in this 
resolution, to exercise in Palestine the functions which are 
assigned to it by this resolution; 
c) The Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace or act of aggression, in accordance with 
article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force the 
settlement envisaged by this resolution; 
d) The Trusteeship Council to be informed of the responsibilities 
envisaged for it in this plan; 
Calls upon the inhabitants of Palestine to take such steps as 
may be necessary on their part to put this plan into effect; 
Appeals to all governments and all peoples to refrain from 
taking any action which might hamper or delay the carrying 
out of these recommendations, and at the same time 
authorises the Secretary General to allow subsistence 
appropriate in the circumstances, and to provide the 
commission with the necessary staff to assist in carrying out 
the functions assigned to the commission by the General 
Assembly. 
B 
The General Assembly, 
Authorise the Secretary General to draw from the working 
Capital fund, a sum not to exceed, $ 2000000 for the purpose 
set forth in the last paragraph of the resolution on the future 
government of Palestine. 
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The resolution adopted by 33 votes in favour, 13 against and 
10 absentees. 
The Zionists accepted the partition plan. By March 1948 
a provisional Jewish government was announced.33The Arabs 
opposed this partition plan under UN Resolution 181. From 
the Palestinian perspective the UN Partition Plan was illegal 
and illegitimate attempt to divide Palestine. In December 1947 
Arab states announced their intention of intervening through 
military to prevent its implementation. 
The partition plan as per the UN resolution 181 and the 1949 
Armistice —comparison can be understood as depicted in Map No.2 
For further analysis see William Roger Louis ann Robert W.5tookey eds_ j19A6), The tnd of the Palestine 
Mandate, London_ I.B. Taoris, also see Michael). Cohen (1982), Palestine and Great Powers, 1945-1948, 
Princeton: Prince tol University Press. 
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Map No.2 
1947-UN-Partition-Plan-1949-Armistice-Comparison 
United Nations Partition Plan 
UN Resolution 181 	 Rhodes Armistice Line 
1949 
PASS1A 
1947 	1 
ACr• 
Hnita 
t~r•th 
• 
Nabkn:• 
TM Aviv 
Jaffa 
Ramallyh• 	echo 
»JJ 
\' 1 	NrRev 
Proposed Jewish State 
Proposed Arab State 
Internatlonaiy administered 
Corpus Separatum' 
of JNUSaISm 
Nabk,% 
R am an 
• Ji 
e.a)Ie;em • 
llr«,• 
e•irsrwba , 
Ne`e v 
~I Proposed Jewish Slate 
Arab territory 
Territories seized bbry Israel
the 
prrOpoSed Jewish State 
Tel Av v 
Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs 
(PASSIA) 
Source: http://www.passia.org/palestine facts/MAPS/1947-un-partition-plan-reso.html 
2S 
1.9. The Arab Israeli War 1948 
As soon as the British Mandate over Palestine terminated on 14 
May 1948, the same day formation of the State of Israel had been 
declared. Ben Gurion became the first Prime Minister of Israel. State 
of Israel was accorded quick recognition by USA and USSR, Italy, Iran 
and Turkey. Britain's recognition came a little late. However, Arab 
Countries such as Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon could not 
reconcile to the creation of the Jewish state of Israel and declared 
war against it. Throughout the period from the partition resolution in 
November 1947 until the completion of British withdrawal on 15 
May1948 a state of non-exercised sovereignty and undeclared war 
existed within Palestine. The Zionists were determined to implement 
partition plan by force and the Palestinians were equally determined 
to resist. There followed two wars: a civil war, largely between the 
Jewish community and the Palestinian community before the end of 
the British mandate on 15 May 1948; and a regular war after 15 May 
between Israel (established on that date) and units of the regular 
Arab armies. In the civil war the Palestinian community was crushed 
and routed. According to Walid Khalidi, "it was during the civil war 
that the Palestinian Exodus and Diaspora began to take place.i34 Jews 
refer to 1948 War as the war of independence marking the fulfilment 
of their national aspirations with the establishment of the State of 
Israel. However, the Palestinians considered the 1948 War as the 
'Nakba' or disaster and destruction.35 
In the wake of the Palestinian War of 1947-48 and the Arab- 
Israeli hostilities of 1948, Palestine was politically transformed into 
34 Walid Khalidi (1992), Palestine Reborn London: I. B. Fauris, pp. 5-15 
35 
Simona and Abu Nimer (2000), n. 14, p. 71. 
Israel. Egypt occupied the Gaza strip, and Transjordan annexed the 
West Bank of the Jordan River and renamed the country as Jordan. In 
the resulting war, the Israel seized approximately 78 percent of 
Palestine. Neighbouring Egypt and Jordan captured the remaining 22 
percent of Palestine. 
In the aftermath Palestine and Palestinian became obscure. 
Palestine and Palestinian re-emerged as the centre of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict only after 1969 when Yasser Arafat and his Fatah resistance 
organization assumed control of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO), and Palestinians remained at the heart of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict.36 
1.10. Flight of the Palestinian Refugees 
In the immediate aftermath of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War there 
was one pressing problem of the Palestinian refugees which was of a 
major political consequence. The very existence of the Palestinians 
was in danger following uprooting of the Palestinian society. Having 
left their farm lands, shops and workshops, etc, they had no means of 
survival. For shelter, some found mosques, churches, schools, but 
most were in temporary camps that offered rudimentary 
protection.37Israel took steps to prevent the refugees return after the 
war. 
The UN General Assembly Resolution 194 established a 
Reconciliation Commission, to assert that refugees wishing to return 
to their homes and live at peace should be allowed to do so, the 
compensation should be paid to them and that free access to the 
holy places should be assured. Resolution 194 remains the 
;6 Rubenberg (2003), n. 12, p. 18. 
37 Morris (1990), n. 37, pp. 4-10 
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fundamental, although not the only, legal basis for the refugee's right 
of return.38 On 8 December the UN General Assembly established the 
United Nations Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA) for Palestine 
refugees, to provide assistance to the refugees with respect to food, 
shelter, education, and health services. Isee Appendix 1) 
According to Henry Cattan, the exodus of the Palestinians in 
1948 War was mainly due to Jewish intolerance which was the policy 
of the Zionists to establish a single national state in Palestine. They 
resorted to forced expulsions. The expulsion was carried out by 
Israeli forces as they used loudspeakers to threaten civilians and 
ordered them to leave. Dier Yassin massacre occurred On 9 April 
1948. In this period a total chaos loomed large due to total 
breakdown of the British Government machinery that was nearing its 
mandate on 15 May 1948. 
The question of what ceased the Palestinians to become 
refugees has been a controversial issue between Israel, and the Arab 
states for more than half a century. In general, Arab claimed that the 
Jews expelled Palestinians with determination and preplanning, as 
part of a grand political-military design. On the other hand, Israeli 
official version stated that Palestinian fled voluntarily not under 
Jewish compulsion and that they were asked to do so by the 
Palestinian leaders and the Arab states.3 ' 
The Arab-Israeli Conflict in 1948 caused Egypt and Israel to be 
bitter foes until 1979. The second war between these West Asian 
neighbours took place in 1956. As part of the Egyptian President 
Ibid., p. 13. 
"Though the Israeli Government claimed that the Palestinians left their country voluntarily. Israeli historians 
and others using archival material from the Israeli Government and its antecedents reveal that there was 
indeed a calculated policy to force the hulk of the Palestinian population Into exile. one of the most famous 
works is Benny Morris (1989), fhe Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problems, 1947-1949, New York. Cambridge 
University Press 
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Nasser's nationalist agenda, he took control of the Suez Canal zone, 
away from the British and French companies which owned it. At the 
same time as part of his ongoing struggle with Israel, Egyptian forces 
blocked the strait of Tiran, the narrow water way that is Israel's only 
outlet to the Red Sea. In July 1956 Egypt also nationalised the Suez 
Canal Company, (under British and French control). France and 
Britain were principally concerned with Egyptian nationalization and 
management of the Suez Canal. Israel was primarily concerned with 
stepped up Fidayeen raids from Gaza and Sinai. Israeli forces took 
action which was supported by the joint Anglo-French air-borne 
attack on the Canal area- allegedly to restore the security of the area. 
However after a lot of efforts made by the United Nations, the United 
States, the Soviet Union Israel agreed to a cease-fire. Upon the arrival 
of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) French and British 
troops began withdrawing. Israeli withdrawal particularly from Gaza 
and strategic Sharm-el-Sheikh began after US re-assurance to Israel 
that Strait of Tiran Water Way will remain opened for shipping by all 
states of the region. Israeli forces withdrew from the area. 
The flight of Palestinian Refugees took place in two major 
phases: the first in the 1948-1949 Arab-Israeli War, almost after 20 
years interval the second phase began during the 1967 War. To the 
Arabs and Palestinians in particular it symbolised the injustice to 
which Palestinians have been subjected to by Western powers and 
Israel. The Zionists looked upon it as symbolising the refusal of Arabs 
to accept the existence of Israel. It has been viewed as one of the 
most difficult problems before the UNO where more than a million 
Palestinians have been homeless and landless to live in misery and 
bitterness for no faults of theirs. 
The question of what caused the Palestinians to become 
refugees has been a controversial issue between Israel and Arab 
nations for more than half a century. In general Arabs claimed that 
the Jews expelled Palestinians with predetermination and 
preplanning, as part of a grand political-military design. On the other 
hand the official Israeli version stated that Israeli fled voluntarily not 
under Jewish compulsion and that they were asked to do so by the 
Palestinian leaders and Arab states. 
The flight of refugees was aggravated by the June 1967 Arab-
Israeli War; with hundreds of thousands of people being forced to 
abandon their homes and become refugees. This time the West Bank 
of Jordan and the Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, Golan Heights and the 
Sinai Peninsula were occupied by the Israeli troops. Many were twice 
refugees who left their camps set up after 1948 and moved to the 
East Bank of Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq.40 Between 1948 and 
1967, the UN General Assembly adopted 19 resolutions confirming 
their right to repatriation, or if they did not want to return, to 
compensate for the loss of property, but Israel never complied with 
these resolutions. 
1.11. The Issues of the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
The term West Bank is relatively new in the lexicon of 
international politics. It is the area of historical Palestine lying west of 
the Jordan River and the Dead Sea designated by the United Nations 
Palestine Partition (UNPPP) to become part of an Arab state. To the 
north and south is the State of Israel; to the west are Israel and the 
Gaza Strip. It was not used until after 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Before 
the League of Nations adopted the Mandate for Palestine in 1922, 
40 
Primakov (1984), n. 22, p. 13. 
i3 
Palestine was a geographical name of rather loose application. The 
Jordan River was considered the line of demarcation between 
Western and eastern Palestine. Under British administration the East 
became Transjordan and the West Bank called as the rest of the 
Palestine, or the area in which the provisions of the Balfour 
Declaration of the 1917 were applicable.41 The present West Bank 
grew out of a number of factors such as the 1948 Arab-Israeli War 
and include: 
1) The subsequent Israeli-Trans Jordan Armistice Agreement of 
1949 
2) Jordan annexation of the areas in western Palestine in 1950. 
3) The change in name from Transjordan to Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan. Thereafter the kingdom was divided by the Jordan River 
into the East and the West Bank. 
The Palestine autonomous areas are located in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip. A part of these areas formed the territory in which 
area an independent Palestine State may be declared along with the 
eastern half of Jerusalem, the West Bank was occupied by Jordan 
during the 1948-1949 Arab-Israeli war. On 24 April 1950, the 
parliament of Jordan passed legislation designed to unite the West 
and East Jerusalem with Jordanian territory east of Jordan: however, 
this annexation was largely ignored by the international 
community.42  
Apart from the Urban Centres of Bethlehem and Heron to the 
south, 	the majority of the 	majority 	of 	Palestinian population 	is 
Don Peretz (1986), the West Bank: History, politics and Society, London: West View Press , p. 4. 
°2 Bernard Reich and David H. Goldberg (2000), Political Dictionary of Israel, London: The carecrow Press, Inc, p. 
412. 
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concentrated in the northern localities around Ramallah, Nabulus 
Jenin and Tulkarm, In November 1988 the Palestine National Council 
(PNC) proclaimed Jerusalem as the capital of a newly declared 
independent State of Palestine. In fact West Jerusalem has been the 
defacto capital of Israel since 1950. During the June Six days War of 
1967 the Israeli authorities formally annexed East Jerusalem, but the 
UN has never recognised its annexation. 
Jordan continued to control effectively the West Bank, the Old City 
(East Jerusalem) and its northern, eastern and southern environs, 
from the time of General Armistice on 3 April 1949. In the summer of 
1988, King Hussein of Jordan announced that Jordan was disengaging 
politically and administratively from the area.43 Ramallah is the 
administrative centre for the West Bank. 
Israel had captured the West Bank and Gaza Strip during Arab-
Israeli war in 1967. Since the conclusion of this war Israel has been in 
control of former territory of Palestine under the British mandate. 
Israel took administrative steps to unify the city of Jerusalem. It has 
exercised a military government administration in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, allowing limited powers to the local Arab Mayors and 
town councillors. It has considerably extended the number of new 
Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip.44 
Representing an administrative province under the British 
Mandate of Palestine, the Gaza Strip was transferred to Egypt after 
the 1949 Armistice and remained under Egyptian administration until 
it was passed into the hands of the Israelis during the Suez War of 
October-November 1956. However, Israel vacated the area in 1957. 
In the June 1967 War the area was again captured by the Israelis and 
'" Europa (2005), The Middle East and North Africa, London: Europa pub., 51st edn., p. 930. 
11 
Hasan Bin Talal (1981), Palestinian Self Determination, London: Quarter Books, pp. 43-45. 
was put under Israeli military administration with arrangement of 
day- to-day affairs being the responsibility of the area's Israeli 
military commander. Neither Israeli law, nor governmental and public 
bodies including the Supreme Court could review or alter the orders 
of the military commander to any great extent. 
Gaza City is the main inhabited area and the administrative centre 
for the Palestinian Authority (PA) Pursuant to the Israeli-PLO Gaza-
Jericho. First implementing Agreement (Cairo, May 1994), control 
over much of the Gaza Strip was transferred to the Palestinian self-
rule authority, with the exception of a handful of small settlement in 
northern Gaza. In 2001 an estimated 42 percent of Gaza Strip was 
under Israeli control, including Jewish settlements, military bases, 
bypass roads and a 'buffer zone' along the border with Israel.45 Its 
ultimate status is yet to be decided. 
The future of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the issues related 
to Jewish settlements, Palestinian refugees and Israeli control policies 
would have much impact on the border scope of Wes Asia politics. 
The issues have affected the relations between Israel and the US, 
Egypt, Jordan and other Arab countries. These issues are an integral 
part in the approach to West Asia peace settlement. 
In 1948 War and the subsequent armistice agreements failed to 
solve the Arab-Israeli problem. In essence, the Arab-Israeli conflict 
has changed in character very little over the years, but it has taken 
different forms and has been powerfully affected by trends in 
international politics.46 The world now looked forward to a 
negotiated settlement of the Palestine problem. Thus the genesis of 
the Palestine problem historically dates back to the rise of the Basle 
'S Europa (2005), 54, p. 930 
°G Dodd and Sales (1970), n. 31, p. 15. 
Programme of 1897. The Zionist repatriation had taken place in two 
major phases: the first from 1918 to 1948 and after an interval of 
nearly twenty years, the second phase began in 1967. During the first 
phase, the demographic, economic, military and organisational 
infrastructure of the Jewish state was laid at the expense of the 
indigenous Palestinian population. 
1.12. The United State's Peacemaking: A brief preview 
According to the official American view, the Arab-Israeli conflict 
and its resolution is a very complex issue. Although America is 
portrayed as an honest peace broker in this conflict but in fact this 
has been a total discouragement and opposition to a comprehensive 
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict for almost a quarter century. 
The US has consistently rejected international peace conference 
that could lead to a comprehensive all parties-peace settlement, and 
instead pushed for successive bilateral arrangement that could 
maximise American influence in the region, such as the 1978 Camp 
David agreement between Israel and Egypt and the 1994 peace 
treaty between Israel and Jordan. Neither of these could effectively 
address the underlying source of the Arab Israeli Conflict-the fate of 
the Palestinians. 47 
After 1956, although there was an armistice between Israel and 
Arab sides, the conflict continued and the region remained in 
imperilled by the prospects of another war. This was fuelled by an 
escalating arms race as countries built up their military caches and 
prepared their forces (and their population) for a future showdown. 
4" Stephen Lunes (2003), Tinderbox: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Roots of Terrorism, London: Zed Books LTD., P. 
112. 
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By the early 1960s, however, the region was becoming a hot spot of 
Cold War rivalry while the US and Soviet Union were competing with 
each other for global power and influence. As the military and 
diplomatic crisis since 1956, clashes between Israel and Syria had 
been escalating for about 9 years and Israeli leaders had publicly 
declared that it might be necessary to bring down the Syrian regime 
if it failed to end Palestinian commando's attacks against Israel from 
Syrian territory. On April 7 1967, one of these clashes escalated into 
what in retrospect appears to have been the curtain raiser to the 
1967 War. 
1.13. 1967 Arab-Israeli War 
Another major milestone was the Arab Israeli War of June 1967. 
Israeli troops crossed the Armistice lines of 1949 and occupied Gaza 
Strip and entire Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank and East Jerusalem. 
Syria lost its Golan Heights. Al! attempts to persuade Israel to vacate 
captured territories failed. The UN Security Council Resolution 242 
(See Appendix z) called for the return of occupied territories and get back 
into pre-1967 boarders had no effect on Israel. The territories 
conquered and occupied by Israel as of June 1967 are as depicted in 
Map No. 3 
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Map No. 3 
West Asia after June 1967 War 
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The defeat of Egypt, Syria and Jordan made the Palestinians 
realised that they had to carry on struggle on their own and resorted 
to guerrilla war against Israel. l`8 The traumatic experience of the war 
had two major impacts: 
1. It focussed upon the need to negotiate with Israel on the 
question of evacuation of the occupied territories. Israel then offered 
the formula of 'land for peace' to defeated Arab states, 
2. The popularity and legitimacy of the Palestinians 'Fidayeen' rose 
from small disorganised groups into well-armed and substantially 
funded movement. 
1.14. Yom Kippur —October 1973 War 
Militarily strong front line Arab states, Egypt and Syria tried to 
regain their lost territories in October 1973 but as a result Syria lost 
more of its territory in Golan Heights. Israeli forces captured parts of 
east banks of Suez Canal thereby facing a direct threat to the entire 
Nile Valley. 
As a consequence, Arab countries unanimously resorted to a 
tactical manoeuvre of oil as a weapon against the Western countries 
including Japan. In the aftermath of 1973 War, Arab leaders 
unanimously proclaimed the Palestine Liberation Organisation as the 
sole representative of the Palestinian people, with Yasser Arafat as its 
leader. Now the Palestinians could speak for themselves. The PLO 
(See Appendix 3) became a powerful political entity, able to arouse 
strong support in international forums, including Third World 
Countries, Soviet Union block and many others. However, the US 
Government pledged not to recognise nor negotiate with PLO until 
the acceptance of the UN Resolution 242 which required the 
"Farah Naz (1999) " The Israeli Palestinian !rack," Word Focus, 20 (9): pp. 11-13 
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acknowledgement of sovereignty and political independence of every 
state in West Asia, including Israel and their right to exist in secure 
and recognised borders. As a consequence Egypt opted out of the 
Arab Israeli conflict. Jordan, by not joining the war had already 
signalled its stand on the issue. Thus, the October War of 1973 had 
demonstrated the futility of a military confrontation with Israel. It 
opened up a series of negotiated settlement between Israel and the 
individual Arab states. Anwar Sadat, Egyptian President realised 
peace with Israel and under the auspices of the US signing of Camp 
David Accords in September 1978. Though many Arab states and 
Palestinians condemned Sadat's move and even termed him as 
traitor. Jordan was the second Arab country after Egypt to have 
concluded a peace treaty with Israel on October 26 1994. The treaty 
normalised relations between the two countries. Egypt welcomed 
the agreement but Syria ignored it. Israeli public fully supported the 
agreement and this led to opening up the border between two 
states. 
1.15. US President Jimmy Carter years (1977-1981) 
Jimmy carter in 1977 for the first time talked of 'homeland' for 
the Palestinians. He was the first US President who talked the 
existence and acknowledged their legitimate rights. American policy 
in the West Asian conflict has been predicated on key UN Security 
council Resolutions, notably to 242 of 1967 and 338 of 1973( See 
Appendix 4). The basic premise of their resolutions is that Israel's 
captured territory by force is illegal and thus Israel must withdraw 
from the territories. President Jimmy Carter shifted the 'terrorist 
refugee' perception when he said that the Palestinians deserved a 
homeland on 4 January 1978. As Walid Khalidi put it "Carter a born-
again Christian" was like a breath of fresh year for the Palestinians. 
N 
He was first American President to recognise the people hood of the 
Palestinians through his early call for a `homeland` for them. He was 
also opposed to settlements in the occupied territories, including 
East Jerusalem. 49 
1.16. Camp David Accords (September 1978) 
Camp David Accords was signed by Anwar Sadat and 
Menachem Begin and ratified officially by the two governments of 
Egypt and Israel. The Camp David Accord was based on the two UN 
Resolutions 242 of 1967 and 338 of 1973. The Camp David was an 
effort towards a Palestinian State which prescribed: 
1) Full autonomy for inhabitants of the occupied territories. 
2) Withdrawal of Israeli military and civilian forces from the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip. 
3) The recognition of the Palestinian people as a separate political 
entity with a right to determine their own future. 
4) Palestinians were to participate as equals in further 
negotiations. 
5) The final status of the West Bank and Gaza was to submit to a 
vote by the elected representatives of its inhabitants. 
The Camp David Accords mentioned the legitimate rights of the 
Palestinian people.50 However, the autonomy plan in the agreement 
did not implement Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 which 
demanded complete Israeli withdrawal from all occupied areas. It 
rejected the Palestine Liberation Organisation as the sole legitimate 
representatives of the Palestinian people expressly excluded it from 
A Walid Khalidi (1998), "The American Factor in Arab-Israeli Conflict", Middle East International, 16 January 
(566): pp. 19-21 
S° Carter (2007), n. 66, p. 48 
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the negotiations. Thus, the broader objective of finding a peaceful 
resolution to the Palestinian issue remained unresolved. According to 
Farah Naaz, Israel and the US dictated the course of the talks in 
accordance with their own wishes. The treaty between Egypt and 
Israel remained a separate treaty and Egypt achieved nothing for the 
Palestinians." As Carter has stated: 
Our celebration of the Camp David Accords was short 
lived, as we endured weeks of tedious and frustrating 
negotiations to implement a commitment to conclude a 
peace treaty between Israel and Egypt....... Although this 
crucial peace treaty has never been violated, other equally 
important provisions of the agreement have not been 
honoured since I left office. The Israelis have never granted 
any appreciable autonomy to the Palestinians, instead of 
withdrawing their military, Israeli leaders have tightened their 
hold on the occupied territories.
52 
1.17. Palestinian Intifada in 1987 
Israel's brutal crackdown on Palestinians was doing great 
damage to its own interests. The American public sympathy for Israel 
began to be shifted when the death toll from first intifada reached 
500 and the image of the Israeli army was increasingly shown on 
television screens around the world as brute occupier 53 ( Also See 
Appendix 5) 
In January 1988 Regan Administration took some steps and 
urged Israel to stop settlement in the occupied territories and to hold 
free elections on the West Bank for a "Palestinian's self - governing 
authority" within one year. 
SS Farah Naaz (1999), The Israeli Palestinian Track, "World Focus, 20(9): pp. 11-13. 
Carter (20071, n.66, pp. SI-52. 
s' Samuel W Lewis 11999), "'The United States and Israeli Evolution of an unreturned Alliance;' Middle East 
Journal, 53131. pp. 364 377 
1.18. George H.W. Bush years (1989-1993) and the first Gulf War 
American triumph in the Persian Gulf War accorded an 
opportunity to clear the way for the Arab Israeli peace process. King 
Hussein of Jordan decided to reduce Jordan's administrative role in 
the West Bank and Yasser Arafat announced the willingness of PLO to 
accept UN Resolution that recognised Israel's right to exist within 
1967 borders, and publicly disavowed terrorism as a means to 
achieve PLO's goals. On 14 December 1988 Arafat announced in a 
press conference in Geneva, Switzerland that confirmed that PLO 
undertakes to live in peace with Israel and it rejects individual, group 
and state terrorism in all its forms.54 
Meanwhile the Cold War came to an end making it possible for 
Two Super Power to co-operate. As a consequence, Arab nations 
particularly Syria and Egypt lost their strong political support from 
Moscow. Moscow and Washington became more willing to ease 
tensions in the region. Moscow allowed Russian Jews in large 
numbers to immigrate to Israel.55 In another major development Iraqi 
troops invaded and annexed Kuwait on 2 August 1990. The UN 
Security Resolution 600 was adopted quickly condemning the 
invasion by Iraq and demanded its immediate troop withdrawal from 
Kuwait.56 
On 16 January 1991, the American-led coalition launched a 
massive air strike against Iraq. Saddam tried to drag Israel into the 
war as Iraqi forces suffered their worst defeat. Under US persuasion 
Israel did not retaliate. The Arab allies in the coalition held firm and 
'Quoted in Douglas Little (2003), American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945, 
London: I.B. Tauris, pp. 295-6. 
ss Carter (2007), n. 66, p. 131. 
s6 
Zunes (2003), n. 59, p. 76. 
Saddam's troops beat hasty retreat from Kuwait at the end of 
February 1991. 
During the Iraq War the Soviet Union did nothing to protect its 
long time friend or support Iraqi regime. In fact, the Soviets voted 
against Iraq in the UNO along with the United States, in a graphic 
display of first Cold War co- operation. The decisive defeat of Iraqi 
forces in the massive Multi-national Forces left the PLO demoralised 
and dangerously isolated. The PLO prestige seemed to be lower than 
ever before due to the public solidarity its leaders had manifested 
with Iraq. Many countries of the Gulf stopped financial support to 
PLO. Consequently the PLO made a significant effort to secure a 
renewal of the peace making process after the war.57 
$7 Sela (2002), n. 30, p. 109. 
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CHAPTER -2 
Madrid Conference & Oslo Breakthrough 
2.1 Introduction 
Policies of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev helped end the 
Cold War, making it possible for the two Super Powers to co-operate. 
Around the end of the Cold War and America's triumph in the Persian 
Gulf seemed to clear the way for the Palestinian-Israeli peace 
process. Prospects for peace re-emerged to improve in July 1988, 
when king Hussein of Jordan decided to reduce Jordan's 
administrative role in the West Bank. Yasser Arafat announced that 
the PLO would accept several UN Resolutions that recognised Israel's 
right to exist within 1967 border and PLO undertook to live in peace 
with Israel and it would condemn individual, group and state 
terrorism in all its forms.58 
As the gulf War came to an end in February 1991 US Secretary 
of State James Baker made eight trips to the region which was 
responsible for the Madrid Conference on 30 October 1991. ( See 
Appendix 6) This conference was convened jointly by the US and the 
USSR and attended by Israel, and many Arab States including Syria, 
Lebanon, Jordan and Palestinian delegates from the occupied 
territories. The conference was a breakthrough in which Israel and all 
of its immediate enemies had initiated a face to negotiations for the 
first time. Subsequently several rounds of talks were hosted by US, 
aimed at peace agreement between Israel and its immediate 
S' Quoted in Douglas Little (2003), American Orientalism: The United States and Middle East since 1945, 
London: I.B. Ta a ris, pp. 295-6. 
neighbours. The Israeli Government led by Yitzhak Shamir took part 
in negotiations on the conditions that PLO was not invited. The only 
Palestinians present were the representatives from the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip, but the talks broke down because of Palestinian's 
insistence on the right to recognition of sovereignty.59 The Madrid 
Conference ended without an agreement or an agenda for the next 
round of negotiations. The Madrid Conference ended without 
agreement and without any resolution of the issues, the willingness 
of the participants to communicate with one another, reduced 
regional tensions and renewed hopes of future progress toward 
peace. The conference was an important step on the road to peace 
involving direct, bilateral, public and official peace negotiations 
between Israel and its Arab neighbours.6o 
At that time the policies of the Soviet President Mikhail 
Gorbachev helped to end the Cold War, making it possible for the 
two Super Powers to co-operate. Further, Syria and other Arab 
nations lost their strong political and military support from Moscow 
as they became more willing to ease tensions in the region. In May 
1989, Arab leaders accepted Egypt back into the Arab League, and 
the same year USSR permitted hundreds of thousands Soviet Jews to 
immigrate to Israel.61  
In an unprecedented development in the region, Iraqi troops 
invaded and annexed Kuwait on 2 August 1990. The UN Security 
"Jocelyn Grange (2002), quoted in Reporters Without Borders (ed.) Israel/Palestine: The Black Book, London: 
Pluto press, pp. 1-8. 
fiO Reich and Goldberg (2000), n. 57, p. 250 
61Jimmy Carter (2007) Palestine Peace not appreciated, New York: Simaon & Sihuster paper backs pp. 37-38. 
Council quickly adopted Resolution 660, condemning the invasion 
and demanded Iraq's immediate withdrawal. 2` 
On 16 January 1991, the American-led Coalition launched 
massive air strikes against Iraq. Almost immediately it was clear that 
Iraqi fighting force was doomed. President Saddam Hussein tried to 
drag Israel into the first Gulf War by firing Scud Missiles at Tel Aviv 
and Haifa. If the Israelis came into the war, President Saddam 
Presumably believed, the Saudis, Egyptians and Syrians may switch 
over sides to Iraq. But under considerable American pressure, Israel 
did not retaliate; the Arab allies in the coalition held for; and 
Saddam's forces, faced with a ground offensive, beat a hasty retreat 
from Kuwait at the end of February 1991. 
The decisive defeat of Iraq by Multinational Forces left the PLO 
demoralised and dangerously isolated. The PLO prestige seemed 
lower than ever before due to the public solidarity its leaders had 
manifested with Iraq. The PLO was punished by the Gulf Sheikhdoms, 
which stopped financial aid to the organisation and the occupied 
territories during the war and afterwards. Consequently the PLO 
made significant efforts to secure a renewal of the peace making 
process after the war.63  
The Gulf War (1991), placed the Israeli Government in a 
different position, after Tel Aviv and Haifa became the target of Iraqi 
Scud Missile attacks. Decades of its strategy doctrine called for Israel 
and to determine its own course of action and to take firm military 
measures by means of air or ground attacks against Iraq. However, 
because of concern to ensure the anti-Saddam coalition against 
52 
Stephen Zures 92003), Tinder box: US Foreign Policy and the Roots of terrorism, London: Zed Book Ltd., p. 
112. 
Avraham Bela ed. (2002), The Continuous Political Encyclopaedia of Middle East, London: the continuous 
International Group. P.58. 
defection by any of its Arab participants, the Bush I administration 
brought intense pressure to bear in dissuading Israel from acting 
militarily. 
On the other hand, there was a degree of reciprocity in the 
relationship, accompanying the pressure to discourage Israel from 
taking action on its own, the Americans gave increased emphasis to 
efforts at destroying the Scud Missiles by means of air and along with 
British Special forces covert commandos attacks inside Iraq.64 
 
The United States deployed patriot missile batteries with 
American Crews in Tel Aviv and Haifa, the first time that Israel ever 
had relied on forces of another country to come to its defence.65 
Ironically, the impact of the Patriot batteries was more of 
Psychological than military: although results remained disputed, later 
assessment indicated that the patriot missiles were relatively in-
effective against the Scuds.66  
Secretary of State James Baker told to an American-Israeli 
Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC, pro-Israel lobby group) audience on 
22 May 1989, that Israel should abandon its expansionist policies, a 
remark which may be taken as a signal that the pro-Israel Reagan 
years were over. President Bush remarked at a press conference on 3 
March 1990, that East Jerusalem was occupied territory and not a 
sovereign part of Israel as the Israelis claimed. This remark became a 
cause of tension between the US and Israel which was over soon 
after the start of the Persian Gulf War on 16 January 1991, when 
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Israel became a target of Iraqi scud missiles. The United States urged 
Israel not to retaliate against Iraq for the attacks because it was 
believed that Iraq wanted to drag Israel into the conflict and forced 
other coalition members, Egypt and Syria in particular, to quit the 
coalition and join Iraq in a war against Israel. Israel did not retaliate, 
and gained praise for its restraint.67 
2.2 The Madrid Peace Conference 
In October 1991, in response to pressure from the USA and the 
active efforts by US Secretary of State, James Baker, a conference on 
West Asia was held in Madrid. Another important pre-condition for 
the start of peace talks was the Palestinian intifada (uprising) which 
had begun in Gaza and the West Bank in December 1987. The 
intifada was a popular uprising against the Israeli occupying power. 
Daily clashes between Israeli security forces and Palestinians, strikes, 
demonstrations and closures of the borders and other unrest all 
contributed to the enormous international attention that the conflict 
aroused. 
The Madrid Peace Conference, however, did not result any 
changes in the parties positions, and there was little enthusiasm for 
the negotiations process that had begun. For periods of time, some 
of them even boycotted the talks. None the less, the conference 
proved to be significant. It established a frame work for negotiations 
and it was clear that the international community expected some 
results. The Madrid Conference established two parallel tracks, 
bilateral negotiations between Israel and its neighbours and 
negotiations between several of the countries involved both within 
and outside West Asia. 
`" Ibid. No. 5. 
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However, the official peace process proved to have its weakness. 
Firstly, the bilateral negotiations suffered from the fact that direct 
contact between Israel and PLO was still impossible. The PLO's 
representatives had to take part as members of Jordan's delegation. 
Secondly, the negotiations in Washington were being held more or 
less in public. This meant that they tended to end up in open 
controversy. With the media present and the Israeli and Palestinian 
public within ear shot, it proved impossible to have a genuinely 
constructive dialogue. 
In Madrid at the end of October 1991 an Israeli delegation met 
Palestinian and other representatives of neighbouring states, Syria, 
Jordan and Lebanon. Although the Palestinian representatives were 
pro P.L.O., they were not publicly stated as being members of the 
organisation, as to do so would have subjected them to 
imprisonment under Israeli law. The United States had organised the 
conference and insisted that the talks be based on the UN 
Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of 'land for peace'.68 This 
premise was accepted by the Palestinians but rejected by the Israelis. 
In the mean time, the Likud administration announced a new wave of 
settlement buildings designed to double the settler population in the 
occupied territories in four years. Little progress was made in the 
negotiations, either in Madrid or in the five rounds of bilateral talks 
that took place in Washington. The Likud party pledged to continue 
the peace process but retaining all the occupied territories and 
expanding settlement buildings. The Labour vowed to conclude a 
deal on Palestinian autonomy, allow residents of East Jerusalem to 
take part in negotiations and freeze the construction of the 'political 
settlement' deep in the occupied territory. Labour won the election 
°" Berry, Mike and Ph~lo Grag, Israel and Palestine. 
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under Yitzhak Rabin in a major political swing, which ended 15 years 
of Likud rule. Finally a change in the Israeli government in 1992 
brought into power a new leadership under Rabin who was 
considered to be more supportive of the peace process. 
The Madrid peace process envisaged the Arab-Israeli peace 
negotiations on two tracks, first bilateral negotiations between the 
direct parties to the conflict i.e. Israel — other conflicting states. 
Second, multilateral negotiations on those broader issues whose 
solutions required coordinated action and the international 
community's support. It was welcomed as a major breakthrough in 
the West Asia peace process. The Declaration of Principle (DOP) was 
never the less regarded as only a tentative first step towards the 
resolution of the region's conflict. ( See Appendix 7) Although Israeli 
Prime Minister, Rabin was able to get the ratification of DOP from the 
parliament but PLO's recognition on 23 September 1993 was 
opposed from the right wing Israeli political groups. Conclusion of 
Declaration of Principle (DOP) between Israel and Palestinians was 
denounced by Hamas and Islamic Jihad and considered by them as 
treason. Jordan's King Hussein welcomed the agreement and agreed 
on the agenda for the direct talks with Israel. Lebanon however, 
feared that the division that that the DOP had provoked amongst the 
Palestinians might lead to renewed conflict in Lebanon. It remained 
unclear whether Syria would support or denounce the agreement or 
support those Palestinian groups opposed to the PLO's position. 
While the official negotiations continued the Israelis decided to 
open up a second and secret channel of diplomacy in Oslo, Norway. 
For the first time they agreed to negotiate with a section of the PLO. 
Although these talks by — passed the bulk of the PLO and Fatah, with 
negotiations directed only towards Yasser Arafat and a few close 
associates. On 13 September 1993, the 'Declaration of Principles' 
between the Palestinians and Israelis was finally brought into the 
open and signed by both parties on the White House lawns. Both the 
parties finally reached to an agreement on mutual recognition of 
Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The precise 
details of these Oslo Accords were kept deliberately vague, it 
included: 
1. Early withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza and Jericho areas. 
2. The redeployment of Israeli troops in other areas of the West 
Bank. 
3. Creation of a 'Palestinian Interim self — Government Authority. 
4. The gradual transfer of civic power to a Palestinian Authority. 
5. The Creation of a Palestinian Police Force. 
6. The election of a Palestinian Council. 
7. Called for a permanent settlement in 5 years. 
The declaration was an agenda between Israel and 
Palestinians for negotiations that stipulated that within four 
months of signing the agreement Israel had to withdraw 
completely from Gaza and Jericho, with a Palestinian police 
force taking over internal security in those areas. Israel would 
still maintain over- all responsibility for external security and 
foreign affairs. Elsewhere in the West Bank, Palestinians were 
to take control of five spheres, education, health, social welfare, 
direct taxation and tourism. Within nine months elections were 
to be held for a Palestinian Authority, which was to assume 
responsibilities for those municipal affairs. 
Final Status negotiations were scheduled to start within 
two years and were to be completed within five years. All of the 
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most serious issues affecting the two parties, including possible 
Palestinian Statehood, border, refugees, settlement of 
Jerusalem, were postponed to the final settlement talks. The 
PLO agreed to accept UN Resolution 242 and 338, to end all 
round - struggle against Israel and amend the parts of the 
Palestinian National Charter that called for the destruction of 
Israeli State. Israel agreed to recognise the PLO as the sole 
representative of the Palestinian people. The DPO brought an 
end to the intifada which was responsible for the death of 160 
Israelis and 1162 Palestinians. 
In any case, the Madrid Peace Conference could be convened 
because of the joint efforts of the two Super Powers, USA & the 
USSR. It was a first face to face conference between Israel and its 
immediate enemies, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinians. The 
Madrid Conference failed without an agreement or an agenda for the 
next round of negotiations and it brought no specific resolution of 
issues. The willingness of participants to communicate with one 
another reduced regional tension & renewed hopes of future 
progress towards peace.69 
2.3. Oslo Peace Process 1993 
The Israeli law prohibited meetings between PLO or its 
members but the law was revoked on 19 January 1993 which enabled 
the meetings possible between the two delegations of the Israelis 
and PLO in Oslo, Norway in order to conduct the Oslo Channel that 
culminated with the signing of the historic agreement between Israel 
and the Palestinians on 13 September 1993 at the White House lawn. 
'' Reich and Goldberg (2000), n. 57, p. 250 
It is important to remember the fact that only after a few 
months after the Madrid Conference conducted in Washington got 
entangled in a political and legal quagmire. Representatives of both 
Israel and Palestinians entrenched in their known positions and 
started making prepared statements basically aimed at their own 
constituencies which hindered any progress following the Madrid 
peace process. It is also important to note that in the period prior to 
and during the Oslo Process, the Palestinian armed struggle 
continued. Also the terrorism of fundamentalist Islamic groups linked 
to the PLO continued their attacks against Israelis both in the 
occupied territories and within the green Line, against civilians and 
soldiers. 
Abu Ala, the chief delegate of the PLO reiterated the views of the 
organisation and its leader Yasser Arafat and declared that the PLO 
had made a historic decision and had recognised the need for 
peaceful co-existence with the State of Israel, and had to amend the 
strategic goals of the PLO and negotiate the establishment of an 
independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza with East 
Jerusalem as its capital. 
In their first meeting the mistrust seemed to have been lifted and 
expressed their commitment to finding a pragmatic, creative and 
realistic solution acceptable to both sides. Moreover a methodology 
was also agreed upon. It was based on a forward — looking approach 
involving practical discussions, focussing on building a better future 
for both sides, rather than engaging in debates on correcting the 
past. The message conveyed by the PLO representative was quite 
clear- a wish to end the historic conflict through special measures 
and to reach a political agreement on the basis of UNSCR 242, the 
1967 borders, mutual trust and understanding taking into account 
Israeli Security interests based on openness, cooperation, 
coordination, rather than cold peace and hostility. 
The second meeting in Oslo resulted in the creation of a 
framework within which a draft of a joint Israeli-Palestinian 
Declaration of Principles was discussed. 
In May 1993, after the first draft was approved within the Oslo 
framework, Rabin and his Foreign Minister Shimon Peres decided to 
turn the secret and informal track into an official and secret channel 
of negotiations between the Government of Israel and the PLO, and 
to adopt the draft that was prepared during the first five months as 
the basis for these negotiations 
The negotiations in Oslo carried on for an additional four months. 
As a result, on 8 and 9 September 1993 the letters were signed 
between Chairman Arafat and Prime Minister Rabin, according to 
which the Government of Israel recognised the PLO as the 
representative of the Palestinian people. Accordingly, the PLO 
recognised the right to exist for Israel in peace and security. Both the 
parties accepted UN Resolution 242 and 338 and committed 
themselves to a peaceful resolution of the conflict and all 
outstanding issues relating to permanent status through 
negotiations, thus renouncing the use of terrorism and other acts of 
violence, which endangered peace and stability. 
5 
Following the elections in 1992 and Yitzhak Rabin, leader of the 
Labour Party becoming Prime Minister of Israel, secret talks started 
between PLO and Israelis. It was an attempt on the part of the Prime 
Minister to revive the Madrid Process and bilateral negotiations with 
Palestinian delegation representing the West Bank and Gaza in Oslo, 
Norway. This agreement opened a new chapter that promised a 
better future for the whole of West Asia. Under the auspices of the 
Norwegian Foreign Minister, the two sides hammered out a 
Declaration of Principles (DOP) on Palestinian Self Rule. The 
agreement provided for the self - rule in the Gaza Strip and Jericho, 
followed by Palestinian civil administration over the West Bank for a 
five year interim period. The signing of Oslo agreement took place 
between Rabin and Yasser Arafat in white House Rose Garden on 13 
September 1993. The agreement enabled Yasser Arafat to establish 
the PA (Palestinian Authority) in May 1994 to rule the town of Jericho 
and most of the Gaza Strip. But the PA did not gain control over other 
towns on the West Bank until another agreement signed in 
September 1995 (called Oslo II or the Taba agreement). Oslo II also 
enabled Yasser Arafat to hold elections in January 1996 for an eighty-
eighty- seat Legislative Council and for the Presidency, which Arafat 
won easily. The precise details of the agreement were kept 
deliberately vague but it included: 
1) Early withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza and Jericho area. 
2) The redeployment of Israeli troops in other areas of the West 
bank. 
3) Creation of a 'Palestinian interim Self-Government Authority'. 
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4) The gradual transfer of civic power to a Palestinian Authority. 
5) The Creation of Palestinian police force. 
6) The election of a Palestinian Council. 
7) Called for a permanent settlement in five years.70 
2.4. OSLO 11 
The formally signed Israeli-PLO declaration of Principle on 
Palestinian-Self Rule was however, delayed due to differences on key 
security issues between the two parties. 
The interim agreement of 1995 which was also called Oslo II 
provided: 
1) Elections for the eighty-eighty-seat Palestinian Assembly. 
2) Release of Israeli-held prisoners. 
3) Israeli withdrawal from six West Bank cities. 
This was as per the agreement shown in Map No. 4 
70 For the text of Oslo Accords (1993), See (on line: WebJ Assessed 12 June 2005, URL: ";t ~ 	ti+~w.hrookinQS. 
edu/press/appendix/peace-process.htm. 
58 
Map No.4 
Oslo II, 1995 
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The Israeli forces withdrew from the West bank cities by the 
end of 1995 and the Palestinian Assembly was elected on 20 
January 1996, sworn on 7 March 1996. Israel recognised PLO as 
the sole representative of the Palestinian people in the peace 
negotiations and promised five years of further progress. Arafat 
got from the Oslo Accords the assurance of organising a form of 
Palestinian Government and continued to stay in power in 
order to administer Palestinian affairs in the West Bank and 
Gaza. Arafat did not get any other specific concessions such as 
a time table for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. 
Although Yitzhak Rabin, Simon Peres and Yasser Arafat all 
received the Nobel Peace Prize for their outstanding and historic 
achievement, there was great opposition from radical elements on 
both the sides. 
After Oslo agreement, peace efforts suffered serious setback 
when Rabin fell to an assassin's bullet, Yigal Amir, a right wing and 
religious fanatic. Israeli Prime Minister died minutes later. This killing 
was a great blow to Oslo Peace Process resulting into Israeli 
tightened hold on the occupied territories and led to further violence 
from the Palestinians. 
Oslo Accords was the first Arab Israeli agreement since 1967 that 
was negotiated without significant involvement by the US 
Government but Bill Clinton was a gracious host. Clinton helped to 
mobilise international economic aid of about $ 2 billion over several 
years for the development in the West Bank and Gaza, including $ 
500 million contribution from the United States.71 Clinton made 
sustained efforts for an accommodation between Israel and 
71  Bill Clinton (2004), My Life, (Autobiography), London: Hutchinson, p. 545. 
Palestinians and ordered the negotiations to take their own course. 
Oslo was not an American designed agreement like the Camp David 
Accords of September 1978.72 Therefore, the parties had less reason 
to turn to Washington when disputes arose. 
As a consequence, violent clashes erupted in the West Bank 
between Palestinians and Israeli security forces. Since the outbreak 
of the al Aqsa intifada on 28 September 2000, Israeli security forces 
and Palestinians have been engaged in confrontation. Palestinians 
further demonstrated their frustration at the lack of progress in the 
peace process and their failure to achieve statehood. Despite these 
setbacks, the US sponsored a series of peace talks at Sharm el-Sheikh, 
Bolling Air Force Base and at Camp David in July 2000. 
2.5. The Hebron Protocol 
Hebron Protocol talks started on 7 January 1997 and were 
concluded on 17 January 1997. The talks were held between Israeli 
Prime Minister Netanyahu and the PLO Chief Yasser Arafat, under the 
supervision of the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher for 
redeployment of Israeli military forces in Hebron in accordance with 
the Interim Agreement (or Oslo II of September 1995) on the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip. The Hebron protocol was part of a series of 
diplomatic accords. And these were in addition to other Israeli-
Palestinian accords agreed and signed during OSLO 11 and after wards 
as follows: 
'Z Quandt, (2005), n. 7S.pp. 330-342. 
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1) Protocol on Economic Relations, signed in Paris on April 29, 
1994 
2) Cairo Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area 4 May 
1994 
3) Washington Declaration 25 July 1994 
4) Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and 
Responsibilities between Israel and PLO 29 August 1994 
5) Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities 
signed at Cairo on 27 August 1995 
6) Protocol concerning the Redeployment in Hebron 15-17 
January 1997 
7) Wye river Memorandum 23 October 1998 
8) Sharm al-Sheikh Memorandum 4 September 1999 
9) Taba Summit 27 January 2001 
The Palestinian Authority jurisdiction resulting from OSLO Agreement 
was/is illustrated as depicted in Map No. 5. 
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The unexpected assassination of Yitzhak Rabin left Israeli State 
and its people in a great shock and the peace process was left 
without one of its most crucial players." Israel began the first 
redeployment of Israeli forces in Hebron as provided in the interim 
agreement. During the next two months after the assassination of 
Rabin, Israeli forces withdrew from most of the Palestinian cities with 
the exception of Hebron. Withdrawal from most of Hebron was 
promised to take place twenty-two days prior to the election for the 
Palestinian Legislative Council in January 1996. In a little over one 
week from 25 February to 4 March 1996 about sixty four Israelis 
were killed in a spate of suicide bombing in Israeli cities. The attacks 
were said to have been in retaliation for the Israeli killing of a 
Palestinian resistance leader but these extremist killings virtually 
brought the peace process to a standstill. As a consequence the 
Labour Party became discredited in the eyes of Israeli people and the 
right wing Likud Party won the elections and Benjamin Netanyahu 
became the Prime Minister of Israel. Netanyahu was well known for 
his extreme views on Palestinian State, return of refugees, 
settlements in the occupied territories, final status on Jerusalem, etc. 
He was openly against pursuing the Oslo Peace Process, although it 
did not officially end with the election of Netanyahu, but there was 
no commitment to continue it further. His interest in an expanded 
settlement was loud and clear. However Netanyahu's coalition guide 
lines called for negotiations to reach a permanent arrangement only 
if the Palestinians fulfil all commitments fully, opposed to the 
establishment of Palestinian State West of the Jordan River, vowed to 
ensure the existence and security of the Jewish settlements and to 
keep Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty. On 2 August 1996, his 
cabinet abolished most of the restraints on settlements. In 
September 1996, Palestinians protested violently against Israel's 
"' Millian B. Quondt (2005), peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli-Conflict since 1967 third 
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opening of access to the Jewish archaeological sites. In the October 
1-2 summit meeting the two sides resumed talks and initiated a 
protocol concerning the redeployment in Hebron by 15 January 1997. 
The subsequent Israeli redeployed though fell far short of the 
Palestinian demands. 
The Hebron Protocol was a complex set of arrangements that 
consisted of a number of segments, in chronological order: 
1) The Agreed Minute of 7 January 1997 
2) The Note for the Record of 15 January 1997 
3) The actual Protocol Concerning Redeployment in Hebron of 17 
January 1997 
4) A Letter to be provided by the US Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher to Benjamin Netanyahu at the time of signing of 
the Hebron Protocol on 17 January 1997. 
5) An Agreement on Temporary international Presence in Hebron 
(TIPH) on 21 January 1997 
Agreed Minute: 
The Agreed Minute was concluded on 7 January 1997, and in it 
the Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat 
agreed that the process of reopening an important street in the West 
Bank town of Hebron, the Shuhada Road, would be initiated 
immediately, and would be completed within four months. This work 
would take place in conjunction with the implementation of the main 
Hebron Protocol. 
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Note for the Record 
This note stated that Netanyahu Arafat met in Erez on 15 
January 1997, in the presence of the U.S. special West Asian 
coordinator Dennis Ross. They requested him to prepare a "note for 
the record" to summarise what had been agreed to at their meeting: 
That the Oslo Peace Process (1993) must move forward to succeed 
and that they had concerns and obligation about the Interim 
Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Interim Agreement 
or Oslo II 1995). Accordingly, the two leaders reaffirmed their 
commitment to implement the interim agreement on the basis of 
reciprocity and, in that context, conveyed the following undertakings 
to each other: 
Obligations to be honoured by Israel 
Israel reaffirmed its commitment to the following measures and 
principles in accordance with the Interim Agreement: 
1) The first phase of the further redeployments will be carried out 
during the first week of March. 
2) Prisoners release issues will be dealt with in accordance with 
the Interim Agreement's provisions and procedure, including 
Annex VII. 
3) Negotiations on the following outstanding issues will be 
resumed immediately and conducted in parallel: 
a) Safe Passage 
b) Gaza Airport 
c) Gaza sea port 
d) Passages 
e) Economic, financial, civilian and security issues 
f) People-to —people contact 
b 
4) Permanent Status negotiations will be resumed within two 
months after implementation of the Hebron Protocol. 
Obligations to be honoured by the Palestinians 
The Palestinian side reaffirmed its commitments to the 
following measures and principles in accordance with the Interim 
Agreement: 
1) Complete the process of revising the Palestinian National 
Charter. 
2) Fighting terror and preventing violence: 
a) Strengthening security cooperation 
b) Preventing incitement and hostile propaganda, as specified in 
Article XXII of the Interim Agreement 
c) Combat systematically and effectively terrorist organisations 
and infrastructure 
d) Apprehension, prosecution and punishment of terrorists 
e) Request for transfer of suspects and defendants will be acted 
upon in accordance with Article II (7)(f) of Annex IV to the 
Interim Agreement. 
f) Confiscation of illegal fire arms. 
g) Size of the Palestinian Police will be pursuant to the Interim 
Agreement. 
h) Exercise of Palestinian governmental activity, and location of 
Palestinian governmental offices, will be as specified in the 
Interim Agreement. 
With the conclusion of the negotiations regarding Hebron, both 
sides will have to continue their dialogue. The process was long and 
arduous and had its share of "ups and downs", nevertheless, these 
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negotiations have shown that vital interests joined with good faith on 
the part of all concerned will lead to progress. 
"People to people" contacts, which are an integral part of the 
Interim Agreement and were aimed at creating mutual respect and 
building bridges between Israel and the Palestinians, are/were of 
special importance and significance. 
2.6. Failure of Peace process 
The failure to complete the withdrawal was certainly a factor in 
the failure of the Oslo Accord, but there were several other factors. It 
is also commonly believed that the failure of the West Asian peace 
process to resolve the Palestinian Israeli conflict occurred at the 
Camp David II summit in July 2000(see Appendix 8). According to 
American policy makers, Camp David offered an opportunity for 
peace in West Asia but it was missed by PLO, Bill Clinton publicly 
blamed Palestinian Authority for this failure. However, according to 
Yasser Arafat, the summit's failure was not due to the Palestinians 
alone but to the Israelis and Americans as well, and that the failure of 
the Oslo Peace Process was due largely to faulty negotiating styles, 
poor management of the implementation process, and the 
unwillingness of right-wing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu to honour negotiated agreements. 
The DOP and the subsequent agreements were flawed: the 
interim nature of Oslo opened the way for opponents to provoke and 
cause disruption of the process; the agreement provided no clear 
indication of the end game, namely the goal of statehood that might 
have given the Palestinians greater enthusiasm in implementation; 
and the agreements neglected to provide a forceful, over all 
monitoring mechanism to ensure implementation and to prevent the 
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numerous delays and a need for even more formal agreements. A 
number of clauses simply had not been implemented, such as the 
release of prisoners, provision of safe passage between the Gaza 
Strip and the West Bank, the buildings of an airport and a seaport 
and many others. The absence of a direct interdiction on settlement 
buildings meant that settlements could and were expanded, with still 
more expropriation of land for settlement expansion and for the 
building of by-pass roads. The Israeli effort to exclude East Jerusalem 
from Palestinian jurisdiction and its refusal to discuss the city led to 
the closure of East Jerusalem to non-resident Palestinians, along with 
periodic closures and road- blocks within the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip, in part connected with the redeployments and by-pass roads all 
of which contributed to limitations on Palestinian's freedom of 
movement. Moreover, the Palestinians felt that they were being 
called upon to protect the Israelis, i.e. to prevent terrorism, and that 
they were losing domestic political support for attempting to do so. 
Thus, in the eyes of Palestinian they were actually losing out, as a 
result of Oslo while Israel was the real and only beneficiary. 
Israel did indeed benefit from Oslo Peace Process: Israel's 
pariah status on the world scene had ended, along with most of the 
indirect and some direct Arab boycotts; Israel doubled the number of 
countries with which it had diplomatic relations, it got a peace treaty 
with Jordan, investment and tourism skyrocketed including tourism 
with some Arab countries, all leading to an economic boom for the 
Israelis. 
Yet the Palestinians too contributed to the failure of Oslo 
Accords. There were indeed Palestinians violations, most connected 
with security matters of concern to Israel such as the size of the 
police, the number of weapons they held, the apprehension and 
extradition of suspected terrorist and the like. The most serious 
Israeli grievance revolved around the actual acts of terrorism, and 
these in turn strengthened the political opposition leading to a return 
to power of the right-wing and providing "justification" for the new, 
ideologically anti-Oslo government to virtually hold the process. The 
most basic of principles for coexistence there must be more 
negotiations, more confidence building measures and more 
demonstrations of a desire to resolve differences and live together 
without using violence. 
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CHAPTER - 3 
Wye River & Sharm el Sheikh Memorandum and the Peace 
Process 
3.1. Introduction 
The Wye River Memorandum was an agreement negotiated 
between Israel and the Palestine Authority to implement the earlier 
Interim Agreement of 28 September 1995. Brokered by the United 
States at the Aspen Institute Wye River Conference Centres near Wye 
River, Maryland, it was signed on 23 October 1998. 
Clinton opened the summit at Wye River Conference Centre on 
15 October and returned at least six times to the site to press 
Netanyahu and Arafat to finalize the deal. Clinton also invited King 
Hussein of Jordan to join the talks and try to ease out tensions 
between the two leaders. 
The Memorandum provides that the provisions in the 
agreement are subject to the relevant terms and conditions of the 
preceding agreements. The Memorandum places the focus of 
Palestinian obligations firmly on Palestinian security commitments 
underlined in the Interim Agreement. The agreement was finally 
signed by Netanyahu and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat at the White 
House, with Bill Clinton as the official witness, On 17 November 1998, 
Israel's Parliament, the Knesset, approved the Wye River 
Memorandum by a vote of 75-19. 
3.2. The Wye River Memorandum 
The Memorandum aims at implementation of the Interim 
Agreement and of agreements specified in Notes for Record that 
accompanied the Hebron protocol. Israel will redeploy from 
territories in the west Bank in exchange for Palestinian security 
measures. The PA will have complete or shared responsibility for 40% 
the West Bank of which it will have complete control of 18.2% 
Palestinians assure systematic combat of terrorist organisations and 
their infrastructure. 
Their work plan will be shared with United States. A Palestinian 
and US committee will review steps to counter terrorism. The 
Palestinians will prohibit illegal weapons. The Palestinians will 
prohibit incitement to violence and terror and establish a mechanism 
to act against provocateurs. 
A US Palestinian-Israel Committee will monitor incitement and 
recommend how to prevent it. Israeli-Palestinian security 
cooperation will be full, continuous and comprehensive. A trilateral 
control committee will meet not less than bi-weekly to assess threats 
and deal with impediments to cooperation. The Palestinians will 
provide a list of their policemen to the Israelis. The PLO Executive and 
Control Committees will reaffirm the 22 January 1998, letter from 
Arafat to President Clinton that specified articles of the Palestinian 
Charter that had been nullified in April 1996. The Palestine National 
Council will reaffirm these decisions. They agreed to work to agree on 
safe passage between the Gaza Strip and West Bank and on Gaza Sea 
Port.74 Permanent Status talks will be resumed when Memorandum 
"' http://orin.dep.no.ud/engIish/doc/reports/032005-990785/doct-bn 
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will take effect. A time line was an "integral attachment" to the 
Memorandum. 
3.3. The Role of Israeli Government 
The Israeli Parliament by a large majority approved the terms of 
the agreement, though Netanyahu received virtually no support for 
the agreement among his right wing/religious coalition partner. 
Although both parties to the agreement had agreed not to undertake 
'unilateral actions' to change the status of the occupied territories, 
members of Netanyahu's coalition publicly called on settler groups 
population to take as much land as possible to keep it out of 
Palestinian hands. Ariel Sharon, Foreign & the Infrastructure Minister, 
told a Tsomet party gathering on 15 November that "Everyone has to 
move, run and grab as many hilltops as they can to enlarge the 
settlements because everything we take now will stay ours. 
Everything we don't grab will go to them. This issue of settlers was 
coordinated behind closed doors with the army and not in front of 
the media. On 20 December 1998, the Israeli Government suspended 
the second redeployment stipulated in the Wye Memorandum unless 
the Palestinian Authority met five conditions, most of which were 
new. Netanyahu claimed that it was necessary to suspend the 
redeployment to safeguard Israel's security.75 
Media in the First World had become more critical accusing 
Israel of procrastination and derailment of the peace process. These 
were the developments that were shaping the future of the region, 
enforcing new realities that cannot be reversed by any mad 
adventure or miscalculation. Mr. Netanyahu and other leaders in 
Israel recognised the lasting impacts of such developments and were 
's Israel and Palestine, Berry Mike and Phllo Greg, p 105 
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reconciling with the absolute fact that the establishment of the state 
of Palestine is an invisible conclusion. Their hostile attitude is sadly 
focussing on measures to minimise these impacts and extract every 
possible concession, which may curtail the Palestinian dream in self 
determination and independent state with Jerusalem as its capital. 
Israel's leadership failed to realise that this approach could only 
prolong an early settlement, complicate the burning issues invite 
discontent, weaken the people's faith in peace and encourage 
catastrophic events out of distress and disappointment. It could only 
prolong the suffering of innocent civilians in Palestine, in the 
neighbourhood and Israel itself, and cast dark shadow over the hopes 
and aspirations of the people of the region and world community in 
maintaining a just and lasting peace.76 
3.4. The Role of USA 
As repeated crises arose between the Netanyahu government 
and the Palestinian Authority over commitments made by both sides 
but not carried out, the Clinton Administration remained concerned 
more into dealing with the smallest details of the new Israeli-
Palestinian relationship approaching at times in the role of de-facto 
arbitrator rather than that of mediator. In the absence of any 
personal rapport between Netanyahu and Arafat (as had been 
achieved eventually between Rabin/Peres and Arafat) both sides 
during this period had either sought or acquiesced in this intensified 
American role. However, playing that role as intensely as President 
Clinton was forced to do in late October 1998 to achieve the Wye 
River Memorandum between Netanyahu and Arafat, inevitably 
added to an already mistrust and continuous personal relationship 
Ibld, p.145 
between Netanyahu and Clinton. Their mutual suspicions were 
further exacerbated by Netanyahu's successful cultivation of 
relations with the key Republican leaders in the US Congress then 
controlled by Clinton's political opponents. Thus, while the strategic 
security relationship between the Israeli Government and 
Washington had grown ever stronger, re-imposed by joint efforts to 
develop and effective defence shield against ballistic missiles, 
Clinton's efforts during the second term to consolidate his peaceful 
achievements in the West Asia had largely frustrated." 
However, regardless of its faltering and shortcomings, the 
peace process on the Oslo Accords, in the Clinton Administration's 
view, apparently superseded the entire basis of earlier US policy. But 
it was not correct to say that simply because Arafat might have 
accepted the loss of rights belonging to populations under military 
occupation (Sharon's plan to nearly double the number of West Bank 
shelters), the US backsliding on long established positions were 
desirable. On the contrary, had Washington remained firm, the 
United States might face fewer potentially disruptive domestic 
obstacles, and Palestinian Authority might be in a better position to 
carry out negotiations where much of the substance had already 
been decided.78 
It is not worthy that for nearly twenty years the US barred the 
PLO from participating in the US sponsored peace process on the 
ground that the UN Security Council Resolution 242 had to be the 
basis of negotiations. The resolution did not recognise Palestinian 
national rights, but it did call on the Israeli withdrawal from the 
occupied territories in return for security guarantee, allowing for only 
7,'Lweis, 1999 : 311-72 (Gulrez Sb 97) 
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very minor territorial adjustment to strengthen some of the lines 
from the 1949 Armistice which formed the borders of Israel and 
insisting that such adjustments had to be mutual. 
3.5. Implementation of Wye 
In the month of November 1998 the Israeli Knesset ratified the 
Wye Memorandum by 65 votes to 19. Few days later the Israeli 
Government implemented the first stage of renewed redeployment 
from the West Bank, also releasing 250 Palestinians prisoners and 
signing a protocol allowing for the inauguration of an international 
airport at Gaza.79 With ongoing West Asia Peace Process, Israel and 
Palestinians exchanged angry accusations over Jewish settlement and 
street clashes. Ahmad Qurei, speaker of the Palestinian Parliament, 
warned of possible violence if Israel continued to expand settlements 
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, where the Palestinians hope to 
establish a state. "if settlement activity continued, then all means of 
resistance are opened" Qurei, who is also known as Abu Ala, told 
reporters in West Bank town of Ramallah. Since the signing of a land 
for security accord, Jewish settlers had accelerated the establishment 
of make shift communities on West Bank hill tops, to keep the land 
from being turned over to the Palestinians. After an attack on an 
Israeli soldier by a Palestinian mob in West Bank on 7 December, 
Israel announced that it was suspending the accord until the 
Palestinians stopped violating the agreement.80 
Israeli Channel 2TV reported that Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu under pressure from the hard liners who threatened to 
destabilise his government over the accord, had secretly agreed to 
Europa, p 543 
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freeze the deal days before the attack to use Palestinians violations 
as an excuse. 
The report said that Nissim Somalianski, a member of the 
National Religious Party (NRP) told Netanyahu that if he went ahead 
with further West Bank troop withdrawal under the latest peace 
accord, the NRP would topple the government. Somalianski refused 
to comment directly on the report.81  
During December 1998 it became increasingly evident that 
division within Netanyahu's party and coalition over implementation 
of the Wye Memorandum were making effective government 
untenable. Attempts to rescue the coalition by offering to reappoint 
David Larry to the government were far shorten when the Gesher of 
the coalition member refused the terms proposed by Netanyahu. 
Moreover, on 16 December Yaccor Neeman, the Minister of Finance 
announced his resignation, stating that the coalition was no longer 
funding and on 21 December Netanyahu was forced to support an 
opposition motion demanding the dissolution of the Knesset and the 
organisation of early elections to the legislature and premiership in, 
the May of 1999. 
3.6. Clinton's visit to Gaza 
For a change, US, Palestinian and Israeli leaders emerged from a 
three-way Summit without any pretence that they had been able to 
inject fresh memorandum into the negotiations. From the 
assessment made by various political quarters in Israel, and the very 
fact that a US President made something very close to a state visit to 
Palestinian-controlled territory, it would appear that Palestinian 
statehood has now become an established fact. The Palestinian had 
81 Ibid, 101 dated 8 December 1998 
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not declared sovereignty and the US had not announced{ that it 
would recognise such a declaration but it was more or less clear that 
the negotiations would lead to Palestinian statehood and that the US 
was comfortable about such a denouncement. Mr. Clinton stopped 
just short of recognising the Palestinian right to self determination 
when he said that the Palestinian now had the opportunity to shape 
their own destiny in their own homeland. Clinton's main purpose in 
visiting Israel and Palestine was to push the protagonist to implement 
the Wye Memorandum agreement, which sets out the method and 
form in which these preliminary issues have to be tackled. US 
President also made it clear, after the summit that the day he 
thought the schedule for the implementation of Wye Memorandum 
was of paramount importance. But Netanyahu still hold out in what 
was transparently an effort to snatch some sign of victory from a 
major blow to his political agenda.82 
The Israeli Prime Minister insisted the vote taken by the 
Palestinian National Council (to revoke clauses of their covenant 
which call for the destruction of Israel) came about only because 
Israel was firm that it should take place. Since then it had been 
demonstrated that Israeli firmness would produce a positive 
Palestinian response, so Mr. Netanyahu claimed it was then 
necessary that Israel insisted that the Palestinians fulfil other 
obligations. Mr. Netanyahu drawn up a list of four demands that the 
Palestinians must meet before he would fulfil his part of the Wye 
dealing and withdrew troops from a further portion of the West 
Bank. 
82 The Hindu, 16 December 1998 
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3.7. The Ultimate Fate of Wye River 
There was considerable unrest in the West Bank and Gaza prior 
to a visit by President Clinton in mid-December 1998. On 14 
December Clinton attended a meeting of the PLO's Palestine National 
Council (PNC), at which the removal from the Palestinian National 
Charter of all clauses seeking Israel's destruction was reaffirmed. The 
US President also attended the formal inauguration of the new 
airport at Gaza. At a meeting between Clinton, Arafat and Netanyahu 
at the Brez Check Point, Netanyahu reiterated accusation that 
Palestinians had not adequately addressed their security 
commitment and announced that he would not release of Palestinian 
prisoners considered to have 'blood on their hands'. Netanyahu also 
demanded that Arafat renounced his intention to unilaterally declare 
Palestinian statehood in May 1999. Arafat, for his part, conveyed for 
his own security concerns and reasserted demands for a "freeze" 
on the construction of the Jewish settlements in occupied territory. 
In the ongoing meeting Netanyahu announced that the second phase 
of Israeli troop deployment envisaged by the Wye Memorandum, 
scheduled for 18 December would not be undertaken. On 20 
December the Knesset voted to suspend implementation of the 
memorandum. In late December, Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmad Yasin 
was released from house arrest in Gaza. Yasin had detained as part of 
a high profile initiation by PA security forces to subdue Hamas 
activities following a failed suicide bomb attack on settler school 
children in October 1998.53 
Ultimately Israel suspended implementation of Wye Agreement 
in early December 1998, because Prime Minister Netanyahu said that 
Bd see Israel Palestine, Berry Mike and Phdo George, p 105. 
the Palestinians violated the Wye Agreement by threatening to 
declare a state which was not mentioned in this Agreement. 
3.8. Sharm eI-Sheikh Memorandum 
This memorandum also known as Wye II was signed on 4 
September 1999 by the Prime Minister Ehud Barak and the PLO 
Chairman Yasser Arafat at Sharm el-Sheikh in Egypt, over seen by the 
United States represented by the Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright. ( See Appendix 9) The memorandum was witnessed and co-
signed by President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and King II Abdullah of 
Jordan. The aim of the agreement was to implement the interim 
Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Oslo II of September 
1995) and to implement all other agreements between the PLO and 
Israel since September 1993.84 
Ehud Barak, as a prime Minister, invited by the speaker of the 
Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), Ahmad Quray to address the 
Israel Knesset. This was the first visit to the Israeli Parliament by a 
leading Palestinian official. Barak also moved to initiate negotiations 
with Syria rather than with Palestinians, which the Palestinians took 
as snub and an attempt to pressurise them. Barak argued that he 
persuade the Syrian track first because this problem was considered 
less intractable, and secondly, because Syria with its large army and 
non-conventional weapons was considered as 'existential threat'.85 
After four months of negotiations the Peace Talks between Israel and 
84 Protocol on Economic Relation 1994; 1994 Cairo Agreement on the Gaza Strip and thee Jericho Area, 1994 
Washington Declaration, Agreement on preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities between Israel 
and the PLO 1994; Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities 1995. 
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Syria collapsed without settlement. Both parties blamed each 
other.` 
Meanwhile, the first talks between Yasser Arafat and Prime 
Minister Barak were held at the Rez check Point in Gaza on 11 July 
1999. By late July relations had deteriorated, after Barak expressed 
the desire to combine the Israeli land withdrawal agreed under the 
terms of the Wye Memorandum with 'final status' negotiations. 
Subsequently, a revised Wye Memorandum was signed by 
Yasser Arafat and Ehud Barak in Sharm-El-Sheikh, Egypt on 4 
September 1999. The revised memorandum repeated the call for the 
swift resumption of accelerated 'final status' negotiations, but unlike 
the original Wye Agreement, called on Israel and the PA to conclude 
a Framework Agreement on permanent status issue or (FAPS) by 13 
February 2000 and a comprehensive 'final status' agreement by 13 
September 2000. Explosion of car bomb in a Haifa and Tiberius on 5 
September 1999, killing the three Palestinians bombers, though, 
failed to derail the implementation of the Sharm eI-Sheikh 
Memorandum. Following the signing of the agreement, Israel and 
the PA generally fulfilled their outstanding obligations, although 
frequently behind schedule. The amount of the land slated for 
transfer to full and partial PA control was the same under Sharm-El-
Sheikh was as under the original Wye Agreement, however, transfer 
was to take place in three sages instead of two. Israel was late in 
carrying out the first stage of the Sharm-El-Sheikh redeployment. It 
turned over maps to the PA on 9 September 1999 and carried out the 
transfer of 7% of the West Bank from Area C to Area B on 10 
September. However, the numerous pockets of land to come under 
°` Israel and Palestine, Berry Mike and Philo Greg, p. 107 
PA control were sparsely populated, and no IDF forces check points 
were moved. 
On 25 October a southern safe 'passage' for Palestinian 
travelling between Gaza and Hebron was finally opened, under the 
terms of the Wye Memorandum. In late November and early 
December 1999 Israel approved land plans to expand Jewish 
settlement in the West Bank, which convinced the PA that Israel was 
not negotiating in good faith. But the end of November interim talks 
had reached an impasse. The PA suspended 'final status' meeting 
saying it would no longer discuss anything with Israel except 
settlements. On 21 December Barak and Arafat held private 
discussion in Ramallah (their first ever meeting on Palestinian 
territory), after which they announced their intentions to resolve 
quickly the two most important outstanding interim obligations: the 
second stage of redeployment and final prisoner release.87 The 
second stage of West Bank redeployment was implemented on 6-7 
January 2000, when Israel transferred 2 percent of jointly controlled 
Area C. to Area B. evacuating 6 IDF posts. By mid February Area A 
represented 12, One percent of West Bank, Area B. 26.9 percent and 
Area C. 6.12 percent. On 16 January Israel postponed the 
implementation of the third stage of redeployment, planned for 20 
January, on the pretext that Barak would not have a chance to review 
the redeployment maps until he returned from his negotiation round 
with Syria. Meanwhile, on 17 January as many as twenty people were 
wounded in a bomb explosion at Hedera northern Israel, which 
appeared to have been perpetrated by the terrorists of Palestine 
origin. Although the 10 January deadline passed without a draft FAPS, 
S ' Middle East North Africa, p.544 
the US was sufficiently satisfied with efforts of both the sides to host 
a meeting in Washington. 
The general optimism generated after September 1999 by the 
fulfilment of some of the interim obligations outlined in the Sharm el-
Sheikh momentum evaporated by early 2000. Indeed, the 'final 
status' talks between Israel and PA appeared to be heading towards a 
stalemate.88 
3.9. Palestinian Political Prisoners 
The future of Palestinian political prisoners detained by Israeli 
authorities during the long history of Israeli-Palestinian conflict has 
long been considered central to the progress in Israeli Palestinian 
peace negotiations. It is reported by Palestinian sources that 
between the years after Six Day war in 1967 and the First Intifada 
(1988) more than six hundred thousand Palestinians were arrested 
and imprisoned for a week or more than a week, and this claim had 
been confirmed by the Jerusalem correspondent of the Guardian, 
England's news paper. Wholesale arrests of Palestinians consisted of 
young and old, children of 12 and 18 years and women were held in 
detention and interrogation cells as well as in prisons in occupied 
Palestinian territories and inside of Israel. Israeli authorities knew 
that was in contravention of international law particularly the Fourth 
Geneva Convention. 
The 1995 Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 
also known as Oslo II, calls for the release of Palestinian prisoners in 
stages as a series of "confidence building measures".R9 Because the 
Middle East North Africa, p5 4b 
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Accords failed to call for the immediate release of all Palestinian 
political prisoners, from signing of Oslo 1995 through 2001 an 
additional thirteen thousand Palestinians were arrested, tried or 
convicted, and there was no clause in Oslo prohibiting or pertaining 
to arrests made after the signing of the accords. 
The Wye Memorandum specified that Israel was to release 750 
Palestinian political prisoners, some 250 of which were released by 
the time of Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum in 1999. Wye second 
reduced the numbers who were to be released from five hundred to 
three fifty, and these were freed by mid-October 1999. Israeli 
pledged to release an unspecified numbers of prisoners at the 
beginning of Ramadan that very year. Some Political prisoners from 
East Jerusalem were also released. 
Physical Torture 
Until 1999 "moderate physical pressure" was permitted in the 
interrogation of suspects by the Israeli Shin Bet, as outlined in the 
London Commission report of 1987. BTselem, the Israeli information 
centre for Human Rights reported that the methods of interrogation 
included various techniques, such as depriving the interreges of sleep 
for a number of days by binding him or her in painful positions; 
playing loud music; covering their heads with filthy sack; exposing the 
interreges to extreme heat & cold, tightly cuffing the interreges 
hands, having the interreges stand in tied and down upwards; forcing 
the interreges to crouch on his toes with his hands tied behind him; 
violent shaking of the body; using threats & curses and feeding him 
poor quality and insufficient amounts of food. 
In 1997, the UNO's Committee against torture found that such 
methods of continued torture were in breach of the UNO Convention 
against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, a convention ratified by Israel 1991. In September 1999, 
a ruling by Israel's High Court repudiated the London Commission's 
position stating that the Israeli security agency, (ISA) does not have 
legal authority to use physical means of interrogation that are not 
"reasonable and fair" and that cause the detainee to suffer. 
The political prisoners in the mid 70s to early 80s were 
consisted of young and educated youths. They were familiar with the 
tactics of civil disobedience and unarmed protests. These political 
prisoners came in contact with the veteran guerrilla leaders who 
were in prison. They learnt many things from them including 
organisational skills, political indoctrination. These political prisoners 
of different affiliations when came in contact - decided to run 
educational program for one another in the prisons. Thus, many 
youths finishing their prison terms would go on to become leaders of 
student movements in Palestine Universities and colleges. 
Prison Education Programmes 
Since the occupation of the Palestinian territories in 1967, 
Israeli authorities initially banned Palestinian prisoners from using 
pen, pencils and papers while serving their terms. After a number of 
hunger strikes, the Israeli authorities gradually allowed Palestinian 
political prisoners access to pen, paper, books, news papers and 
certain amount of carefully monitored radio broadcasting. Palestinian 
political prisoners soon established a library in every prison and 
organised literacy classes, language courses, political discourse & 
orientation workshops. Thousands of prisoners learnt Hebrew in 
Israeli prisons. 
Hunger Strike 
In 1998, there were nine hunger strikes conducted by 
Palestinian prisoners in different prisons in Israel. More than 1000 of 
the 1,650 Palestinian prisoners being held in different Israeli jails 
went on a month long hunger strike in protest against arbitrary 
treatment, substandard prison conditions, use of solitary 
confinement, poor medical care, prohibiting of family visits and 
release of Palestinian political prisoners of all categories by the Israeli 
authorities. Mass demonstrations in solidarity with prisoners erupted 
through the area of Palestine self rule culminating on 15 May (the 
anniversary of Nakba) which ended on 18 May with seven 
Palestinians killed, one thousand injured and sixteen Israelis 
wounded.90 The Israeli authorities promised to look into the 
complaints and ease restrictions on relatives visit leading to the end 
of the hunger strike on 31 May 2001. An Israeli report released in 
June 2001 on conditions in the Shatta prison noted that the living 
conditions were "particularly harsh" in the wing where prisoners 
from occupied territories were held and concluded that the exposed 
tents and filthy bathrooms in which prisoners were housed and 
bathed were unfit for human use.91  
Second Intifada and the Peace Process 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict had arisen to a new level of blood-
shed and destruction in the form of al-Aqsa intifada. Since the 
outbreak of the aI-Agsa intifada on 29 September 2000, Israeli 
Defence Forces and the Palestinians have been engaged in a violent 
confrontation. The peace talks stalled at Camp David II in July 2000, 
and remain suspended since the Palestinian uprising began in 
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September. Palestinians demonstrated their frustration at the lack of 
progress in the peace process and their failure to achieve statehood. 
Despite various allegations, the al-Aqsa intifada was not planned or 
shaped as part of the policy of one side or the other. 
Fatah's suicide tactic was not a vehicle used to promote 
strategic or political interests but rather a necessary means of their 
political survival. Although the uprising was directed to primarily at 
Israel, it was also directed against the Fatah dominated Palestinian 
Authority and its failure to establish a viable state institution engaged 
in a process of national reform and reconstruction and democratic 
practice. 
Suicide bombing forced Israel to pull out of Palestinian 
territories that were not part of even peace agreements and without 
requiring the Palestinians to yield to any of its (Israeli) original 
demands. 
Threat perception of Israel intensified drastically. Consequently, 
it adopted deliberate and coercive counter measure to curb 
Palestinian militancy. Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) inflicted severe 
damage on Palestinian government and civilian infrastructures but 
far worse was the damage done to the idea of a "partner". 
The al-Aqsa intifada was a reaction to Israeli and the US 
attempts to impose unacceptable permanent-status settlement on 
the Palestinians and force them on two major issues: Jerusalem 
(including control of Haram al-Sharif) and the refugee problem. 
Furthermore, the resumption of violent conflict brought the most 
fragile peace related activities to a complete halt. The demise of the 
Oslo Peace Process was seen as the failure of the peace movement in 
its totality. The occupation of Palestinian territories with its 
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settlement construction undermined not only the future of 
Palestinian state but also Israel's democratic ideals. 
Israel claimed that Arafat instructed the dominant Palestinian 
political faction, Fatah, to incite the Palestinian public to demonstrate 
and throw stones at soldiers. But Fatah's ability to mobilize the 
Palestinian street was circumscribed by widespread disillusionment 
with the PA and a more general political apathy. No less important, 
there was nothing, Arafat could have said or done to incite 
Palestinians more than Israel and its actions. At the same time, Arafat 
was also concerned that he would never ever be a partner in 'peace 
again'. 
The peace process was badly eroded due to Israel's 
intransigence and its settlement policies in Occupied Palestinian 
Territories. The two-state solution, however, was most seriously 
threatened by the on-going construction of Israeli colonies and by-
pass roads aimed at incorporating the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories into Israel. Without a halt, of such constructions, a two-
state solution may simply be impossible to implement. The situation 
undoubtedly hardened positions on both sides, with extremists in 
both Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories claiming all of 
historic Palestine. 
The international consensus for peace in West Asia has involved 
withdrawal of Israeli forces to internationally recognised (pre-June 
1967) boundaries in return for security guarantees from Israel's 
neighbours, the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip, a shared Jerusalem as the co-capital of both states, 
and a just resolution for the Palestinian refugees. The United States, 
however, rejected the international consensus for the establishment 
8S 
of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel on the basis of 
the UN Security Council resolution reflecting the international 
consensus which had the support of the entire international 
community including most Arab states and the Palestinians. It was 
put up or for a vote as far back as 1976, but was opposed by Israel 
and was vetoed by the United States. 
This strident opposition to Palestinian - statehood finally shifted 
when President Clinton towards the end of his Presidency declared 
that the United States would support a Palestinian state in parts of 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, his administration made it 
clear that the US would not support anything beyond the very limited 
sovereignty and severely circumscribed boundaries that the Israeli 
occupiers were willing to offer. 
The American factor in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could be 
outlined as: 
The Jewish people today are predominantly an American people 
in the sense that there are many more Jews than any other 
nationality in the US than in Israel itself. 
American Jewish establishment taps the extra-ordinary energy, 
unfailing generosity of its members for the causes of Zionism and 
Israel. 
Popular American notion that Israel is a pioneering society much 
like America, and a tiny democratic struggling country is the sole 
friend of America in West Asia, threatened by the fanaticism of 
terrorism. 
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The Jewish lobby contributes substantially to the maintenance of a 
special relationship between America and Israel. 
The impact of all this over the decades is most noticeable in the 
Congress which has become very responsive to pro-Israel activism. 
The US continued to find strategic relevance of Israel after the 
disintegration of Soviet Union and end of the Cold War. Various US 
administrations have been compelled to intervene in the region in 
the name of protection of the values of freedom, independence, and 
democracy and to stop terrorism threatening the security of the 
global order. Israel's military and intelligence capabilities and 
strategic location contributed to the US objective of containing Soviet 
expansion into the region. But friendly US-Israeli ties did not advance 
other US interests in West Asia. 
As US relations with Arab nations improved, the United States 
attempted to balance its stated commitment to Israel with other 
regional commitments and interests. It is believed that many Jews in 
America have supported the idea of a Palestinian state and are of the 
view that resolving Palestinian-Israeli conflict would help America to 
win support around the world in its war against extremism and 
terrorism. Many believed that America should play a positive role in 
the West Asian peace process even if it disagreed with Israelis.92 
In recent years, the situation of the Arabs in Israel has improved 
in every way with respect to standard of living, level of education and 
civil rights but they confront discrimination in Israel and considerable 
gap between them and Jewish Israelis remained. Discrimination 
continues in allocation of public resources and social wealth; the 
State of Israel continues to be Jewish in its foundation and in its 
9~Reverly Milton-Edwards, 7OO61, Cnrtemporsry Middle Cast, Cambridge UK: Polity Press, pp 237. 
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agenda; and the Arabs do not enjoy collective rights as a national 
minority. Relations between Jews and Palestinians in Israel have not 
been the same since the al-Agsa intifada. The fracture would not be 
mended without the security guarantees to the Israelis and the 
establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Obviously, there 
could be no comprehensive solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
without resolving issues of Jerusalem and the plight of the Palestinian 
refugees. 
Thousands Palestinian activists have been held as political 
prisoner subjected to severe kind of tortures. Nevertheless, 
Palestinians political prisoners have been a back bone of the 
Palestinian National movement, steadfast and firm in their 
commitment to the Palestinian struggle for the liberation. For them it 
is the struggle for the Palestinian people for their basic right of self 
determination for statehood. 
91 
CHAPTER - 4 
Clinton Peace Plan: Israeli and Palestinian Response 
4.1. Introduction 
The United States devoted remarkable energy and resources to 
the Israeli Palestinian peace process during the tenure of Bill Clinton. 
Peacemaking in West Asia became a major focus for Clinton ever 
since the historic handshake between Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin 
in his presence at the White House lawns on 30 September 1993.93  
Subsequently, Washington became a regular venue for bilateral and 
trilateral summits that brought Clinton and Arafat and successive 
Israeli Prime Ministers together. Following the election of Ehud Barak 
as Israeli Prime Minister in 1999, both Palestinians and Israelis were 
optimistic about Clinton's personal involvement in their negotiations. 
During the last years of Clinton Administration (2000-01 
January), the US came out with a series of peace proposals with three 
major initiatives. 
1) Camp David Talks 11 July 2000 
2) Sharm el-Sheikh Summit, 16 October 2000 
3) Bill Clinton proposal, 23 December 2000 
President Clinton assumed office in January 1993 with a strong 
administration and sympathy for Israel. Indeed Bill Clinton was 
viewed by many Israeli observers as the most pro-Israeli president in 
history.94 As matter of fact the US Congress is the most pro-Israeli 
parliamentary body in the world, it is not surprising that Clinton was 
93Samuel W, Lewis, "The United States.nd Israel Evolution of an unwritten AlMonce", Mldde East Journal 1999, 
53(3): op. 365 378. 
Y4 Norton, Augustus Richard, "Amerca's Middle East Peace Cris Y' Current IVotory, 2001, 100 (642):pp.3-9. 
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also a little too more pro-Israeli US President. The President was well 
aware of the phenomenal power the Jews wielded in the American 
body politic. This included their extensive control of the American 
media. The news media have been virtually in control and guided by 
the Jewish lobby. Majority of Jewish votes, perhaps 90 percent went 
to Clinton. A large number of Jews in America had been inducted in 
his Administration. US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright and 
William Cohen, The US Defence Secretary were Jews. Two more Jews 
who were involved in the peace process were Dennis Ross and 
Martin Indyk. Clinton's five of seven advisers were Jewish, namely, 
Robert Reich, Ira Magaziner, Robert J. Shapiro, Samuel R. Berger, 
Michael Mandelbaum. There was not one single department of his 
administration which did not have the majority of Jews. Clinton being 
pro-Israel in his own right was clearly evident when Washington and 
Israel signed agreements on Arrow missile programme, the nautilus 
high energy laser system, giving Israel F-15 fighter aircrafts, training 
Israeli astronauts programme, selling Israel super computers. 
President Clinton, during his term of office, did not criticise Israel 
once for any action. 
Palestinians were not accepted as equal contenders for policy 
maker's attention during Clinton's Administration. Hence the working 
assumptions that guided American negotiators tarnished their 
credibility with Arabs as the honest brokers.95  
4.2. Objectives of the Camp David Peace Summit 
As Clinton approached his last year in office, he was keen on 
striving a deal for West Asia. During the first two years of his second 
term, Clinton pressed on his contacts with Palestinian leader Yasser 
's Christian, Kathleen, "Bound by a Frame of Reference, Part III: U.S. Polley and the Palestinians, 1948-88", 
Journef Of Pa Iestine Studies, 1998, 2f(4):pp53-64. 
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Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, in order to bridge the 
gap between their positions.17 As William B Quandt has said, "Clinton 
had opted for Summit diplomacy08' as a last resort, not out of 
confidence that he could produce a deal." But there was no bright 
prospects, both Arafat and Barak were under considerable domestic 
political pressure, and it was by no means clear that either one was 
prepared to make hot decisions to win peace.99 However, Clinton 
pushed hard for a three- way summit at his meeting in Washington 
with Arafat on 14 June 2000. 
In June 2000, Clinton sent Secretary Albright and Dennis Ross to 
West Asia with the purpose to discuss the possibility of a trilateral 
summit in the United States and work out a final status agreement 
between the Palestinian and Israel.100  However, Arafat agreed that 
Palestinian Authority (PA) was not ready to jump to a final 'status 
accord' when Israel still refused to carry out obligations under 
existing interim agreement. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak 
96 Benjamin Netanyahu-soldier, diplomat and the ninth Prime Minister of the state of Israel June 1996to July 
1999, Foreign Minister of Israel November 2on2- February 2003 and was finance Minister of Israel until 9 
August 2005 
"Summit Diplomacy-the tensions of 1930's revived conference, diplomacy, which continued during World War 
II. Therefore, Summit meetings heads of government became the norm as technology again quickened the 
peace of Diplomacy. In the 1930s statement began to telephone each other, a pracice that was characterised 
in the 1960s by the Soviet American 'hotline'. Heads of states or government or foreign ministers meet by 
bilaterally 	or 	multilaterally. 	Encyclopaedia 	Britannica, 	2006, 	(online: 	med 
http.//www. britannica.com/eb/article-233753/diplomacy. 
'a William B. Quench, "Clinton and the Arab-Israeli conflict: The limits of instrumentalism", Journal of Palestine 
Studies, 2001, 30 (2j:pp. 26-40. 
99 Three Nationalist parties in the ruling coalition withdrew their support for the government, complaining that 
it failed to consult the parties over the extent of the concessions that Barak would be prepared to make at 
Camp David despite the Knesset vote of 'no-confidence the Israel Premier narrew'y survived prior to his 
departure for USA. Both Barak and Arafat announced to their respective cnnstituencies that any agrPPmPlts on 
a permanent status would subject to national referendums. Also see the Middle East and North Africa, Europe 
51 edn. Loncon: Europa publications, p. 20. 
t"0  Ambassador Dennis Ross is the Washington Institutes councillor and Ziegler dis Ling uishad fellows. He served 
as the director of policy planning in the State Department under George H. W. Bush and special Middle Last 
Coordinator under President Biil Clanton. The envoy and chief negotiator under both Republican and 
Democratic President, Ross was integral in shaping US involvement in West Asia peace process and dealing 
directly with the negotiations during his tenure. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2006(Online: 
webj Accessed 20 June 2006. UFGh to /, Nww, Washington Irstitute.org. 
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showed a positive outcome, although his coalition government was 
crumbling around him. 
President Clinton relied on the recommendations of the 
Secretary of State, Albright, and went to the summit with a 
confidence to achieve a historic agreement which would crown his 
political career. In his presence, Barak and Chairman Yasser Arafat 
met at Camp David from 11-24 July 2000, in an attempt to reach a 
permanent agreement. Prior to the summit, to bridge the substantial 
gaps that existed between them, Clinton announced the objectives of 
the Camp David peace summit as follows: 
1) To reach an agreement on the core issues that had fuelled half-
century of conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. 
2) Peace that could fulfil the Israeli people's quest for security. 
3) Genuine reconciliation with Palestinian people and genuine 
acceptance in the region. 
4) Peace that could fulfil the Palestinian people's legitimate 
aspirations to determine their destiny on their own land. 
5) And to build a better future for the Palestinian people.101  
Israeli Position: 
The well-known Israeli and Palestinian positions were the 
concerns on the key issues and reflect a wide range of differences. 
The Israeli position on the key issues can be summed up as follows: 
1) Annexation to Jerusalem the cities within the West Bank 
beyond the 1967 border. Like Ma'ale Adumim, Givat Ze'er and 
Gush Etzion. 
101Presiclent Bill Clinton (2001), Remarks Announcing the Camp David West Asia Peace Summit and An 
Exchange with Reporters, 5 July 2000. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 
Book II- June 27 to 11 October, 2000, Published by office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records 
of Administration, Washington: 2001.pp.1380-84. 
2) Palestinian sovereignty over certain villages or small cities 
annexed to Jerusalem after 1967. 
3) No relinquishment of the parts of Jerusalem taken in 1967 War 
Ehud Barak's positions on other issues were: 
a) No right of return for the Palestinian refugees into Israel 
proper. 
b) 80 percent of Israeli settlers within settlement blocks under 
Israeli sovereignty. 
c) No militarisation of the West bank and Gaza. 
d) Permanent recognised borders for the State of Israel 
e) Security arrangements that would provide adequate safeguards 
for Israel against external threats.102 The Palestinians reacted 
over the Israeli position when Abu Mazan in his speech at the 
meeting of the PLO's Palestinian Central Council stated: 
The Position we have adopted are, from our point of 
View, the minimum that we can accept. The positions are 
based on the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 
242, 338 and 194. They are based on agreements signed 
between the Israelis and us, they are based on Israeli 
documents concerning the 1948 'Nakba'103 and the forced 
expulsion of Palestinians from their homes, and they are 
based on UN Security Council Resolutions dealing with 
Jerusalem and Jewish settlements. The Palestinians 
demanded the following concessions: 104 
 
102 Press Conference following the conclusion of the Camp David Summit, Washington, 25 July 2000, My Israel 
Source, (online web) Assessed 4 March 2006, URL: 
htt_p:/[wwv✓.mvisraelsource.com/content/barakcampdavidpress. 
103 Nakba- The Palestinian exodus referred to by most Palestinians and Arabs as the Nakba (Arabic: meaning 
the "disaster"), "catastrophe", or "cataclysm", refers to the creation of the Palestinian Arabs refugee problem 
during the last six months of the British Mandate of Palestine, the founding of the State of Israel, The first Arab 
Israeli War and also during the period of the consolidation of the State of Israel. 
' Mahmoud Abbas (2000), speech at the meeting of the PLO's Palestinian Central Council, 9 September 2000, 
UNISPAL-United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine, (online: web) access 22 September 
2006, URL: http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.nsf/. 
1) Full Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories-including 
East Jerusalem 
2) Implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 242, 
related resolutions and other long standing principles of 
international law. 
3) Full Palestinian sovereignty over Jerusalem occupied in 1967. 
4) Recognition of the Right of the Palestinian refugees to return 
home in accordance with UN Resolution 194. 
During 11 to 24 June 2000, Palestinian and Israeli negotiators, 
led by Clinton, went into round-the-clock talks, with Clinton shuttling 
between Arafat and Barak offering bridging proposals, in hope of 
reaching an agreement. With no further progress, the White House 
declared late on 19 July that the summit had concluded without 
reaching to an accord. The Draft proposal given by President Clinton 
to find a just and lasting solution regarding Arab-Israeli peace 
settlements was as per depicted in Map No. 6 
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Map No.6 
Clinton Proposal at Camp David 2000 
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Source: Dennis Ross (2004), The Missing Peace, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. No maps were 
ever 
Drawn up by the United States or Israel to reflect the proposal made at Camp David or the White 
House 
in 2000 during negotiations between President Clinton, Yassar Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud 
Barak. The map is from chief negotiator Dennis Ross. 
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Clinton's Camp David Parameters 
Clinton proposed a number of possible compromises, 
particularly on the question of Jerusalem. In his autobiography he 
wrote: 
I told him (Arafat) that I thought he could get 91 
percent of the West Bank, plus at least a symbolic swap of 
land near Gaza and the West Bank; a capital in East 
Jerusalem; neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem; planning, 
zoning and custodianship but not sovereignty over the 
Temple Mount, which was known as Haram al-Sharief to the 
Arabs. Arafat balked at not having sovereignty over all of 
East Jerusalem, including the Temple Mount. He turned the 
offer down; I called Arab leaders for support. Most would 
not say much, for fear of undercutting Arafat. On the night 
of 24 July 2000, Clinton asked each side to send to him one 
negotiator. Israel chose Shlomo-Ben-Ami,105  and the 
Palestinians sent Saeb Eraket.106  Clinton presented the duo 
with some positive proposals on Jerusalem: 
1) Palestinian sovereign "custodianship" over the Haram al-
Sharief, while Israel would retain "residual sovereignty" 
Jos Professor Shlomo- Ben —Ami was Israel's top negotiator during the July 2000 Camp David Summit. Ben-Ami 
became the Minister of Internal Security, responsible for the Israel police in Ehud Barak Government in July 
1999. IN August 2000, when David Levy resigned as Foreign Minister during talks with Palestinian leaders in the 
United States, Barak designated Be-Ami to be the acting Foreign Minister and he was officially appointed to the 
role in November 2000. Ben-Ami remained Foreign Minister and security Minister until March 2001 when, 
having won elections, Ariel Sharon took over from Barak. Ben-Ami refused to serve in the Sharon government 
and resigned from the Knesset in August 2002. For further reference see Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(2002), (online: web] accessed 22 September 2006, URL: 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchives/2000_2009/2002/8. 
106 
Saeb Erakat has been at the centre of negotiations with Israel for over a decade and participated in 
numerous conferences. He was deputy head of the Palestinian delegation to the Madrid conference in 1991 
and the 1992-1993 follow-up talks in Washington. In 1994, Eraket was appointed the chairman of Palestinian 
negotiation delegation and in 1995, he served as chief negotiator for the Palestinians during the Oslo period, 
including the Camp David meetings in 2000 and the negotiations in Taba in 2001. He also acted Passer Arafat's 
English interpreter. When Mahmoud Abbas was nominated to serve as prime minister of the Palestinian 
legislative council in early 2003, Eraket was slated to be minister of negotiations in the new cabinet. See, 
Palestinian National authority, (2003), "Politics in Palestine: The PA Ministerial cabinet List, Emergency Cabinet, 
October2003- November 2003", Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, [Online: web) Accessed 24 
September 2006, URL:http://www.jmcc.org/politics/pna/newemergedgov.03.htm. 
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2) Arafat would recognise Israeli sovereignty over all the other 
areas of expanded East and West Jerusalem, and the 
settlement blocs of greater and metropolitan Jerusalem. 
3) Palestinian functional jurisdiction in the inner neighbourhoods: 
Musrara, Wadi al-Juz, Shaykh Jarrah, Ras al-Amud, al-Tur, 
Suwwana, and salah al-Din. 
4) Palestinian sovereignty over the Muslim and Christian quarters 
of the old city.107 
5) Israeli sovereignty over the Jewish and Armenian quarters. 
6) Palestinian 	sovereignty 	over 	Jerusalem's 	"outer" 
neighbourhoods; if the "inner" neighbourhoods had Palestinian 
sovereignty, then a special regime would apply in the old city; 
the details of which the party would agree among themselves. 
However, the unequivocal Palestinian rejection of the American 
proposals disturbed Clinton's calculations, which Arafat insisted were 
Israeli ideas. Within a week of the convening of the Camp David, 
Clinton came to realise that the assessments presented by his aides 
had nothing to do with reality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
The Map No. 7 is a rough approximation of what the Clinton Plan 
envisioned as a future Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip showing the overland highway expected to connect the two. 
10/ The Old City is a 0.9 square kilometre (.3S sq. mile) area within the modern city of Jerusalem. Until the 
1860's this area constituted the entire city of Jerusalem. The old city is home to several sites of key religious 
importance: the Temple Mount and its Western Wall for Jews, the Church of the Holy Sepulchre for Christians, 
and the Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa Mosque for Muslim. Traditionally, the old city has been divided into four 
quarters, although the current designations were introduced only in the 20"' century. Today, the old city is 
roughly divided into the Muslim quarter, the Christian quarter, the Jewish quarter and the Armenian quarter. 
Map No. 7 
Approximate Clinton Plan as Future Palestinian State 
The map is a rough approximation of what the Clinton Plan envisioned as a 
future Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza Strip showing the 
overland highway expected to connect the two. 
Source:  http://www.wewishvirtuaIlibrary.orp/isource/History/clintonmap.html 
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According to Clinton: 
As a last-ditch effort I offered to try to sell Barak on full 
sovereignty for East Jerusalem's outer neighbourhoods, 
limited sovereignty over the inner ones, and "custodial" 
sovereignty over the Haram al Sharief. Again Arafat said no. 
shut down the talks; it was frustrating and profoundly sad. 
There was little difference between the two sides on how 
the affairs of Jerusalem would actually be handled; it was all 
about who got to claim sovereignty.108 
The failed Camp David peace summit in July of 2000 had been a 
matter of contention. In fact numerous factors contributed to the 
failure of the Camp David Summit. 
4.3. Critical Assessment of the Camp David Summit 
According to President Clinton, the Israel and Palestinian 
Authority could not resolve their differences on Jerusalem and 
needed time for internal debate and reflection in a less pressured 
environment before making further progress. He stated that the 
parties could not reach an agreement at that particular time taking 
into account the historical, religious, political and emotional 
dimensions of the conflict. Despite US desires to continue to keep the 
details of the talks in hope of building on the progress achieved, 
Israel stated that in the absence of an agreement, all negotiation 
positions it had offered at Camp David were "null and void." 109 The 
results of Camp David could be seen as a possible starting point for 
subsequent talks but the parties had agreed in advance that nothing 
Clinton (2004), n. 15, p. 915. 
109 Bill Clinton,lsraeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and PLO Chairman, Yasser Arafat, Trilateral Statement on the 
Conclusion of the Camp David Talks, Camp David, Maryland 25 July, in Clinton (2001), n.9 pp. 1453-58 
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would be final until everything was agreed, especially concerning 
Jerusalem, and so it was technically accurate to say that no 
agreement had been reached on anything at all.110 America's offer of 
a financial aid package for the Palestinians upon the signing of an 
agreement failed to convince and conciliate the Palestinians. 
Clinton blamed Arafat for the summit's failure, starting that Barak 
showed more flexibility and seriousness of the purpose than his 
Palestinian counterpart. Clinton's role at Camp David was 
unmistakable and both negotiating parties seemed to have had a 
degree of confidence in him. However, he avoided taking stands on 
many of the most controversial issues, urging them to reach a 
consensus decision themselves. He often listened with great 
attention and understanding to the Palestinian view point and on 
many occasions argued against the views of his advisers. 
Nonetheless, Clinton had his own calculations and limitations which 
was a structural constraint emanating from the permanent American 
Policy of supporting Israel. A leading American specialist William 
Quandt has commented that Clinton was right to try, but should have 
done so a year earlier, rather than waiting until the tail end of his 
presidency.111 Whereas Roger Hardy, a West Asian analyst, opined 
that Bill Clinton won points for trying. It is legitimate to ask whether 
he was right to force the pace, given the intractable nature of the 
issues the parties were grappling with.112  
910 William B. Quant (2005) Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab Israeli Conflict since 1967-Third 
edition. Washington D.C. Rrookings Irstiturlon Press, p. 371. 
''1 Quandt (2001), n.6. pp. 32-33 
'' Roger Hardy (2000}, "Camp David. whatwerit wrong?" B.B.0 News Wednesday, 261uIy20t)0, (Online: web) 
Accessed 24 June 2003, URL:http://news.bc.co.uk/1/ni/worla/rniddIeeast/352726.stni 
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One sided negotiation position: The Palestinians alleged the United 
States and Israel worked closely with each other their respective 
proposals prior to presenting them to the Palestinians.113 The 
Palestinian negotiators appealed openly to the US to leave aside its 
bias towards Israel in order to be an honest broker. Palestinians 
requested the US to put forward compromise proposals of its own 
rather than reflected-over Israeli ideas.114 Robert Malley 
acknowledged in March 2001 that there was a clear bias towards the 
Israeli negotiating position. The US position substantially departed 
from UN Resolution 242 and 338, which the Palestinians had been 
promised would be the basis of the negotiations. 115 
Contention over Jerusalem: The Issue of Jerusalem was the biggest 
issue of contention, and it partly accounted for the collapse of the 
talks. The issue was particularly complex for both symbolic and 
substantive results. Israel annexed East Jerusalem immediately after 
1967 War, and made settlements all around the eastern part of the 
city with the affirmed of cutting it off from the rest of the west Bank. 
Clinton hoped that the Palestinians could have custodial (providing 
protective supervision or safeguarding) rights over Haram al-Sharif116 
and would be able to fly Palestinian flags on the mosques but that 
they would remain under Israeli sovereignty. Clinton understood that 
the issue of Jerusalem is sacred in Israel and that no Israeli 
government could compromise on Jerusalem remaining the united 
capital of Israel. But the Palestinians could not agree to Israeli 
'r' Stephen Zunis (2003), Tinderbox. US Foreign Policy and the Roots of Terrorism, London: Zed Books Ltd., P. 
119. 
'r' Quandt (2001), n.5, pp. 34 
p, Robert Malley (2000), "Lecture at the Centre for Policy Analysis on Palestine, Washington D.0-, 27 July, 
Quoted in Stephen Zunes (2003), n. 33, pp. 122. 
Haram al-Sharif also called the Noble Sanctury or the Tern ore mount is a religious site in the Old City of 
Jerusalem. See, in Chapter Three, n.10 
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sovereignty over East Jerusalem in exchange for Palestinian 
statehood in the rest of the West Bank and Gaza. An overwhelming 
majority of the Palestinians rejected a Palestinian state without 
Jerusalem and at the same time significant majorities in Israel 
rejected the idea that a Palestinian state would be sovereign over the 
Old City. This was also one of Barak's red lines"? 
This can be analysed from the following Map No 8. 
Shibley (2002), n. 20, p. 113, Nakba- The Palestinian exodus referred to by most Palestinians and Arabs as 
the Nakba (Arabic: meaning the "disaster", "catastrophe", or "cataclysm", refers to the creation of the 
Palestinian Arabs refugee problem during the last six months of the British Mandate of Palestine, the founding 
of the State of Israel, the First Arab- Israeli War and also during the period of the consolidation of the State of 
Israel. 
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Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Israel (2008), (Online: web) 
Accessed 	7 	July 	2008, 	URL: 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Facts+About+lsrael+in+Maps/Old+City+of+ieru 
salem.html.  
Clinton blamed Arafat for not presenting anything new regarding 
Jerusalem, while he believed Israel had taken steps forward. Ben-Ami 
in his Camp David Journal wrote: 
The interesting fact is that Clinton told them... 'if you 
reject my proposal, at least offer your own, since at that point 
in time Arafat realised that the entire Camp David deal, even 
if minor adjustments were made , is not congruent with 
Palestinian mythology, and thus he did not think it was 
worthwhile...118 
Arafat stood firm and said he would neither sign away nor 
relinquish Jerusalem and the holy places, Israelis had moved neither 
forward nor been generous. In response to Palestinian demands to 
establish their capital in east Jerusalem, the Israelis agreed to allow 
them to set up their new government only in Abu Dis (a West Bank 
Village not far from the city's outskirts that could be annexed into 
greater Jerusalem), thereby allowing the Palestinian Authority to also 
claim Jerusalem as their capital. In return, the Palestinians were 
required to recognise Israel's annexation of virtually the entire 
remainder of the city.119 Barak was prepared to recognise Palestinian 
sovereignty over any part of the 'Old City.' The obvious deadlock in 
the negotiations led to the declaration of the summit as a failure on 
25 July 2000. 
The Palestinian position was that all of East Jerusalem would 
return to Palestinian sovereignty. The Jewish quarter, Jewish 
settlements and Western Wall that were under control until the 1967 
A Ben-Ami's Camp David Diaries (2000), (Online: web] Accessed on 14 October 2007 URL:http•//wwv:_Lewish 
virtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/benamidiary.html. 
Reinhart Tanya (2002), Israel/Palestine: How to en the War of 1948, New Delhi: Left Word 
Books P. 35 
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War, would be placed under Israeli authority, not Israeli 
sovereignty. 120 
4.4. Failure of the Camp David Summit 
One can argue, therefore, that the following were the factors 
that contributed to the failure of the Camp David Summit 
(1). Incompatible offers: The Camp David Summit reflected that the 
peace envisioned by the Palestinians was not the peace Israel was 
prepared to offer. 
(2). Lack of Palestinian counter proposals: According to Shlomo Ben-
Ami, Camp David collapsed over the fact that Palestinians refused to 
make counter-proposal. "No one demanded that they give a positive 
response to that particular proposal of Clinton." What was being 
asked of the Palestinians was they put forward, at least once, their 
own counter proposals.121  
(3). Contrast frame of reference: For the Palestinians, the frame of 
reference was Israel's borders before the June 1967 War, with 
modifications to accommodate each other's needs. For the Israelis, it 
was how much more to concede beyond the status quo. In the 
Palestinian mindset, what Israel keeps out of the West Bank is what 
the Palestinians give to Israel. For the Israelis, what the Palestinians 
get beyond what they now control is "given" by Israel. According to 
Joel Beini, Barak loudly announced that Israel would not return to its 
pre-1967 War borders. He sought to annex settlement blocs 
containing about eighty percent of the 180,000 Jewish settlers in the 
120 Mahmud Abbas (2001), "Report on the Camp David Summit, Gaza, 9 September 2000" 9Excerpts), reprinted 
in Journal of Palestine Studies, 30 (2): p. 169. 
"Shlomo Ben-Ami (2001), "An Interview" Ha'aretz on 13 september 2001, [Online: web] Accessed 26 
September 2006, URL:http//www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/benam12.htmI 
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West Bank (excluding Jerusalem) to Israel122. However, the 
Palestinians believed that they had already conceded 78 percent of 
historic Palestine in accepting Israel as a state and were claiming only 
the West and Gaza, which Israel had occupied in 1967 War.
123 
(4). Lack of diplomacy: Arafat and Barak failed to develop a good 
working relationship, with the two negotiating mostly through 
Clinton. Clinton felt that the parties were not ready for peace 
agreement in such a state of affairs. 
(5). It reached to no agreement: The whole summit was under the 
rule of "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.i
124  In other 
words, `nothing was final until everything was agreed,' no agreement 
had been reached on anything.125 Besides, the fact that there were 
no return formal proposals put forth during the negotiations, Israel 
did not put forth direct proposals to the Palestinians. Rather, the 
United States ended up conveying suggestions on behalf of Israel to 
the Palestinians. 
6). Preparedness: President Clinton insisted to jump to final 
negotiations without prior confidence —building measures, which led 
the Palestinians to question the sincerity of both Israel and The 
United States.126  Arafat pleaded that they needed more time, but 
Clinton pushed Arafat to come and try anyway, promising not to 
blame him if the summit failed. On the contrary, Clinton put 
enormous pressure on Arafat to accept the Israeli proposals and 
blamed Arafat for the collapse of the talks when the Palestinian 
leader rejected Barak's peace proposals. 
122 Joel Bein in (2000), Camp David 1i," Middle East Report on Line, 26 July 2000, (online: web) Accessed 27 
September 2006, URL: http//www.merip.org/mero/nieroO72600.htmi. 
1Zi Shibley (2002), n. 20, p. 110. 
"  Barak (2000), n. 10, p. 154. 
`s Quandt (2005), n. 30, p. 371. 
''" Shibley (2002), n. 20, p. 110. 
1L ) 
(7). On the other hand, Robert Malley stated that Camp David was 
not rushed. Although it was inadequately prepared lacking proper 
fall- back options, without a doubt it was not premature.127 One can 
also conclude that the Camp David Summit failed largely because 
neither side was ready for final agreement. A series of 
miscalculations by both the Israeli and the Palestinians and by 
President Clinton doomed the Camp David Summit. Meanwhile the 
time was running out both for Barak, whose Knesset would 
reconvene in late October, and for Clinton, whose time in office was 
growing shorter.128 
(8). Domestic political unrest: Domestic political concerns of the US 
and Israel overrode the goal of a lasting peace. Akram Hanieh, in his 
work 'The Camp David Papers' explains that Washington exercised its 
role according to the needs, requirement, and concerns of the Israeli 
government. Members of the Palestinian delegation were so 
constantly irritated with Barak's coalition problems that they 
questioned whether the summit was to salvage the peace process or 
to rescue the government of Ehud Barak. Moreover, Barak and Arafat 
faced considerable uncertainties as they confronted their respective 
constituencies. Barak had to decide whether to limp forward with a 
minority government, cobbled together a new coalition, or call fresh 
elections. Arafat, although for the moment enjoyed a hero's welcome 
had to come up with a new strategy. Camp David had changed the 
political landscape, but had also plunged the region into a new and 
uncertain face. 
(9) Who is to be blamed: Both Barak and Clinton have, in differing 
degrees, blamed Yasser Arafat for the Camp David breakdown. In 
Robert Malley (2008), "Fictions about the Failure at Camp David," New York Times, Saturday, 24 May 2008. 
''~ Quandt (2001) n. 6, p. 34. 
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their eyes the Palestinian leader proved impossibly stubborn and 
inflexible. But in one important respect Barak seemed to have 
misjudged Arafat's position, believing that he would bargain away 
sovereignty in Jerusalem in return for most of the West Bank. For any 
Palestinian leader, such a trade-off was never on the cards. Jerusalem 
was as much of a red line for Arafat as it was for Barak.
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According to Robert Malley, Camp David offered close to 99 
percent of Palestinian dreams, but they said no and chose to hold out 
for more. Worst, they did not present any concession of their own, 
adopting a no-compromise attitude that unmasked their 
unwillingness to live peacefully with a Jewish state by their side. 
Despite the fact that Ehud Barak had a great political courage 
but the measures about Israel's giving concessions to the Palestinians 
towards a fair solution of the conflict is really what is of essence. 
suspect they will regret for their failure to respond to President 
Clinton at Camp David.130 
Mahmoud Abbas affirmed in a special Palestinian TV 
Interview, "that no human being could withstand the 
pressure that President Arafat came under during seventeen 
days at Camp David. There was pressure from the strongest 
nation in the world, America, and pressure from all sides to 
accept certain proposals and ideas. But in spite of the 
pressure, we, the humble side, said no, when we saw that 
pressures will lead to concessions on some issues.i131  
'"Hardy (2000), Camp David! What went wrong? BBC news, Wednesday, 26 luly, 2no0, 
ht.p-//naws.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/mldaie east/85272& stm 
1' Malley,(2008), n.49. 
13i Mahmoud Abbas - Abu Ma,en (2003),' No Peare Agreement without Jerusalem, interview with Palestine N 
on 29 July 2003, spoke about the pressures, President Yasser Ararat and the Palestinian delegation came under 
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4.5. Clinton's Limitations 
One can conclude that President Clinton came to office with a 
promising set of circumstance for promoting peace between Israel 
and its Arab Neighbours. Clinton's role at Camp David was 
unmistakable and in fact both the negotiating parties seemed to have 
a degree of confidence in him. Clinton avoided taking stand on many 
of the most controversial issues such as refugees, borders, and 
security, urging the parties to strike a deal between themselves. 
Palestinians unequivocal rejection of the American proposals at 
Camp David in July 2000 upset Clinton's calculations. Clinton realised 
the assessments presented by his aides had nothing to do with the 
reality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The positions of the Israelis 
and the Palestinians on the key issues reflected wide differences. 
Though President Clinton listened with great attention and 
understanding to the Palestinian view point, he was restrained by 
America's known foreign policy stance of supporting Israel. 
Although they were unable to resolve crucial differences between 
the parties but the negotiations were unprecedented both in scope 
and details. The Camp David Summit showed clearly that the peace 
envisioned by the Palestinians was not the peace Israel was prepared 
to offer. 
President Clinton offered his proposals to Israel and Palestinian 
negotiators at a meeting in the White House on 23 December 2000. 
His plan addressed the most contentious issues such as, Palestinian 
refugees, Jerusalem, security and, end of the conflict. But it failed to 
during the Camp David Summit.[Online: weblaccessed27th September 2006,
pp.org/nner.p i p?v e~~; ne o 	manent ierusalern press plerusalern2p. 
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satisfy the conditions required for a permanent peace. The proposals 
remained silent on certain issues that are essential for establishment 
of a lasting and comprehensive peace such as the future relationship 
between the two parties and future economic relations. 
Clinton could not do much in bringing together the conflicting 
parties for a comprehensive final status agreement. He hardly had 
three weeks from relinquishing presidency when he met Arafat in 
January 2001. As a result, sufficient progress was not made in the 
peacemaking. Pressure from the US Congress was a problem for him. 
The Republicans controlled both houses, and pro-Israeli resolutions 
regularly commanded near unanimous support in the Senate and the 
House of Representatives. President Clinton had his calculations & 
restrains i.e. America's known foreign policy stance of supporting 
Israel. Corporate interests and personal political agendas not real 
intentions for peace seemed to have ruled the day throughout the 
Clinton Administration's attempts to broker peace. It was this 
structural flaw that led to so many crucial failures in the pursuit of 
West Asian peace. 
Clinton's peace effort was thwarted by the untoward violence 
that erupted in the late September 2000, which unravelled much of 
what had been achieved in the previous years. Although Clinton 
declared that he was committed to reaching an agreement between 
Barak and Arafat in the waning days of his administration, neither 
Barak nor Arafat was prepared or able to end the crisis on mutually 
acceptable terms. Consequently Clinton's credibility as a mediator 
was not sufficient to bridge the differences. 
Clinton after the failed Camp David Summit of July 2000 and in the 
subsequent months that followed propounded his plan as follows: 
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(1).Clinton provided conditional approval of settlement blocs, but 
insisted that there need to be "territorial swaps" of land from pre-
1967 Israel in exchange for any West Bank land Israel would retain. 
(2). Clinton spoke of Palestinian refugees' finding homes in other 
states including Israel. 
(3). Clinton parameters dropped the idea of defensible borders and 
replaced them with "security guarantees" including a proposed 
"international presence" in the Jordan Valley. 
(4). According to the Clinton parameters, "Israel's need for security 
should not come at the expense of Palestinian's sovereignty or 
interfere with territorial integrity". The Clinton parameters clearly 
envisioned the re-division of sovereignty in Jerusalem according to a 
formula whereby, "what is Arab should be Palestinian" and "what is 
Jewish should be Israelis". 
The fact remained, however, that US exercised its role according to 
the needs and Israeli government's domestic political concerns. At 
the same time, members of the Palestinian delegation were 
constantly irritated with Barak's coalition problems. The Palestinian 
delegates questioned whether the summit was to salvage the peace 
process or Rescue Barak's government. For the timing and the 
content of the affairs, the internal Israeli political situation had to be 
considered. Most of the coalition parties had resigned from the 
Labour party government and put Barak in an intolerable situation. 
His domestic problems were aggravated by the failure of Camp David. 
On the other hand, the internal power struggle within the 
Palestinian political structures had been characterised in part by the 
virtual loss of the PA as a political institution or governing authority 
capable to care or protect its population against abuse. The PA 
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constantly failed to defend its people against the most damaging 
politics of the occupation regime and sometimes collaborated with it. 
The Palestinian regime became synonymous with corruption & 
tyranny sacrificing Palestinian national goals. 
It can be concluded that Camp David and Clinton Peace plan 
provided the Palestinians an opportunity to present their version and 
positions directly to American President whereby, the US understood 
the limits of the Palestinians position. Despite the failure of the 
summit, Camp David certainly transformed the character of the 
peace process. It created a favourable environment where each side 
for the first time got a glimpse of the others bottom line. Though the 
US remained adamant from 1972 onward in its opposition to 
Palestinian statehood, the Clinton administration was the first in US 
history to see the West Bank & Gaza as disputed territories, where a 
viable Palestinian state can be established. 
On the basis of above, the following other relevant factors also 
can be summarised as responsible for the failure of the Camp David 
Summit. 
(1). The Clinton team recognised Israel's security requirements as the 
primary focus of the negotiations which prevented it from 
recognising the Palestinian security concerns.132 
(2). Pressure from the US Congress was a problem for him. The 
Republicans controlled both houses, and pro-Israeli resolution 
regularly commanded nearly unanimous support in the Senate and 
the House of Representatives.'33  
Christison (1995(, n,3, pp. 53-64, aI,. see Lunes (2003), n_33, in 119.  
Ibid. also see, in Quandt (2001, in 6, p. 37. 
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(3). Intense US concern over immediate Israeli domestic political 
constraints overrode the goal of a lasting peace. 
(4). Tough stand of the parties to the conflict made further 
complication to deliver a peace deal. 
(5). Though President Clinton listened with great attention and 
understanding to the Palestinian viewpoints, he was restrained by 
America's Known-foreign policy stance of supporting Israel.
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(6). All through the peace process Clinton administration seemed to 
co-ordinate the agenda of the talks closely with the Israelis ignoring 
Palestinian concerns. 
(7). Clinton could not risk controversy by taking position that might 
offend the Israelis. Rather he was inclined to go slow, not to get too 
far out ahead, he chose to hesitate then to confront. He failed to take 
firm stands with either party. 
According to Edward Said, 
Clinton whom Palestinians had placed their hopes in, 
greeted in Ramallah and Gaza like a hero, rushed together 
the two opponents, locked together in a decades of 
complicated struggle for his selfish purpose to say he had 
engineered a historical achievement. Clinton had always 
been an opportunist, a Zionist and clumsy politician. The 
Palestinians were the weakest party; they were badly led 
and poorly prepared. Clinton assumed that because his and 
Barak's turn in office were ending, he could produce a peace 
ceremony based on Palestinian capitulation, a ceremony 
that would forever enshrine his presidency. But this great 
plan, failed completely. 
' I' Akram (2001), n. Si p. 92. 
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He added Ehud Barak was there mainly to extract a promise 
from the Palestinians that would end the conflict and end all 
Palestinian claims against Israel (including the right of return for 
refugees). In support to this argument Said referred to American 
sources made public by Robert Malley in support of the Palestinian 
argument that Barak's 'generous offer' was neither an offer nor 
generosity. Although, Malley critical of Palestinian tactics during the 
Camp David Summit, he made it clear that Israel was not even close 
to offering what the Palestinian legitimate national demand of a 
statehood. Clinton's limitations and the Palestinian problem 
continued to be the most vital aspect of West Asian crisis. The 
prominent role of the United States in West Asian affairs is an 
accepted and well known fact. It was mostly because of the United 
States support that Israel as a Jewish state could survive and extend 
its territories at the expense of the Arab neighbours.135 
There is no doubt that the Americans have pursued a very 
complex foreign policy towards Palestine in the period of British 
mandate when Palestine was dismembered in 1948. In theory, the US 
accepted the right of the Palestinians to return to their country (UN 
,*solution 194 in December 1948) but it remained indifferent to its 
implementation. In fact, it actively assisted Israel in denying this right 
to the Palestinians. The US refused to accept in principle or as matter 
of policy the right of the Palestinian people's self — determination 
until the early 1990's. 
It is up to 1991 —The Madrid Peace Conference, that both Israel 
and the US refused to include the PLO in the peace process 
negotiations. And the PLO like most Arab governments, initially ruled 
Is`• Rafeek Ahmed (2000), •'US and the Palestinians;' in AK. 2asha, Arab Israeli Peace Process: An Indian 
perspective, New Delhi; DAanas Publication, pp. 143-15/. 
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out any negotiations with Israel. However by the mid — 1970s the 
Palestinians began expressing their desire to be included in the peace 
process. The US position was that the PLO could participate in the 
peace process provided that 1) they recognised Israel's right to exist; 
2) they recognised the UNSCR 242 and 338 as the basis of peace talks 
and 3) they renounced terrorism. On the other hand Israel was 
rejecting not only the right of Palestinians to exist but also rejected 
UN Resolutions 242 and 338. Furthermore, Israel was also not ready 
to renounce its own terrorist acts committed by its security forces 
against the Palestinians. The US had endorsed the Balfour 
Declaration and accepted the formation of a home land for the 
Jewish people but denying the right to Palestinians to establish self -
government in Palestine. The US Foreign policy towards Palestine has 
been that the Palestinians were one of the problems in ending the 
Arab-Israeli disputes rather than the core of the issue that deserved 
participation in the peace process. 
The question of Palestine has always been at the core of Arab-
Israeli conflict. From 1948 until the 1967 War, the US considered the 
Palestinian people in the context of the refugee problem and not as 
an independent national movement.116  Following the creation of the 
State of Israel in 1948, Palestinians disappeared from policy 
considerations of the United States and did not re-emerge until the 
late 1960s. The US frame of reference on the Palestinian issue was 
centred on the Israeli perspective which ignored the Palestinian view-
point ever since the Eisenhower administration through the Reagan 
years with the exception during the Jimmy Carter administration.137 
President Carter shifted the terrorist - refugee perception on 16 
136 Ibid, pp. 191 — 201. 
137Walid Khalidi (1998) "The American Factor in the Arab-Israeli Conflict", Middle East International, 16 January. 
Pp. 19-21. 
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March 1977, when he said the Palestinians had legitimate rights to 
self-determination and should participate in any deliberations about 
their future. The US barred the PLO from participating in the US 
sponsored peace process for nearly twenty years in part because the 
PLO refused to accept UN Security Resolution 242 and 338138 as the 
basis of negotiations. The resolution called on Israel to withdraw 
from the occupied territories in return for the security guarantees. 
The US Congress codified the pledge into law (Section 535, P.L. 98 -
473, October 12, 1984), and added that the PLO also must renounce 
terrorism.'39  
Meanwhile, the PLO as the Palestinian de facto government in 
exile under the leadership of Yasser Arafat has evolved from openly 
calling for Israel's destruction to supporting the international 
consensus for a two state solution.'40  It hinted willingness to accept a 
small Palestinian state living in peace alongside Israel and made it 
official in 1988, and formally repealed sections in its charter calling 
for Israel's dissolution in 1996, which was confirmed in a PNC 
meeting on 18 December 1998 in the presence of visiting US 
President Bill Clinton. 
On 13 December 1988, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat announced 
in a specially convened session of the UN General Assembly in 
Geneva, PLO's commitment to diplomacy and two-state solution, 
accepted UN Resolutions 242 and 338, recognised Israel and pledged 
138 Jimmy Carter (2007), Palestine Peace not Apartheid, New York: Simon & Schuster paperbacks, p.38 
139 Resolution 242 required the acknowledgement of the sovereignty and political independence of every state 
in West Asia including Israel and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised bordes. Resolution 
338 stipulated that resolution of the conflict should be based on land for peace — that is Israel's withdrawal 
from the occupied territories in return for security guarantees. Also like Resolution 242, Resolution 338 
referred to the Palestinians merely in terms of the need to "resolve the refugee problem" and for this reason, 
the PLO initially declined to accept the resolution. 
10 Cheyrl A. Rubenberg (2003), The Palestinians in Search for a Just Peace, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
p. 24. 
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to renounced terrorism'141 The United States continued to maintain 
the dialogue with the PLO in Tunis, 1990, in Madrid in 1991 despite 
opposition from Israel that no Palestinians or any resident from the 
East Jerusalem should be contacted or involved in any delegation 
from the Palestinian side 
Following the back channel-track two diplomacy between Israel 
and Palestinians, Israel formally recognised the PLO as the sole 
representative of the Palestinian people on 9 September 1993. This 
led to the signing of the Declaration of Principles on 13 September 
1993.142 The US opposition to Palestinian statehood in the past had 
finally shifted as Clinton declared in 2001 that the US would support 
a Palestinian state in parts of Gaza Strip and the West Bank.143 Thus 
the attitudes of the US officials towards the Palestinians evolved over 
time from being refugees to a distinct nation deserving homeland. 
In the present , Arabs, Muslims and many other considers the US 
as the only power that is in the position to restrain Israel from 
continuing with its policy of driving out Arabs and settling Jews in 
occupied Palestine. They believe that America alone is in a position to 
exert enough pressure on Israel and help encourage justice, peace 
and stability in West Asia. 
' For the text of the address, see "Passer Arafat (1989), Speech before the Forty Third Session of the UN 
General Assembly on the question of Palestine, Geneva, 11 Deremher 19db."reprinted in Journal of Palestine 
Studies. IS, l31 no 180-181. 
141Congressional Research Service ICRS) Issue Brief 1991137, "The Middle East Peace Talks,' IB92052 10-10-
03CRS, Online: web] Accessed on 14 October 2007, hllp://'po slate.gov/documents/organization/25370.pdf. 
Zunes (2003), n. 1, p. 107. 
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CHAPTER —5 
Jewish Lobby & the Peace Process 
5.1. Introduction 
The Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is America's pro-Israeli 
obby and is has been described as one of the most powerful 
obbying groups in Washington, DC. It is also called the most 
mportant organisation affecting America's relationship with Israel. 
is critics have stated that it acts as an agent of the Israeli 
;overnment with a "stranglehold" on the United States' Congress. As 
i lobbying group it advocates pro-Israel policies to the Congress and 
.xecutive Branch of the United States. Being a mass membership 
American organisation it includes Democrats, Republicans and 
ndependents as its members. 
The American Israeli Public Affairs Committee was inaugurated 
)n 2 January 1961. Its stated purpose has been to lobby the Congress 
if the United States on issues and legislation related to Israel. AIPAC 
egularly meets with members of Congress and holds events where it 
:an share its views. It is not a political action committee, and does 
•iot directly donate to campaign contributions. Nevertheless, 
according to the Washington Post, money is an important part of the 
!quation. 
AIPAC supports US involvement in the peace process. It supports 
continued US involvement in negotiations with the Palestinians on 
conditions of secure, recognised and defensible borders, with the 
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understanding that Israel must determine its own security 
requirements. 
AIPAC lobbies for financial aid from the US to Israel, helping to 
procure up to three billion dollars in aid yearly, making Israel the 
largest cumulative recipient of US foreign assistance since World War 
II. Additionally, the efforts made by AIPAC include numerous 
exceptional provisions in making aid available to Israel that are not 
available to other US allies. 	The New York Times on 6 July 1987 
reported that the AIPAC was a major force in shaping US policy in the 
West Asia. 
The lobby also has significant leverage over the Executive branch 
of the US Administration. That power has been derived in part from 
the influence Jewish voters have on presidential elections. Despite 
their small numbers in the population (less than 3 percent), they 
make large campaign donations to candidates from both parties. 
Jewish voters have large turnout rates during elections and are 
concentrated in key states like California, Illinois, Florida, New York 
and Pennsylvania. As a result, elected members of both the houses as 
well as the US President do not antagonise Jewish voters on policy 
matters relating to Israel. 
Key organisations in the lobby also directly target the US 
administration in power. For example, pro-Israel forces make sure 
that critics of the Jewish state do not get important foreign policy-
appointments. The AIPAC goals are also served when pro-Israel 
individual occupy important positions in the executive branch. During 
the Clinton Administration, for example, West Asian (Middle East) 
policy was largely shaped by officials with close ties to Israel or to 
prominent pro- Israel organisations — including Martin Indyk, who 
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was a co-founder of the prodsrael Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy (WINEP); Dennis Ross, who joined WINEP after leaving 
government in 2001; and Aaron Miller, who had lived in Israel and 
often visits there. These men were among President Clinton's closest 
advisors at the Camp David Summit in July 2000. Although all three 
supported the Oslo Peace process and creation of a Palestinian state, 
they did so only within limits of what would be acceptable to Israel. 
The American delegation took its cues from the Israeli Prime Minister 
Ehud Barak, coordinated negotiating positions in advance, and did 
not offer its own independent proposals for settling the conflict. Not 
surprisingly, Palestinian negotiators complained that they were 
negotiating with two Israeli teams- one displaying an Israeli flag and 
one an American flag. 
5.2. Manipulating the Media 
In addition to influencing government policy directly, the lobby 
also strives to shape public perceptions about Israel and the Middle 
East. It does not want an open debate on issues involving Israel, 
because an open debate might cause Americans to question the level 
of support that they currently provide. Accordingly, pro-Israel 
organisations work hard to influence the media, think tanks, and 
academia, because these institutions are critical in shaping popular 
opinion. 
The Lobby's perspective on Israel is widely reflected in the 
mainstream media in good part because most American 
commentators are pro-Israel. The pro-Israel bias is reflected in the 
editorials of major news papers. Robert Bartley, the late editor of the 
Wall Street Journal once remarked that, "Shamir, Sharon, and Bibi-
whatever those guys want is pretty much fine by me." Not 
surprisingly, the journal, along with other prominent news papers like 
The Chicago Sun Times and The Washington Times regularly run 
editorials that are strongly pro-Israel. Magazines like Commentary, 
the New Republic, and the Weekly Standard also zealously defend 
Israel at every turn. American media contains few criticism of Israeli 
policy, rarely questions Washington's relationship with Israel, and 
only occasionally discuss the Lobby's profound influence on US 
policy. 
5.3. Think Tank that Thinks One Way 
Pro-Israeli - forces predominate in the US think tanks, which play 
an important role in shaping public debates as well as actual policy. 
The Lobby created its own think tank in 1985, when Martin Indyk 
helped found WINEP. Although WINEP plays down its links to Israel 
and claims instead that it provides a "balanced and realistic" 
perspective on the West Asian issues, this is not the case. In fact 
WINEP is funded and run by individuals who are deeply committed to 
advancing Israel's agenda. The Lobby's influence in the think tank 
world extends well beyond WINEP. Over the past 25 years, pro-Israel 
forces have established a commanding presence at the American 
Enterprise Institutes i.e. the Brookings Institute, Centre for Security 
Policy, the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Heritage foundation, 
Hudson Institute, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, and the Jewish 
Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA). These think tanks are 
decidedly pro-Israel, and include few, if any, critics of US support for 
the Jewish state. Thus, a good indicator of the Lobby's influence in 
the think tank world is the evolution of the Brookings Institution that 
holds and shapes expert opinions on the West Asian matters. 
12.1 
There is probably no other foreign policy issues that rooted in 
domestic politics in the United States as this country's approach 
towards Israel. As Ken Organski has argued, there are a number of 
geo-political, cultural, historical, and other reasons why the United 
States would consistently back Israel, but there are also important 
elements of leadership organisation among Israel supporters.144 
Ever since the establishment of the State of Israel, it desired 
three things from American Jews: financial support, political backing, 
and their coming to Israel. But most of the American Jews were not 
willing to migrate to Israel; their help was thus limited to money and 
politics. The newly established state of Israel desperately needed US 
economic aid. During Israel's first three years, the population swelled 
to more than a million. Israel acquired strong economic and strong 
political support from the US in view of intense Arab hostility to the 
creation of a new state for the Jews. American Jewish leaders 
understood that the Arabs would make peace if they knew the US 
supported a strong Israel.145 
The Jewish lobby as an interest group plays a prominent role 
impacting in the makings of the US foreign policy. The Jews are in fact 
influential in American politics. Former Illinois Congressman Paul 
Findley believed that the American Israeli Public Congress' West Asia 
policy has become a "captive of its client state" and that the Israel 
lobby shapes United States West Asia policy,146 
There is a general consensus among scholars on the strength of 
Jewish Lobby in the US. There are an approximately six million Jews 
in the US constituting, around three percent of the US population.141  
14' Ken Organski, quoted in William III (2004) n. 19, p. 219. 
gas I.L. Kennen (1981), Israel's Defence Line, Buffalo: Promethous Books, pp. 66-67. 
k1W, Paul Findley (1985),' They Dare to Speak Out,' Westport: Lawrence Hill, pp. 25-26. 
'" A Goldberg (1996), Jewish power, Wesley: Reading addition, pp. 20-21. 
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Yet they exert a disproportionate influence on the policy process. 
This in fact is a function of numerous factors: 
(1). Substantial financial contributions to political campaigns; 
(2). Demographic concentration in key states; 
(3). High Voter turnout in elections; 
(4). High level of institutionalisation in the Jewish community with 
500 synagogues and 300 national organisations 148 
The Jewish Lobby contributes substantially to the existence of 
the special relationship between America and Israel, comparable only 
to the one between the United States and Great Britain, emanating 
from root, democratic political cultural pioneering spirit and similar 
strategic perceptions. 
5.4. The US and Peace Process: American-Israeli Special 
Relationship 
The US-Israel relations have evolved into a unique, strategic 
alliance since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. A 
special relationship has developed between the US- one of the 
largest and most powerful nation, and Israel- one of the smallest 
countries in West Asia. Despite occasional diplomatic discord 
America continued to support Israel's existence and safety. In 
general, Israel is perceived and discussed in favourable terms, and 
support for Israel enjoys wide bi-partisan appeal consensus and 
acknowledgement by the Congress.149 Since the 1967 Arab-Israeli 
War US diplomacy has become the lynchpin behind nearly all efforts 
to reach Arab-Israeli peace settlement. 
14" Nimrod Novik, (1986), The United States and Israel, Boulder: West View, p.56. 
"9 Ernest J. Wilson III (2004), Diversity and US Foreign Policy, New York, London: Rutledge, p. 221. 
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There are several important reasons why US citizens have 
favoured Israel and opposed Soviet expansion during the World War 
II. Of these, most notable was that the United States has tremendous 
sympathy for the experience of European Jews during the War.150 
Other reasons include: 
1). Both countries are democracies- One of the factors that 
contributed to widespread American sympathy and goodwill towards 
the State of Israel are the common beliefs shared by the people of 
both countries, which included Israel's commitment to maintain a 
democratic form of government which is seen as unique in the 
region, which has garnered American support from the outset.151  
2). Israel and the United States espouse shared Judo-Christian 
principles- A common democratic heritage and pioneering 
background which facilitated the development of a natural kinship 
with the land of the Bible and 'the people of The book' were the 
American religious and historical ties to the old Testament of the holy 
Bible. The Link between the ancient Hebrews and the modern Israelis 
was played up repeatedly. For many, in America, Israel's very 
existence is a proof for the realisation of Biblical prophecies. The 
vision of Israel as the land where the Biblical happenings took place 
stimulates the American imaginations. 
3). American Jews- Jewish Americans are affectionately attached 
towards the land and its history. They have pro-Israel political 
organisations such as American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee. 
American Jews, while strongly retaining their cultural identity, are 
150 Samuel W. Lewis (1990), "I he United States and Israel: Evolution of an _nwritten Alliance, "Middle East 
Journal 53 (3):. pp. 3b4-31/. 
1s1 [bid p  223. 
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fully integrated into leading roles in the political, economic, social, 
literary, cultural and professional elite of US. 1L " 
The Unites States government has always emphasised its role in 
the establishment of Israel, and has sometimes expressed its moral 
commitment to the Jewish survivors to the Nazi slaughter of six 
million Jews. It is the combination of American ideals and aspirations 
of American Jews that has been largely responsible for the 
willingness of the US government to respond to and cooperate with 
the aspirations of the Jews in Israel. 
5.5 Congress Support for the US-Israel Relationship 
The US Congress always supports the Jewish State. It is their firm 
belief that Israel is the only reliable and democratic ally in the entire 
Middle East. The Congress expresses full solidarity with Israel and 
influences the US President to toe the line and publicly support the 
State oflsrael 
In the 104th Congress, Jewish members comprised 9 percent of 
the Senate and nearly 6 percent of the House of Representatives. Bill 
Clinton nominated two Supreme Court Justices, both Jewish. In his 
first term, he had two Jewish Cabinet members and dozens of Jews 
held other key Administration's posts.'53 
5.6 A Source of Sympathy 
The gradual evolution of the relationship from friendship to 
alliance could not have been achieved without the support of the 
WaIid Khalidi (1998), The American factor in the Arab .srae Ii Conflict, "Middle East international, 30 January 
1998, pp. 16.17. 
15: 
The One Hundred Fourth United States Congress was a meeting of the legislative oranch of the United 
States federal government, composed of the United States Senate and the United States House of 
Representatives. It met in Washington, Oc. FROM 3 January 1995 to 3 January 1997, during the last two years 
of the first term of US president Bill Clinton. 
American public, the majority of which consistently sympathised with 
Israel. American's affinity for Israelis also stems from their shared 
Judeo-Christian heritage. In addition, there are numbers of 
remarkable factors which characterise the special relationship 
between the US and Israel, including economic ties, academic 
connections, and shared value initiatives. Unlike the 1950s, no US 
President could credibly threaten a cut-off of aid, since Congress 
would not support such action. For Israel, the strength of the alliance 
provided security.154 
Thus, American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee has become a 
potential pro-Israel political support organisation and has great 
influence in shaping pro-Israel policy in the American political 
institutions both legislature and the executive. It openly works to 
push US foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction. Jewish Americans are 
affectionately attached towards the land and its history. American 
Jews, while strongly retaining their cultural identity, are fully 
integrated into leading roles in the political, economic, social, literary, 
cultural and professional elite of US.'55 
Then the Jewish Lobby is a pro-Israel lobby- a loose coalition of 
individuals and organisations that openly work to push foreign policy 
in a pro-Israel direction. The lobby is not synonymous with Jewish 
Americans because some of them do not support their positions and 
some groups that work on Israel's behalf (Christian evangelicals for 
example) are not Jewish. 
These organisations believed that they are simply engaged in 
interest - group politics, that is legitimate activity in the American 
Bard (2008), n..34. 
•" Walid Khalidi (1980), "The American Factor in the Arab-Israeli Conflict," Middle East international, 30 
January 1998, pp. 16-17. 
political system and that their efforts advance both American and 
Israeli interest. They shaped public discourses so that Israel's actions 
were perceived sympathetically by the American public. Interest 
groups in the lobby directly campaign for contributions, encourage 
politicians to adopt pro-Israel positions. They write articles, letters, 
and manoeuvre campaign defending Israel's actions, and they go to 
great lengths to discredit or marginalise anyone who criticise US 
support for Israel. In fact the US- Israel special relationship is due 
largely to the activities of the Jewish Lobby. 
Clinton was trusted by the mainstream Israelis as the one who 
understood their unique security dilemmas and their historical 
trauma. Even in the Palestinian view, he was the first US President to 
understand them. He had the ability to reach over barriers and to 
appeal to both sides of the conflict. However, his inability to take firm 
stands with either party was his dilemma. He could not take a firm 
stand or threaten sanctions despite the failure of the contending 
parties to meet deadlines or honour agreements. Besides, Clinton 
and his team while tackling the Israeli-Palestinian problem were 
dismayed by the rigidity of the conflicting parties. 
Clinton with all his peace efforts could bring the conflicting 
parties to the threshold of peace, but at the most crucial of 
moments, the untoward violence that had erupted in the late 
September 2000 had unravelled much of what had been achieved in 
the previous years.156  In the final year of the Clinton's administration, 
the importance of a just and lasting peace had been overshadowed 
by the need for yet another interim agreement that would provide 
only short term political gain. Thus, the prospects of a long term 
156 Quandt (2001), n. 6, p. 39. 
stability and peace in West Asia was put at risk.157 Although Clinton 
declared that he was committed to reaching an agreement between 
Brak and Arafat in the waning days of his administration, neither 
Barak nor Arafat was prepared or able to end the crisis on mutually 
acceptable terms. As a consequence Clinton's credibility as a 
mediator was not sufficient to bridge the difference. The American 
factor in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is evident from the popular 
American notion that Israel is a democratic struggling country and 
the only US ally in West Asia threatened by the fanaticism of 
terrorism. The Jewish Lobby in America continues to contribute 
substantially to the existence of a special relationship between 
America and Israel. The US continued to find strategic relevance of 
Israel even after the disintegration of Soviet Union and end of the 
Cold War. The proactive role in the Peace process by the Jewish 
Lobby seemed vital for the US strategic interests in the region. 
Moreover, both the parties expect US to involve and spend 
enormous resources in the peacemaking. Despite numerous 
drawbacks, the US active involvement is likely to continue until a 
permanent peaceful solution is achieved. 
''' Richard (2001), n. 2, p. 9. 
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CHAPTER -6 
6.1. Conclusion 
The Arab-Israeli conflict over Palestine originated as a clash of the 
ideologies. It began at the end of the nineteenth century as a struggle 
between two national movements, the Zionist and the Palestinian, 
over the same piece of land. Zionism, the dream of Jews to return to 
their ancient homeland, spawned waves of migration of European 
Jews to Palestine before World War I. Arab Nationalism, by contrast, 
infused the indigenous inhabitants of Palestine with a burning desire 
to achieve political independence from foreign rule. Britain took 
responsibility for governing Palestine after World War I. During the 
British Mandate, Zionists and Arab nationalist clashed, with 
intensifying violence, for control of Palestine. The Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict is a direct result of World War II and the Holocaust, of which 
the Jews were victims. The Palestinian Diaspora is a direct result of 
the creation of the State of Israel. 
Palestinian strongly refuted the idea that Palestine was `a land 
without people and for the people without a land' as the Zionist 
slogan proclaimed. Jewish interpretation portrays Zionism as an 
attempt to ensure the return of Jews to the land of Israel (Eretz-
Israel), which God promised to Abraham and his seed. But the 
problem Zionist faced in Palestine was that it was an inhabited 
country at the time of Basle programme in 1897. 
During the 1947-48 War and the Arab-Israeli hostilities of 1948, 
Palestine was politically transformed into Israel. The subsequent 
Armistice agreements failed to solve the Arab-Israeli problem. The 
root cause of the Palestinians disadvantages lies in two political 
decisions made in Europe. First was in 1897 by the Zionist 
Organisation, which resolved to establish a Jewish state in Palestine. 
Second was the Balfour Declaration, which undermined the rights of 
the indigenous Palestinian population. The fundamental nature of 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict has changed in very little over the years, 
yet has been powerfully affected by trends in international politics. 
As a matter of fact it is among the most longstanding and intractable 
conflict of the contemporary era. 
The issues surrounding the question of Palestinian people had 
become obscured in the Arab-Israeli conflict with the creation of 
Israel. 	It seemed US 	policy consciously 	ignored 	the 	political 
dimension of the Palestinian's right 	to 	self 	determination 	and 
independence in the post 1948 period. The US foreign policy towards 
Palestine until recently have treated the Palestinians as one of the 
problems to be resolved in finding a broad based solution to the 
Arab-Israeli dispute rather than as participants in the peace process. 
When the PLO was created in 1964 the US did not pay much 
attention. Palestine and Palestinians emerged as the centre of the 
conflict after 1969 when Yasser Arafat and his Fatah organisation 
assumed control over the Palestine Liberation Organisation. 
United States' Mediation Predicament 
America continued to support the existence of Israel and also its 
security. The US diplomacy has become the motor behind nearly all 
efforts to reach Arab-Israeli peace after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. 
The defeat of Arabs States in the war, made the Palestinians realise 
they had to carry on the struggle on their own. In the mean time, US 
government pledged not to recognise or negotiate with the PLO until 
the PLO officially accepted the UN Resolution 242. 
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For the first time US President Jimmy Carter shifted the terrorist-
refugee perception of the Palestinians when he acknowledged 
publicly of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians and supported 
their participation in any deliberations about their future. In a speech 
on 4 January 1978, he said that they deserved a homeland. Anwar 
Sadat, President of Egypt, came forward to establish diplomatic 
relationship with Israel through American good offices which he 
thought would offer enhanced security as well as return of the lost 
territories. His option for peace with Israel under US mediation led to 
the signing of the Camp David Accords in September 1978. 
The Camp David Accords were just merely tripartite pacts than a 
true peace agreement. This marked the beginning of a succession of 
bilateral arrangements resulting maximum American influence in 
West Asia region. The United States changed its policy towards the 
PLO in 1988 after the latter had expressed willingness to accept a 
small Palestinian state living in peace alongside Israel and made it 
official in 1988. The Madrid conference in 1991 was set up to conduct 
within a bilateral format designed to keep Israelis and Palestinians 
separated by an American chaperon yet, the US continued to reject 
calls for international conference under UN auspices. 
The US went as far as excluding the PLO from the talks, allowing 
for Palestinian participation only on the grounds that they came as 
part of the Jordanian delegation, that they had no direct affiliation 
with the PLO, and that their representatives were not from the 
Palestinian Diaspora (meaning many of the community's most 
powerful and wealthy members were excluded, not to mention Arab-
American Lobbyists) or even from the Palestinian capital of Jerusalem 
(meaning local Palestinian politicos). 
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Progress was made on the Israeli-Palestinian track only when 
Israel and the PLO did an end-run around the restrictive US formula 
and met secretly in a third country, talks which resulted in the Oslo 
Accords. The Oslo Accords on 13 September 1993 was the first Arab-
Israeli agreement since 1967 to be negotiated without significant 
involvement by the United States. 
The Oslo, unlike Camp David 1978, was not an American—
designed agreement, and therefore, parties had less reason to turn 
to Washington when disputes arose. Palestinians entered the peace 
process on the understanding that (1) it would deliver concrete 
improvement to their lives during the interim period, (2) that the 
interim period would be relatively short in duration, that is five years, 
and (3) that a permanent agreement would implement United 
Nations Resolution 242 and 338. But the peace process delivered 
none of these things. Instead Palestinians suffered more burdensome 
restrictions on their movement and a serious decline in their 
economic situation. 
Clinton Diplomacy and its Setbacks 
President bill Clinton came to office with a promising set of 
circumstance for promoting peace between Israel and its Arab 
neighbours. The long-awaited breakthrough seemed to have 
occurred, and to have done so without any American involvement 
whatever. For about a year, the Madrid Conference went on without 
progress on any significant issues. The proceedings of the principal 
business (the bilateral talks) were moved to Washington, but in the 
bilateral setting it became clear that the Jordanians and the 
Palestinians were really two distinct groups with distinct issues to 
pursue. 
Clinton's role at Camp David was unmistakable and both 
negotiating parties seemed to have a degree of confidence in him. 
Clinton avoided taking stand on many of the most controversial 
issues such as refugees, borders and security, urging the parties to 
strike a deal between themselves. The unequivocal Palestinian 
rejection of the American proposals at Camp David in July 2000 upset 
Clinton's calculations. Clinton realised the assessments presented by 
his aides had nothing to do with the reality of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. The positions of the Israelis and the Palestinians on the key 
issues reflected wide difference. Though President Clinton listened 
with great attention and understanding to the Palestinian viewpoints, 
he was restrained by America's known foreign policy stance of 
supporting Israel. 
Although they were unable to resolve crucial differences but 
the negotiations were unparalleled both in scope and detail. 
America's offer of financial aid package for the Palestinians upon the 
signing of an agreement failed to convince and conciliate the 
Palestinians to the above mentioned suggestions. The Camp David 
summit showed clearly that the peace envisioned by the Palestinians 
was not the peace Israel was prepared to offer. 
Nevertheless, Camp David provided an opportunity to the 
American President whereby, the US understood the limits of the 
Palestinian position. Israel began seriously considering compromises 
on the issue of Jerusalem and was prepared to agree on withdrawing 
from over 90 percent of the occupied territories. Despite the failure 
of the summit, Camp David certainly transformed the character of 
the peace process. It created a favourable environment where each 
side for the time got a glimpse of the other's bottom line. 
Clinton offered his proposals to Israeli and Palestinian 
negotiators at a meeting in the White House on 23 December 2000. 
His plan addressed the most contentious issues such as; Palestinian 
refugees, Jerusalem, security and end of the conflict. But it failed to 
satisfy the conditions required for a permanent peace. The proposals 
remained silent on certain issues that are essential for establishment 
of a lasting and comprehensive peace such as the future relationship 
between the two parties and future economic relations. Clinton could 
not do much in bringing the conflicting parties together for a 
comprehensive final status agreement. He hardly had three weeks 
from leaving his office when he met PLO leader in January 2001. As a 
result, sufficient progress was not made in the peace making. 
Pressure from the US Congress was a problem for him. Republicans 
controlled both houses, and pro-Israeli resolutions regularly 
commanded near unanimous support in the Senate and the House of 
Representatives. President Clinton had his own calculations and 
restraints. America's known foreign policy stance on supporting 
Israel, corporate interests and personal political agendas not real 
intentions for peace seemed to have ruled the day throughout the 
Clinton Administration's attempts to broker peace. It was this critical 
structural flaw that led to so many crucial failures in the pursuit of 
West Asia peace. 
Clinton peace efforts were thwarted by the untoward violence 
that erupted in the late September 2000, which unravelled much of 
what had been achieved in the previous years. Although Clinton 
declared that he was committed to reaching an agreement between 
Barak and Arafat in the waning days of his administration, neither 
Barak nor Arafat was prepared or able to end the crisis on mutually 
r 
acceptable terms. Consequently, Clinton's credibility as a mediator 
was not sufficient to bridge the differences. 
Though the US remained adamant from 1972 onwards in its 
opposition to Palestinian statehood, the Clinton administration had 
become to be the first in US history to see the West Bank and Gaza as 
disputed territories, insinuating that the Israelis and Palestinians had 
equal claim to the land. 
The existence of extremist elements among Israelis and the 
Palestinians also remained responsible and thwarted the peace 
process and that created potential constraints to a peaceful 
settlement. 
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Appendices 
Appendix -1 
UN General Assembly 
Resolution 194 
11 December 1948 
The resolution terms have been reaffirmed every year since 
1948. The refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace 
with their neighbour should be permitted to do so at the earliest 
practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the 
property of those choosing not to return and for the loss of or 
damage to property which, under principles of international law or in 
equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities 
responsible; 
Official record of the third session of the General Assembly, Part 
I Resolution, p.21 
Appendix-2 
United Nations 
Security Council 
Resolution 242 (1967) 
22 November 1967 
The Security Council, expressing its continuing concern with the grave 
situation in the Middle East, Emphasising the inadmissibility of the 
acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and 
lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security, 
Emphasising further that all Member States in their acceptance of the 
Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act 
in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter, 
Affirms that the fulfilment of charter principles requires the 
establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which 
should include the application of both the following principles: 
(i)Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 
recent conflict; 
(ii) Termination of all claims or states or states of belligerency and 
respect for/ and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and political independence of every state in the area and 
their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries 
free from threats or acts of force; 
Affirms further the necessity 
For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international 
waterways in the area; 
For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; 
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For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political 
independence of every state in the area, through measures including 
the establishment of demilitarized zones; 
Requests the Secretary-General to designate a special a 
Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and 
maintain contacts with the states concerned in order to promote 
agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted 
settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this 
resolution; 
Requests Secretary - General to report to the Security Council on 
the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as 
possible. 
Source: Congressional Quarterly, the Middle East, 7' ed. Washington 
D.C. p. 301 
Appendix-3 
Palestine Liberation Organisation 
PLO (Excerpts) 
Palestine liberation Organisation (Munazzamatu t-Tahriri 
Falastiniyya) has worked as the official representative for the 
Palestinian people, and is now the leading force of Palestine. 
PLO is an umbrella organisation made up of a handful of other 
organisation, like al-Fatah, as-Saiqa and Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine, organisations that are very different in many 
fields, but they all share the same goal of an independent Palestinian 
state. 
But a large number of the individual members connected to the 
PLO are members directly connected organisation. Earlier the 
planned Palestinian state was intended to be on the very same 
ground where Israel was, while they now define the new Palestinian 
state inside the borders of the areas occupied by Israel since 1967, 
the West Bank, Gaza Strip, plus East Jerusalem. 
The PLO is made up of three bodies, the Executive Committee, 
exercising central control; the Central committee, the counsel; and 
the Palestine National Council, which was earlier the Palestinian 
people parliament in exile. 
Politically, the organisation has been only partly democratic, 
dominated as it has been by one person for all its history; Yasser 
Arafat: Yet, this political structure have proven o be effective enough 
to be implemented as a structure for Parliamentarianism of the new 
Palestinian state, called Palestinian Authority for the transitory 
period from 1994 to 2000 or longer. 
Appendix-4 
United Nations 
Security Council 
Resolution 338 (1973) 
22 October 1973 
The Security Council, 
Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing 
and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours 
after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions 
they now occupy; 
Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the 
cease-fire the implementation of the Security Council resolution 242 
(1967) in all of its parts; 
Decide that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, 
the negotiations shall start between the parties concerned under 
appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace 
in the Middle East. 
Adopted at the 1747th meetin by14 
votes to none.1 
1 One member (China) did not participate in the voting. 
Appendix-5 
Intifada 
Uprising in the Palestinian Occupied Territories from 1987 to 1993, 
in protest against the Israeli Occupation and Politics 
The Intifada involved demonstrations, strikes, riots and violence, 
and was performed both in Gaza Strip and on the West Bank. What 
made the intifada stand out from earlier and later forms of protests, 
was its broadness, the wide support, duration and the involvement 
and organisation by psalmist groups. 
There were three principal groups behind the Intifada: PLO, 
Hamas (founded in 1988) and Jihadul-Islamiyya, both these 
organisations were waging war in the name of Islam. 
The most symbolically important act of the Intifada was the 
stoning of Israeli security forces and civilians often performed by 
young men and boys. Israel tried to suppress the Intifada, with more 
police and army force, closing of universities, deportations and 
restrictions on economical activities. 
Before a united Palestinian public, Israeli opinion gradually 
changed in favour of talks with the Palestinians. It was a good omen 
for both the Israeli and the Palestinians, symbolically and politically. 
The Intifada, and the change of the public opinion, was one of the 
reasons for the arrival of the Oslo Agreement of 1993. The Intifada became 
weaker with decreasing participants, especially after Oslo Agreement, from 
when it turned into more of a traditional violent liberation struggle. By now 
militant Islamists had taken over the Intifada, and in a sense, it was now no 
longer the Intifada. 
Source: Tor Kjeilen (http://i-cias.com/e.o. 
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Appendix-6 
The Madrid Peace Conference 
Following the 1991 Gulf War, US Secretary of State James Baker 
made eight trips to the Middle East in eight months. As a result of the 
shuttle diplomacy by James Baker, the United States invited Israel, 
Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians to enter into peace 
negotiations that were to be held in Madrid, Spain. The Madrid peace 
Conference held on 30 October 1991. The invitation was jointly 
issued by the United States and the Soviet Union. Only the part of the 
invitation that highlighted the commitment of the peace talks to the 
UN Resolution 242 and 338 will be presented. 
Letter of Invitation to Madrid Peace Conference 30 October, 1991 
After extensive consultations with Arab States, Israel and the 
Palestinians, the United States and the Soviet Union believe that a 
historic opportunity exists to advance the prospects for genuine 
peace throughout the region. The United States and the Soviet Union 
are prepared to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting and a 
comprehensive peace settlement through direct negotiations along 
two tracks, between Israel and Arab states, and between Israel and 
the Palestinians, based on the United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 242 and 338. The objective of this process is real peace. 
Towards that end, the president of the United States and the 
President of the USSR invite you to a peace conference, which their 
countries will co-sponsor, followed immediately by direct 
negotiations. The conference will be convened in Madrid on 30 
October 1991. 
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President Bush and President Gorbachev request your 
acceptance of this invitation no later than 6 PM Washington time, 23 
October 1991, in order to ensure proper organisation and 
preparation of the conference..... The European Community will be a 
participant in the conference, alongside the United States and the 
Soviet Union and will be represented by its presidency.....the 
negotiations between Israel and the Arab states, will take place on 
the basis of the UN Resolutions 242 and 338...... 
Yasser Arafat Accepts UN Resolutions 242 and 338 
Beginning with the Madrid Peace Conference, talks continued 
between Israel and PLO. Eventually these peace talks resulted in an 
agreement between Israel and the PLO were termed as "Declaration 
of Principles" which was signed at the White House in Washington 
D.C. on 13 September 1993. 
In preparation for the signing of this agreement, Yasser Arafat 
sent a letter to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin acknowledging Israel's 
right to live while reaffirming that peace negotiations would be based 
upon UN Resolutions 242 and 338. The letter from Yasser Arafat to 
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin is given below. Following Arafat's letter 
to Rabin, the Prime Minister Rabin's reply to Arafat is as follows. 
Letter from Yasser Arafat to Yitzhak Rabin 
9 September 1993 
Prime minister of Israel 
Mr. Prime Minister, 
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The signing of the "Declaration of Principles" marks a new era in 
the history of the Middle East. In firm conviction thereof, I would like 
to confirm the following PLO commitments: 
The PLO recognises the right of the State of Israel to exist in 
peace and the security 
The PLO accepts United Nations Security Council Resolutions 
242 and 338. 
The PLO commits itself to the Middle East peace process, and to 
a peaceful resolution of the conflict to permanent status will be 
resolved between the two sides and declares that all outstanding 
issues relating to Permanent status will be resolved through 
negotiations 
In view of the promise of a new era and the signing of 
'Declaration of Principles' and based on the Palestinian acceptance of 
the Security Council Resolution 242 and 338, the PLO affirms that 
those articles of the Palestinian covenant which deny the right of 
Israel to co-exist, and the provisions of the covenant which are 
inconsistent with the commitments of this letter are inoperative and 
no longer valid. Consequently, the PLO undertakes to submit to the 
Palestinian National Council for formal approval the necessary 
changes in the Palestinian covenant. 
Sincerely 
Yasser Arafat 
Chairman 
The Palestine Liberation Organization 
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Letter from Prime Minister Rabin to Yasser Arafat 
9 September 1993 
Yasser Arafat 
Chairman 
The Palestine Liberation Organisation 
Mr. Chairman 
In response to your letter of 9 September, 1993, I wish to 
confirm to you that in the light of the PLO commitment included in 
your letter, the Government of Israel has decided to recognise the 
PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and commence 
negotiations with PLO within the Middle East peace process. 
Yitzhak Rabin 
Prime Minister of Israel 
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APPENDIX-7 
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES 
On Interim Self —Government Arrangements 
13 September 1993 Oslo Interim-Agreement 
The Government of the State of Israel and the PLO team (the 
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace 
Conference), the Palestinian delegation representing the Palestinian 
people, agree that it is time to put an end to decades of 
confrontation and conflict, recognise their mutual legitimate and 
political rights, and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace 
settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political 
process. Accordingly, the two sides agree to the following principles: 
Article- 1 
Aim of the negotiations: The aim of Israel -- Palestinian negotiations 
with the current Middle East peace process is, among others to 
establish a Palestinian interim self-government Authority, the elected 
Council (the "Council"), for the Palestinian in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a 
permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolution 242 and 
338. 
It is understood that the interim arrangement are an integral 
part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the 
permanent status will lead to the implementation of the Security 
Council resolutions 242 and 338. 
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Article — II 
Framework for the Interim Period 
The agreed framework for the interim period is set forth in this 
Declaration of Principles. 
Article III 
Elections 
In order that the Palestinian people in the West bank and Gaza 
strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles, 
direct, free and general political elections will be held for the Council 
under agreed supervision and international observation, while the 
Palestinian police will ensure public order. 
An agreement will be concluded on the exact mode and 
conditions of the elections in accordance with the protocol attached 
in Annex I, with the goal of holding the elections not later than nine 
months after the entry into force of this Declaration of principles. 
These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory 
step towards the realisation of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian 
people and their just requirements. 
Article — IV 
Jurisdiction: 
Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip 
territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent 
status negotiations. The two sides view the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during 
the interim period. 
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Article — V 
Transitional Period and Permanent status Negotiations: 
The five year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal 
from the Gaza and Jericho area. Permanent Status negotiations will 
begin as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the 
third year of the interim period, between the Government of Israel 
and the Palestinian people representatives. 
It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining 
issues including, Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security 
arrangements, border, relations and co-operations with other 
neighbours, and other issues of common interests. 
The two parties agreed that the outcome of the permanent 
status negotiations should not be prejudiced or pre-empted by 
agreements reached for the interim period. 
Article — VI 
Preparatory Transfer of Power and Responsibilities 
Upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, and 
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, a transfer of 
authority from the Israeli military government and its civil 
administration to the authorised Palestinians for this task, as detailed 
herein, will commence. This transfer of authority will be of a 
preparatory nature until the inauguration of the Council. 
Immediately after the entry into force of this Declaration of 
Principles and the withdrawal from Gaza Strip and Jericho area, with 
the view to promoting economic development in the West bank and 
the Gaza Strip, authority will be transferred to the Palestinians on the 
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following spheres, education and culture, health, social welfare, 
direct taxation and tourism. The Palestinian side will commence in 
building the Palestinian police force, as agreed upon. Pending the 
inauguration of the Council, the two parties may negotiate the 
transfer of additional powers and responsibilities, as agreed upon. 
Article — VII 
Interim Agreement 
The Israeli and Palestinian delegations will negotiate an 
agreement on the interim period (the 'Interim Agreement") 
The interim Agreement shall specify, among other things, the 
structure of the Council, the number of its members, and the transfer 
of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government 
and its civil administration to the Council. The Interim Agreement 
shall also specify the Council's executive authority, legislative 
authority in accordance with Article-IX below, and the independent 
Palestinian judicial organs. 
The Interim Agreement shall include arrangements, and to be 
implemented upon the inauguration of the council, for the 
assumption by the council of all of the powers and responsibilities 
transfer previously in accordance with Article VI above. 
In order to enable the Council to promote economic growth, 
upon its inauguration, the council will establish, among other things, 
a Palestinian Electricity Authority, A Gaza sea Port Authority, 
Palestinian Development Bank, A Palestinian Export Promotion 
Board, A Palestinian Environment Authority, a Palestinian Land 
Authority and a Palestinian Water Administration Authority and any 
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other authorities agreed upon, in accordance with the Interim 
Agreement that will specify their powers and responsibilities. 
After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration 
will be dissolved, and the Israeli military government will be 
withdrawn. 
Article -VIII 
Public Order and Security 
In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the 
Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Council will 
establish a strong police force, while Israel will continue to carry the 
responsibility for defending against external threats, as well as the 
responsibility for over all security of Israelis for the purpose of 
safeguarding their internal security and public order. 
Article IX 
Laws and Military Orders 
The Council will be empowered to legislate, in accordance with 
the Interim Agreement, within all authorities transferred to it. 
Both parties will review jointly laws and military order presently in 
force in remaining spheres. 
Article X 
Joint Israeli — Palestinian Liaison Committee 
In order to provide for a smooth implementation of this 
Declaration of Principles and any subsequent agreement pertaining 
to the interim period, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of 
Principles, a joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee will be 
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established in order to deal with issues required Co-ordination, other 
issues of common interests and disputes. 
Article XI 
Israeli- Palestinian Co-operation in Economic Fields 
Recognising the mutual benefit of co-operation in promoting the 
development of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel, upon the 
entry into force of this Declaration of principles, an Israeli-Palestinian 
Economic Co-operation committee will be established in order to 
develop and implement in a co-operation the programs identified in 
the protocols attached as Annex iii and Annex iv 
Article XII 
Liaison and Co-operation with Jordan and Egypt 
The two parties will invite the governments of Jordan and Egypt 
to participate in establishing further liaison and co-operation 
arrangements between the government of Israel and the 
Palestinians. These arrangements will include the constitution of a 
continuing Committee that will decide by agreement on the 
modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West bank and 
Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent 
disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concerns will be 
dealt with by this committee. 
Article XI11 
Redeployment of Israeli Force 
After the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, and 
not later than the eve of elections for the Council, a redeployment of 
Israeli military force in the West Bank and Gaza Strip will take place, 
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in addition to withdrawal of Israeli forces carries out in accordance 
with Article XIV 
In redeploying its military forces, Israel will be guided by the 
principle, that its military forces should be redeployed outside 
populated areas. Further redeployments to specified locations will be 
gradually implemented commensurate with the assumption of 
responsibility for public order and internal security of 
Palestinian police force pursuant to Article VIII above. 
Article XIV 
Israeli Withdrawal from Gaza Strip and Jericho Area 
Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area, as 
detailed in the Protocol attached as Annex ii 
Article XV 
Resolution of Disputes 
Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this 
Declaration of Principles or any subsequent agreements pertaining to 
the interim period, shall be resolved by negotiations through the 
Joint Liaison Committee to be established pursuant to Article X above 
Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be resolved by 
a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties. 
The parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating 
to the interim period, which cannot be settled through conciliation. 
To this end, upon the agreement of both parties, the parties will 
establish will establish an Arbitration Committee. 
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Article XVI 
Israeli Palestinian Co-operation concerning Regional Programs 
Both parties view the multilateral working groups as appropriate 
instrument for promoting a "Marshall Plan" the regional programs 
and other programs, including special program for the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, as indicated in the protocol attached as Annex iv. 
Article XVII 
Miscellaneous Provisions 
This Declaration of Principles will enter into force one month 
afterwards of its signing. 
All protocols annexed to this Declaration of Principles and Agreed 
Minutes pertaining thereto shall be regarded as an integral part 
thereof. 
Done in Washington D.C. this thirteenth day of September 1993. 
For the Government of Israel 
For the PLO 
Witnessed by 
The United States of America 
The Russian Federation 
Source http://www.mideastweb.org/meosint.htm 
jj.JoI.iiI. 
The Camp David Accords 
The Framework for Peace in the Middle East Preambles 
The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by 
the following: 
The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict 
between Israel and its neighbours is the United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 242, in all parts......... 
To achieve a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2 of the 
UN Charter, further negotiations between Israel and Arab nations 
were necessary for the purpose of carrying out all provisions and 
principles of Resolutions 242 and 338. 
Peace required respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity 
and political independence of every state in the area and their right 
to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries free from 
threats or acts of force. Progress toward that goal can accelerate 
movement towards a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East 
marked by the co-operation in promoting economic development, in 
maintaining stability and in assuring security. 
Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by the co-
operation between nations which enjoy normal relations. In addition, 
under the terms of peace treaties, the parties can, on the basis of 
reciprocity, agree to special security arrangements such as 
demilitarised zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, 
the presence of international force, liaison, agreed measures for 
monitoring and other arrangements that they are useful. 
Framework: 
Taking these factors into account, the parties were determined 
to reach a just, comprehensive and durable settlement of the Middle 
East Conflict through the conclusions of peace treaties based on the 
Security Council Resolution 242 and 338 in all their parts. Their 
purpose is to achieve peace and good neighbourly relations. They 
recognise that for peace to endure, it must involve all those who 
have been most deeply affected by the conflict. They, therefore, 
agree that this framework, an appropriate one, is intended by them 
to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but 
also between Israel and each one of its other neighbours which is 
prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis. With that 
objective in mind, they have agreed to proceed as follows: 
A. West Bank and Gaza: 
1. Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representative of the Palestinian 
people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the 
Palestinian problem in all its aspects. To achieve that objective, 
negotiations relating to the West Bank and Gaza should proceed in 
three stages. 
(a) Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful and 
orderly transfer authority, and taking into account the security, 
concerns of all the parties, there should be transitional arrangements 
for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. In 
order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants, under these 
arrangements the Israel military government and its civilian 
administration will be withdrawn as soon as soon as a self-governing 
authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to 
replace the existing military government. To negotiate the details of a 
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transitional arrangement, Jordan will be invited to join the 
negotiations on the basis of this framework. These new 
arrangements should give due consideration both to the principles of 
self-government by the inhabitants of these territories and to the 
legitimate security concerns of the parties involved. 
(b) Egypt, Israel and Jordan will agree on the modalities for 
establishing elected self-government authority in the West Bank and 
Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians 
from West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. 
The Parties will negotiate an agreement which will define the powers 
and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exercised in 
the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will 
take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli 
forces into specified security locations. The agreement will also 
include arrangements for assuring internal and external security and 
public order. A strong local police force will be additional, Israeli and 
Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the manning of 
control posts to ensure assure the security of the borders. 
(c) When the self-governing authority (administrative council in the 
West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional 
period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than 
the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, 
negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West 
Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbour and to conclude 
a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end of the 
transitional period. These negotiations will be conducted among 
Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the elected representatives of the 
inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Two separate but related 
committees will be convened, one committee, consisting of 
representatives of the four parties which will negotiate and agree on 
the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and its relationship with 
its neighbours, and the second committee, consisting of 
representatives of Israel and representatives of Jordan to be joined 
by the elected representatives of inhabitants of the West Bank and 
Gaza, to negotiate the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking 
into account the agreement reached in the final status of the West 
Bank and Gaza. The negotiations shall be based on all the provisions 
and principles of the Security Council Resolution 242. The 
negotiations will resolve, among matters, the location of the 
boundaries and the nature of the security arrangements. The 
solution from the negotiations must also recognise the legitimate 
rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements. In this 
way the Palestinians will participate in the determination on their 
own future through 
1. The negotiations among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and representatives 
of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to agree on the final 
status of the West Bank and Gaza and other outstanding issues by 
the end of the transitional period. 
2. Submitting their agreements to a vote by the elected 
representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. 
3. Providing for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the 
West Bank and Gaza to decide how they shall govern themselves 
consistent with the provisions of their agreement. 
4. Participating as stated above in the work of the committee 
negotiating the treaty between Israel and Jordan. 
All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to 
assure the security of Israel and its neighbours during the transitional 
this 
period and beyond. To assist in providing such security, a strong local 
police force will be constituted by the self — governing authority. It 
will be composed of inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza and the 
designated Israeli, Jordanian and Egyptian officers. 
During the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, 
Jordan and the self-governing authority will constitute a continuing 
committee to be decided by agreement on the modalities of 
admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 
War together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and 
disorders. Other matters of common concern may also be dealt with 
this committee. 
Egypt and Israel will work with each other and also with the 
other parties interested to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, 
just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the refugee 
problem. 
Egypt — Israel: 
1. Egypt - and Israel undertake not to resort to the threat or the 
use of force to settle disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by 
peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of article 33 
of the UN Charter. 
2. In order to achieve peace between them, the parties agree to 
negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three 
months from the signing of the Framework a peace treaty 
between them while inviting the other parties in the conflict to 
proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude similar 
peace in the area. The Framework for the conclusion of a peace 
treaty between Egypt and Israel will govern the peace 
negotiations between them. The parties will agree on the 
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modalities and the timetable for the implementation of their 
obligations under the treaty. 
C. Associated Principles 
1. Egypt and Israel state that the principle and provisions 
described below should apply to peace to peace to treaties 
between Israel and each of its neighbours- Egypt, Jordan Syria and 
Lebanon. 
2. Signatories Egypt and Israel state that the principles and 
provisions described below should apply to peace with one 
another. To this end, they should undertake to abide by all the 
provisions of UN Charter Steps to be undertaken in this respect 
include: 
(a) Full recognition; 
(b) Abolishing economic boycotts; 
© guaranteeing that under jurisdiction the citizens of the other 
parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law. 
Signatories should explore possibilities for economic 
development in the context of final peace treaties, with the 
objective of contributing to the atmosphere of peace, co-
operation and friendship which is their common goal. 
Claim commission may be established for the mutual settlement 
of all financial claims. 
The United States shall be invited to participate in the talks on 
matter related to the modalities of the implementation of the 
agreements and working out the timetable for the carrying out of 
the obligations of the parties. 
The United Nations Security Council shall be requested to 
endorse the peace treaties and ensure that their provisions shall 
not be violated. The permanent members of the Security Council 
shall be requested to underwrite the peace treaties and ensure 
respect of the provisions. They shall be requested to conform, 
their policies and actions, to the undertaking contained in this 
Frame-work. 
For the Government of Arab republic of Egypt: Muhammad 
Anwar al Sadat. 
State of Israel: Menachem Begin 
Witnessed by: Jimmy Carter President of the USA 
Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt 
and Israel signed at the White House on 17 September 1978 
In order to achieve peace between them, Israel and Egypt agree 
to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three 
months of the signing of this framework a peace treaty between 
them: 
It is agreed that: 
The sight of the negotiations will be under a United Nations flag 
at a location or locations to be mutually agreed. 
All of the principles of the UN Resolution 242 will be applied to 
the resolution of the disputes between Israel and Egypt. 
Unless otherwise mutually agreed terms of the peace-treaty shall 
be implemented between two and three years after the peace treaty 
is signed. 
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The following matters are agreed between the parties: 
(a) The full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the 
internationally recognised border between Egypt and 
mandated Palestine; 
(b) The withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from Sinai; 
(c) The use of air fields left by Israel near Al-Arish, Rafah, Ras 
an -- Naqab and Sharm-el Sheikh for civilian purposes only, 
including possible commercial use by all nations; 
(d) The right of free passage by ships of Israel through the 
Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal on the basis of the 
Constantinople Convention of 1888 applying to all nations, 
the Straight of Tiran 	and the Gulf of Aqaba are 
international waterways to be open to all nations for 
unimpeded and non-suspended freedom of navigation 
and over flights; 
(e) The construction of a highway between Sinai and Jordan 
near Eilat with guaranteed free and peaceful passages by 
Egypt and Jordan; 
(f) The stationing of military force listed below: 
After a peace treaty is signed, and after the interim withdrawal is 
completed, normal relations will be established between Egypt and 
Israel, including full recognition, including diplomatic economic and 
cultural relations, termination of economic boycotts and barriers to 
free movements of goods and people, and mutual protection of 
citizens by due process of law. 
Interim Withdrawal: 
Between three months and nine months after the signing of the 
peace treaty all Israeli forces will withdraw east of a line extending 
from a point east of El-Arish to Ras-Muhammad, the exact location of 
this line to be determined by mutual agreement. 
For the Government of the 
Arab republic of Egypt: 
Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat 
State of Israel: 
Menachem Begin 
Witnessed by Jimmy Carter, President of USA 
Source: The Middle East 7th ed. (Washington DC), Congressional 
Quarterly, Inc. (1990), pp.302 — 303. 
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Appendix-9 
Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum On 
The Implementation Timeline of Outstanding Commitments 
of Agreements Signed And The 
Resumption of Permanent Status Negotiation 
(WYE Two) 
The implementation of the Wye River Memorandum having 
stalled under the Netanyahu regime in Israel, in September 1999 the 
new Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Barak , and the PA President, Yasser 
4rafat, met in Egyptian resort of Sharm El- Sheikh to discuss the 
possible reactivation of the Memorandum. On 4 September the two 
signed the Sharm EI-Sheikh Memorandum (also known as Wye Two), 
Nhich detailed a revised time table for the outstanding provisions of 
the October 1998 Memorandum. The Memorandum was witnessed 
)y President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, Secretary of State Madeleine 
4lbright of the USA and King Abdullah of Jordan. 
The Government of the State of Israel and the Palestine 
-iberation Organisation (PLO) commit themselves mutual 
mplementation of the Interim Agreement and all other agreements 
:oncluded between them since September 1993 (herein after 'the 
nor agreements"), and all outstanding commitments emanating 
om prior agreements. Without derogating from the other 
?quirements of the prior agreements, the two sides have agreed as 
)flows. 
1(6 
1. Permanent Status Negotiations 
a. In the context of the implementation of the prior agreements, the 
two sides will resume the permanent status negotiations in an 
accelerated manner and will make a determined effort to achieve to 
achieve their mutual agenda i.e., the specific issues reserved for 
Permanent Status negotiations and other issues of common 
interests; 
b. The two sides reaffirm their understanding that the negotiations 
on the Permanent Status will lead to the implementation of the 
Security Council Resolution 242 and 338; 
c. The two sides will make a determined effort to conclude a 
Framework Agreement on all permanent Status issues in five months 
from the resumption of the Permanent Status negotiations; 
d. The two sides will conclude a comprehensive agreement on all 
Permanent Status issues within one year from the resumption of the 
Permanent Status negotiations; 
e. Permanent Status negotiations will resume after the 
implementation of the first stage of release of prisoners and the 
second stage of the First and Second Further Redeployment and not 
later than 13 September 1999. In the Wye River Memorandum, the 
United States has expressed its willingness to facilitate these 
negotiations. 
2. The Phase One and Two of the Further Redeployments 
1. The Israeli side undertakes the following with regard to Phase 
One and Phase Two of the Further Redeployments: 
a. On 15 September 1999, to transfer 7% from Area C to Area B; 
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b. On 15 November 1999, to transfer 2% from Area B to Area a 
and 3% from area C to Area B; 
c. On 20 January 2000, to transfer 1% from area C to Area A and 
5.1% from Area B to area A. 
2. Release of Prisoners 
a. The two sides shall establish a joint committee that shall 
follow up on matters related to the release of Palestinian 
prisoners; 
b. The Government of Israel shall release Palestinian and other 
prisoners who committed their offences prior to 13 
September 1993, and were arrested prior to 4 May 1994. The 
joint committee shall agree on the names of those who will 
be released in the first two stages. Those lists shall be 
recommended to the relevant authorities through the 
monitoring and steering committee; 
c. The first stage of release of prisoners shall be carried out on 
5 September 1999 and shall consist of 200 prisoners. The 
second stage of release of prisoners shall be carried out on 8 
October 1999 and shall consist of 150 prisoners. 
d. The joint committee shall recommend further lists of names 
to be released to the relevant authorities through the 
monitoring and steering committee; 
e. The Israeli side shall aim to release Palestinian prisoners 
before next Ramadan. 
3. Committees 
a. The Third Further Redeployment Committee shall commence 
its activities not later than 13 September 1999; 
l63 
b. The Monitoring and Steering Committee, all interim 
Committees (i.e. Civil Affairs Committee, Joint Economic 
Committee, Joint Standing Committee, Legal committee, 
people to people), as well as Wye River Memorandum 
Committee shall resume and/or continue their activity, as 
the case may be, not later than 13 September 1999. The 
Monitoring and Steering Committee will have on its agenda, 
inter alia, the year 2000, Donor/PA projects in areas C, and 
the issue of Industrial estates; 
c. The Continuing Committee on displaced persons shall 
resume its activity on 1 October 1999 (Article XXVII, Interim 
Agreement); 
d. Not later than 30 October 1999, the two sides shall 
implement the recommendations of the Ad-hoc Economic 
Committee 111-6, Wye River Memorandum). 
4. Safe Passage 
a. The operation of the Southern Route of the Safe Passage for 
the movement of persons, vehicles and goods will start on 1 
October 1999 (Annex I, article X, Interim Agreement) in 
accordance with the details of operation which will be 
provided for, in the Safe passage Protocol that will be 
concluded by the two sides not later than 30 September 
1999; 
b. The two sides will agree on the specific location of the 
crossing point of the Northern Route of the Safe Passage as 
specified in Annex 1, Article X, provision c-4 in the Interim 
Agreement not later than 5 October 1999. 
c. The safe Passage Protocol applied to the Southern Route of 
the Safe Passage with shall apply to the Northern Route of 
the Safe Passage with relevant agreed modifications; 
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d. Upon the agreement on the location of the crossing point of 
the Northern Route of the Safe Passage, construction of the 
needed facilities and related procedures shall commence and 
shall be on going. At the same time, temporary facilities will 
be established for the operation of the Northern Route not 
later than four months from the agreement on the specific 
location of the crossing points. 
e. In between the operation of the Southern crossing point of 
the Safe Passage and the Northern crossing a point of the 
Safe Passage, Israel will facilitate arrangements for the 
movement between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, using 
non safe Passage routes other than the Southern Routs of 
the Safe Passage; 
f. The location of the crossing points shall be without prejudice 
to the Permanent Status negotiations (Annex I, Article X, 
provision e, Interim Agreement). 
5. Gaza Sea Port 
6. The two sides have agreed on the following principles to 
facilitate and enable the construction works of the Gaza Sea 
Port. The principles shall not prejudice or pre-empt the 
outcome of the negotiations on the Permanent Status: 
The Israeli side agrees that the Palestinian side shall commence 
construction works in and related to the Gaza Sea Port on 1 October 
1999; 
a. The two sides agree that the Gaza Sea port will not be 
operated in any way before reaching a joint Sea Port 
agreement on all aspects of operating the port, including 
its security. 
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b. The Gaza Sea Port is a special case, like the Gaza Air port, 
being situated in an area under the responsibility of the 
Palestinian side, and serving as an international passage. 
Therefore, with a conclusion of a joint Sea Port Protocol, 
all activities and arrangements relating to the construction 
of the port shall be in accordance with the provisions of 
the Interim Agreement, especially those relating to 
international passages, as adopted in the Gaza Airport 
Protocol; 
c. The construction shall ensure adequate provision for 
effective security and customs inspection of people and 
goods as well as the establishment of a designated 
checking area in the port.; 
d. In this context, the Israeli side will facilitate on an ongoing 
basis the works related to the construction of the Gaza 
Sea Port, including the movement in and out of the Port of 
vessels, equipment, resources, and materials required for 
the construction of the Port; 
e. The two sides will co-ordinate such works as goods 
movement through a joint mechanism. 
7. Hebron Issues 
The Shuhada Road in Hebron shall be opened for the movement 
of Palestinian vehicles in two phases. The first phase has been carried 
out, and the second phase shall be carried out not later than 30 
October 1999; 
The wholesale market Hasbahe will be opted not later than 1 
November 1999, in accordance with the arrangements which will be 
agreed upon by the two sides; 
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A high-level joint Liaison Committee will convene not later than 
13 September 1999 to review the situation in the Tomb of 
Patriarchs/Al-Haram Al Ibrahim (Annex I, Article VII, Interim 
agreement and as per 15 January 1998, US Minute of Discussion). 
8. Security 
The two sides, in accordance with the prior agreements, will act 
to ensure the immediate efficient and effective handling of any 
incident involving a threat or act of terrorism, violence or incitement, 
whether committed by Palestinians or Israelis. To this end they will 
co-operate in the exchange of information and coordinate policies 
and activities. Each side shall immediately and effectively respond to 
the occurrence of an act of terrorism or incitement and shall take all 
necessary measures to prevent such occurrences; 
Pursuant to the prior agreement, the Palestinian side will 
undertake to implement its responsibilities for security, security co-
operation, ongoing obligations and other issues emanating from the 
prior agreement, including in particular, the following obligations 
emanating from the Wye River Memorandum. 
Continuation of the programme for the collection of the illegal 
weapons, including reports; 
Apprehension of the suspects, including reports; 
Forwarding the list of Palestinian policemen to the Israeli side not 
later than 13 September 1999; 
Beginning of the review of the list by Monitoring and Steering 
Committee not later than 15 October 1999; 
The two sides call upon the international donor community to 
enhance its commitment and financial support to the Palestinian 
economic development and the Israeli Palestinian Peace Process. 
9. Recognising the necessity to create a positive environment for 
the negotiations, neither side shall initiate or take any step that 
will change the status of the West Bank or the Gaze Strip in 
accordance with the Interim Agreement. 
10. Obligations pertaining to dates which occur on holidays or 
Saturdays shall be carried out on the first subsequent working 
day. 
This memorandum will enter into force one week from the date 
of its signature. 
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Appendix-10 
Israeli-Arab/Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Time Line 
BC 
1300-965 The Hebrew tribes and the Philistines migrate into 
Canaan. The Hebrew tribes defeat the Canaanites and, 
after a struggle, the Philistines. The Kingdom of Israel is 
established with Saul as the first king. King David 
establishes Jerusalem as the capital. 
961-922 Role of the King Solomon and construction of the Temple 
in Jerusalem. Solomon's reign was followed by the division 
of the land into two kingdoms — Northern (Israel) and the 
Southern (Judah). 
721 	The Northern Kingdom falls to Assyria. 
586 	The Southern Kingdom falls to Babylon, which destroys 
the Temple and takes many of the people into exile. 
539 	The Babylonian Empire falls to the Persian Empire. Persian 
emperor Cyrus allows some Jews to return from exile. 
520-515 The Temple in Jerusalem is rebuilt as the Second Temple. 
331 	Alexander the Great defeats the Persian Empire. Following 
his death, the land is subject to rule by Egypt and Syria. 
63-61 	The Romans conquers Jerusalem. 
70 	A Jewish revolt against Rome is put down and the Second 
Temple was destroyed. This marks the beginning of the 
Jewish Diaspora. 
133-135 	Romans suppress a Jewish revolt, killing or forcing almost 
all the Jews of Judaea into exile. The province Syria and 
Palestina forbid Jews to dwell in Jerusalem. 
Ca. 325 	The Roman Emperor Constantine, a Christian strengthens 
his own religion throughout the region. 
Ca. 570 	The Prophet Muhammad is born in Mecca, establishes 
Islam as religion. 
638 	Muslims from the Arabian Peninsula conquer Jerusalem. 
705 	The Dome of the Rock mosque is completed by Caliph 
Abd-a-(Malik Ibn Marwan. 
715 	The Al-Aqsa Mosque is built by Caliph Khalid Bin Waleed. 
1099 	The crusaders conquer Jerusalem, killing many Jewish and 
Muslim inhabitants and expelling surviving Jews. 
1517 	The Ottoman Empire conquers Palestine. 
1896 	Theodor Herz), an Austrian Zionist leader, publishes `Der 
Judenstaat", advocating the creation of a Jewish state. 
1897 	The first Zionist Congress meets in Basel, Switzerland and 
establishes the World Zionist Organization (WZO). 
1914 	World War I breaks out. The Ottoman Empire joins the 
war on Germany's side and is defeated. 
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1916 	The British Commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry Mc Mahon 
promises the Arab leadership post — war independence 
for former Ottoman Arab provinces. Meanwhile, the 
secret Sykes — Picot Agreement between war victor, 
Britain and France, divided the region under their joint 
control for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine 
1917 	The Balfour Declaration, a letter sent by British Foreign 
Secretary Arthur James Balfour to Baron de Rothschild, 
pledges the British support for the establishment of 
Jewish State in Palestine. 
1918 	Britain occupied the region at the World War II and was 
assigned as the mandatory power by the League of 
Nations on 25 April 1920. 
1922 	Council of the League of Nations divides Arab lands; 
British mandate for Palestine established. 
1933 	Hitter's rise to power in Germany. Jewish immigration 
into Palestine increases. 
1937 	The Peel Commission report is published, recommending 
the partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states. 
1938 	Palestinian and Arab representatives rejected the Report. 
Violent opposition continued until 1938 when it was 
crushed with reinforcements from the UK. 
1939-45 September 1939: World War II breaks out. The Holocaust 
takes place during World War II. Jewish migration into 
Palestine increases. 
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1945 	The United Nations is established. The British Government 
issues Defence (Emergency) Regulations, authorising 
military rule in Palestine. 
1947 	UNGA resolution 181 is passed, partitioning Palestine into 
Jewish and Arab states. 
1948 	Israel declares statehood on May 15 as the last British 
troops withdrew. Arab states declare war on Israel. 
Palestinians remember 15 May as "al-Nakba", or the 
catastrophe. 
1964 	PLO is established with the stated aim of "eliminating 
Zionism in Palestine". 
1967 	The Six Day War of June occurs. Israel captures, the Gaza, 
West Bank, East Jerusalem Sinai and The Golan Heights, 
creating additional Palestinian refugees. The PLO moves 
its headquarters to Jordan. The UN Security Council passes 
Resolution 242 which calls for Israeli withdrawal and 
establishes the "land for peace" principle. 
1968-69 AI-Fatah gains formal control of PLO and Arafat becomes 
its Chairman. 
1973 	Yom Kippur War — Egypt and Syria attack Israel. UNSC 
resolution 338 calls for cease fire and negotiations 
between the parties. 
1974 	The Arab League declares the PLO to be the legitimate 
representative of the people of Palestine. The UN 
recognises the Palestinian's right to sovereignty and 
grants observer's status to the PLO. 
l978 	Camp David Accords_ Historic peace accords between 
Israel and Egypt, signed by Menachem Begin and Anwar 
Sadat, with President Jimmy Carter signing as a witness. 
The two nations agreed to negotiate Palestinian 
autonomy measures in the Israeli — Occupied West Bank 
and Gaza Strip. 
1987 	The first Intifada — a Palestinian popular uprising begins in 
Gaza and spreads to the West Bank. Stone throwing 
Palestinian teenagers attack Israeli soldiers. 
1988 	The PLO accepts UNSC resolution 242 and 338, implicitly 
recognising Israel. The US opens dialogue with the PLO. 
The Hamas is founded with a charter advocating the 
destruction of Israel. 
1993 	PLO recognises Israel as a state renounces the use of 
violence, and renders inoperative those articles of the 
Palestinian Covenant which deny Israel's right to 	exist. 
Israel recognises the PLO as the representative of the 
Palestinian people. 
	
'93 	Israel and PLO agree the Declaration of Principles 
recognise their mutual, legitimate and political rights. 
Outline the process to implement resolution 242 and 338 
and allow Palestinians to govern themselves. 
94 	Gaza-Jericho Agreement (Oslo l) — Detailed agreement on 
how to disengage Israeli security, civil affairs, legal 
matters, and economic relations and allow Palestinian 
control in areas of Gaza and Jericho (West Bank). 
1995 	Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II) — Allows for "safe passage" of 
Palestinians between Gaza Strip and West Bank, outlines 
redeployment of troops from within occupied territories. 
1998 	Wye River Memorandum — Meant to clarify ambiguities of 
the Interim Agreement. 
1999 Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum — Restates the 
commitment of both sides to the implementation of all 
agreements arrived at since 1993, also intended to 
overcome more ambiguities from the Wye River 
Memorandum. 
July 2000 Camp David Talks — President Clinton, Israeli Prime 
Minister Ehud Barak, and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat met 
to discuss the prospects of peace. They did not come to an 
agreement, but did issue a Trilateral Statement. 
28 Sept.2000 Al-Aqsa Intifada breaks out after Israeli Opposition 
leader Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount, which is 
also the location of Haram al-Sharief, holy to the Muslim. 
Oct.2000 The US presides over a summit at the Egyptian resort 
town of Sharm aI-Sheikh, which produces a plan to brings 
to an end weeks of Palestinian-Israeli violence. The plan 
unravels soon after it is agreed upon. 
Jan. 2001 The Taba Talks — Intense peace talks between Israel and 
the PA in Taba, Egypt ended without agreement. They 
issued a joint agreement. A comprehensive agreement 
was thwarted by the election campaign and subsequent 
election of Ariel Sharon as Prime Minister (February) 
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